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I.

THE CHARGES.

It is alleged under Count I of the Indictment that the defendant
WEIZSAECKER comTiiitted Crimes against peace in that he participated in the
initiation of invasions of other countries and vrars of aggression in vio

lation of international laus and treaties^ including but not limited to the

planningj preparation_, initiation and v/aging of v/ars of aggression_, and
v/ars in violation of international treaties, agreements and assurandes.

The acts recognized as Crimes against peace are set forth in Article n
of Control Council Law No. 10.

I'VSIZSAECKER is charged under Count II of the Indictment with particiy

pation during a period of years preceding QMay 1945^ as leader, organizer,
instigator and accomplice in the formulation and e^cecution of a common

plan and conspiracy to commit, and which involved the conimission of Crimes

against peace (including the acts constituting iar Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity, which v/ere committed as an integral part of such Crimes aga.inst

peace) as defined by Control Council Law No. 10, and is individually re
sponsible for his ov/n rots and for all acts committed by any persuns in
the execution of such comraon plan and conspiracy.

The proof adduced rela

tive to Counts I, III, V, VI and VII forms a part of the said common plan
and conspiracy, and such proof is incorporated in Count II for the sub
stantiation of the allegations in Count XI.

MZSAECICER is charged under Count UI of the Indictment with the
commission of war crimes in that he participated during the period from

September 1939 to May 1945 in atrocities and offenses against prisoners
of war and members of the armed forces of nations then at vrar vrith the

Third Reich or under the belligerent control of, or military occupation
✓

,

^

•

by Germany, including murder, ill treatment, enslavement, brutalities,
I

cruelties and other inhumane acts.
set forth in Article n

The acts recognized as vjar Crimes are

of Control Council Low No. 10.

VffilZSAECKER is charged under Count V of the Indictment with the corrnnission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity as defined in Article II
of Control Council Law No. 10 in that ho participated in atrocities and

offenses, including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, im

prisonment, killing of hostages^ torture, persecutions on political.
-1-

rP.cicLl and religious grounds rnd other inhumane and criminal acts against
German nationals and members of the civilian populations of countries and

territories under the belligerent occupation of_, or othen^dse controlled

by Germany^ plunder of public and private property^ v^anton destruction of
cities^ toms and villages^ and devastation not justified by military necessity.

Under Count VI of the Indictment ^ V/EIZSAECKER is charged vdth the

Commission of Vjar Crimes and Crimes against Humanity as defined in Article
II of control Council Lav; No. 10 in that he participated in the plunder

of public and private propertjr^ exploitation^ spoliation and other offenses

against property and the civiliaun economies of countries and territories
v;hich came under the belligerent occupation of Germany in the course of its
invasions and aggressive vrars.

Under Count VII of the indictmont, iVEIZSAECIOiK is charged vdth the
commission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity as defined in Article

II of Control Council Lav; Mo. 10 in that he participated in the enslave

ment and deportation to slave labor on a gigantic scale of members of the
civilian populations of countries and territories under the belligerent

©ccupcation of or otherv/isc controU.od by the Third Reich; enslavement of
concentration camp inmatos including Gorman na.tionals; tho use of prisoners
of v;ar in vrar operations and vrorlc having a direct relation to ^;ar opera

tions; and the illtreatmont, tcrrorization^ torture and murder of enslaved
persons^ including prisoners of ivar.

Under Count VIII of tho Indictment, VISIZSAEGKLR is charged rdth

membership, subsequent to 1 September 1939^ in Die schutzstaffeln dor
Mationalsozlalistischcn uoutschon Arbeitorpartei (commonly knovm as the

"SS") declared to bo criminal by the international Ililitary Tribunal and
paragraph 1 (d) of Article XI of Control Council Lovr Mo« 10»

1-a

:

tb'i.

n.

BICGR^^iPIlIC/'i Ci\REER.

The defendant VEIZSAECI^ER
of protestnnt feith.

born in stuttgcrt/'l^bcrttcmbergj in 18S2^

Ho demonstrated from the very inccptioi; of his offi-.

cial career that ho vras a fervent nationcJast ivho devoted himself incessantly

to the realization of the dream of an r.ll-pov/crful Fatherland#

Immediately

after completion of his high school education he became an officer in the
German N^avy^ because.

"The Navy had something tempting for mc as a collecting
point of the German races for the common service,"

(T. 7593).

For the ne:ct twenty years .he assiduously devoted himself to his naval
duties,

pursuant to the Kaiser's visions of world conquest, the German Navy

during this period prepared to challenge the British for supremacy of the
seas.

During the First TorId Tar VJEIZSAECKER saiv active duty, participating,

among other operations, in the ill-fated battle of Jutland; and during the

last months of the vfor as Germany plunged into defeat, VJEIZSAECKER served
#•

as Field H<arshal Hindcnborg's Naval Liaison Officer,

^

(pros,- Exh, 4, NG-3708,

D. B. 1, p. 21).
ITith the German Navj'* sv;opt from the seas and in accordance vrith his

personal belief that the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles
vrould never permit it to regain its former strength, VJEIZSalECKER elected to

enter the diplomatic corps of the newly constituted '/eima.r Republic.

After

a brief assignment as Naval Attache idth the German Legation at the Hague,
T/EEZSAECKER was accepted into the foreign service in 1920,

Under the ^Yeimar

•Republic he received the routine assignracnts accorded to all young diploma-ts
and served as Germaj,i Consul at Basic, ST^itacrland, from 1921 to 1924, as

Legation Councillor of the Gorm.'^n Legation at Copenhagen from 1924 until
1927, and as Senior Legation Councillor at the Berlin office he dclt vdth

problems concerning the League of Nations and disr.raiamcnt questions from
1927 to 1931.

From 1931 until the suromor of 1933 he functioned as the German

Minister in Norway (Ibid., p, 21/22).
It was only under Hitler's Third Reich that ho rose rapidly to promin

ence.

In the summer of 1933 he occupied the strategic post of German Ministor

to S^vitzcrland; and within throo yea-rs he v/a.s olova.tod temporarily to tho

key position of chief of the political Division of the Foreign Office.
-2-
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With

tho approTOl of the Deputy of the Fuehrorji YmZS.WlUM

promoted in May

1937 to the rank of Ministerial Director c^nd confirnGd as Chief of the

Political Division, (T» 194^9/490, and pros, .S>ch, hy

D- B* 3.^

p. 22). TJhen Ribbentropj tho nov; Foreign Ministor, in the spring of 193Sj
mado important changes in personnel in the Foreign Office in "order t» promote
a. new and dynamic policy^ it v:as the defendant whom he personally chose as

his State secretary and permanent deputy 'in the first days of April 193^*
For the next five years, until tho spring of 1943^ "JEIZSAECKSR held this high
V

position, at which time ho a.ssumod the position of German Ambassador to the
Holy gee.

He hold this post in the German foreign sei*vicc until the Nazi

regime cruirblcd in Iiay 1945. (pros, Ibdi* 4^ NG—370^5^

B- Ij P- 22).

Immediately after his accession to the State secretaryship, Vffi2ZSAECICE;R
joined the ranks of the NSDAP.

Simultaneously, he enlisted his services in

tho S3, and on 30 January 1942 this self-styled defeatist vrr.s promoted by

tho vratchdog of Nazism, Himnaor, to the rank of Brigadier General (Brigadefuehrer) in the SS*

(ibid,, P, 22).

Thus I'TECZSAEGKmR Is personal story is one of life-long devotion to a
groa.ter Germany, His lifers history closely paralleled German a.spira.tions
for world conquest.

It mattered not whether he, as an officer and subso✓

.

ciucntly as a diplomat, served tho Kaiser, the Republic, or the Fuehrer,

It

is noteworthy, hovfcver, that' it was only under the Third Rcich that ho sky

rocketed to prominence and reached the highest pinnacle of the foreign
service.

Regardless of tho seniority of others, he v/as•deliberately

selected by the Na.zi leadership to hold the reins of foreign policy,
ITOIZSAECKER stated that he lived solely for "his career and foreign

politics",

(t. 7597)* He vividly described his personal beliefs and de

clared that during his 45 years of service ho constantly remained an ardent

nationalist, whether it was the monarchy, the Republic, or tho Fuehrer to
which ho lent his genius and untiring efforts.

He testified:

"But a.s a'civil servant, one does not servo a con

stitution, but tho Fatherland,"

(T. 7595)* (Under

lining supplied).

-3-
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III.

STATE SECRET'^iRY's SCOP]

OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

As stiiitG socretary of the Foreign Office under the Third Reich, VJEIZV

^

S/iECICSR vras second only to the Foreign Minister^ Ribbentrop^ in steering
Nuzi foreign policj®

In his official capacity^ he exorcised the greatest

influence in shaping Hitler's diplomatic preparations and plans which v/ere

the necessary prerequisite to military aggression* YJEIZSAEGKIH served as
the permanent Deputy of Ribbentrop for the entire field of diplomacy and had

the right to act in the najne of the Foreign Minister,

(T» 316/317).

Such

extensive authority enhanced VffilZSASCKER' s ability to mold and implement the
continuing aggressive policies of Greater Germany.

\Yith RibbentropIs specific authorization^ the defendant handled the
important, current diplomatic relations maintained betv/een the Foreign Office
and the various diplomatic missions in Berlin.

(t< 4992; S097).

This unprece

dented delegation of one of the most vital functions of the Foreign Minister
to the control of the defendant was attributable to the confidence that

Ribbentrop had in him. YJEIZS/^CKER' s experience, ability and extensive dip
lomatic contacts made him the ideal exponent of the nevr German foreign policy.

(T. 4992).

It must be kept continually in mind that the machinery of diplomacy

T/as these very contacts between diplor.iats, and that it was the only medium
by which Hitler's decisions could be transformed into reality,

iVEIZSAECKERj

in his conta.cts with the top ranking diplomats of every nation, made the

necessary promises, ga.vo the false assurances and continuously influenced
policy, as the evidence hereinafter presented vrill prove beyond any reason
able doubt,

Ribbentrop also dologatod sole supervision and full responsibility to
his state Secretary for conducting the general course of business of the

fe':.

Foreign Office, As in the past, all the divisions of the Foreign Office (in

cluding the press, Radio, Cultural Divisions and Division Doutschland) wore

if.

directly subordinate to the state secretary and executed his orders.

Under

National Socialism the eececutivc powers of governmental officials v/ere sub-

stantia,lly enhanced (T» 345)j and Rlbbontrop gave aj-j;izSjiECKER full latitude ^
in directing the policy of the Foreign Office v/ith his general authorization,
>-<4-
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ytfilitir.ftS Miiiai'- till I

rjhon Ribbentrop wcs at his Fic3,d Hordpunrtors, or othoriTiso absent, HEIZ-

SASCKSR was in full charge of the Foreign Office ""t 3c3^1i^^«

The divisions

of the Foreign Office nornially channeled all correspondence and reports to
Ribbentrop via the State Secretary, and as the evidence v/oll rcvoal_, fev/
wore the exceptions to this rule.

The state Secretary presided over the time-honored institution of the

Foreign Office, the morning meetings of all divisions of the Foreign Office

(including the newly created divisions such as Division Dcutschland). (pros.
EKh. a-417, NG-5OG3, D. B. 205, P. 1). These daily conferences vraro the
most important organ for coordinating the activities and policies of the
various divisions,

Dr, Albrccht, chief of the Legal Division, testified,

and was not challenged during cross exajnination, that after a brief report
on the news and propaganda slogans of the day.

i'Follov7ing this di.scussicn cvorj'body present could ask

questions T.hich he thought should bo discussed in this
circle, so that the opinion of the other nombers and
the State Secretary's decision could be obtained.

The

State Secretary often made use of the opportunity of these

- "l',,

conferences in order to announce directives of general

interest or to discuss some departmental matter which'
ho deemed necessary to be discussed in a vridcr circle,

or about A'^ich ho ATantod to get personal information."
Uhid,, p. 2).

This device enabled the defendant to maintain constant control and daily

snporvision, over all of tlae activities of the various divisions of the

Foreign Office and insure that they performed those duties in accordance
VTith the policies of the Third Roich*

All incoming correspondence, including tclegrajns, v;cro routed to the ^
state Secretary as a matter of coAorse with the full approval of Ribbentrop,

Uoroovor, telegrajus classified as "Soaled jw-tters" (yorschlusssachcn) Avorc
forwarded to VEIZSASCKHE's office.

It was his responsibility to determine

T^ich officials wore to rccoivo such telegrams, and distribution ivas made

accordingly by his office, Fvon vrhen the telegram was addressed to the
Reich liinistcr personally, it A;as VffilZS/UCKER who suggested the distribution
list to Ribbentrop, (t. 3262/3265). This procedure also applied to all
outgoing reports so classified, iThethcr emanating from Ribbentrop or various
divisions of the Foreign Office.

This classification was reserved only for

those nuatters of the utmost importancoj and so secret Arero they that offi
cials received such documents In sealed envelopes and A/ere required to sign
-5-
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for them,

(T. 3281).

Tho dcleg-tion of ouch cuthoritv to VffilZSAECK^R by

Ribbentrop in largo part of Itself explodes the defendant is contention
that the Foreign Minister cautiously vdthheld all in^ortant data from him,
VEIZSAECKERj on 1? April 19A3> in c^qDlaining to sonnleithner, of
Ribbentrop Is personal staffs the error of the Foreign Office Tcletj'pG Con-

'trol Office in not transmitting a secret telegram oi'iginating from Ribbcn-

tropts field headquarters to the Reich Economic Ministry^ states in part:
"According to its usual routine after dispatching

siuila.r tclogranis to other departments (of the Roich
Govermicnt)^ it'sent copies to the office of the
State Secretary, i^hich office upon my directive, fur
nished the departments concefnod of the office

(Foreign office) vdth copies," ^(pros, Sxh. C-3i2,
MCt-5450, D.
204, p. US) (underlining supplied).
This evidence is in contract to VJEIZS/lECKSR's contention that during the

*

v;ar Ribbentrop often did not umt him or the divisions of the Foreign Office
at Berlin to see outgoing telegrams whidh originated at the Fiold Head—
<luartors.

All German diplomatic missions abroad Y/ore subordinate to the State
Secretary,

Thoy wore the groping diplomatic tentacles of the Nazi octopus

and put into execution the policies formulated in Berlin.

The evidence as,

f

hcrcina.ftor discussed demonstra.tos that V/EIZS/iECICER could and did issue

direct orders to the Gorman missions abroad, on his ovjn authority as state

k*-

Secretary, as to the policies to be observed.

Further, the state secretary

continuously sent out circular telegrams upon his owe responsibility or in
accordance Tvith Ribbentrop ts general instructions in order to furnish the
missions abroad v/lth vital information and lay dov/n the uniform policies to

^

be follovrcd,
✓

V'/hcncver he desired, the state secretary rccaJlod ambassadors and
Legation hea.ds from abroad to report to him. In addition, due to Ribben
trop is aversion to oral discussions, he frequently entrusted I'JEIZSAECKER.

Vfith the responsibility of receiving German diplomats v/ho returned from
abroad and instructing them in the policies to bo pursuod« V/EIZS/JiICKER

hltoself, time and again admitted that the old officials r/ore responsible to
him and conducted thomsel'ves pursua,nt to his orders,
✓

In the hierarchy of the Germ.an civil service, VJEEZSAECKEH occupied the
position of a top political scrvr.nt of the Tbird Roich, As such, he v;as
-6-
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obligr.ted to adhere to the political.of his government in the performa.ncc of his officirl duties; and under the existing rogimo ho would

have been immediately removed from his office if his political attitudo

and policies did not correspond witli the views of the Fuehrer- (T- 133-6/
1317). Howovcr_, even this law did not obligate him to follov/ superior orders
viiich constituted violations' of the penal lavrs.

(T« 3^9)•

Before the defendant 'I'l/EICZSAECKSR became State socrotaj?y in 1938j he

hold the position of chief of the political Division_ from the summer of 1936
to the spring of 193^. (pros. Ipdi. I+y NG—3706j D- B- 1^ P- 22). In this
capacity he functioned as the deputy to the State sucrota.ry and participated^

among other activities^ in the aggression against Austria (as will bo horo^—
after shown). For purposes of brevity, that portion of the prosecution
against the defendant y/oormann, defining his position and scop of responsi
bility as Chief of the political Division, is incorporated heroin by refer
ence and made a.n integral part of this brief.

(.v;
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IV.

CEBISS AGAINST PE.'iCE:

COUNTS I

& U.

"-r-—

A.

INTRODUCTTON,

TiTith the exception of Ribbentrop^ no jTian bears graver responsibility
than the defendant VffilZSAECKER for the formulation^ implementation and
execution of tlie foreign policy of the Tliird Reich,

As State secretary^ he

vrielded large influence over the planning and preparation of the diplomatic
campaigns that served as the necessary'' prelude to aggression.

Through the medium of foreign policy^ backed by the armed might of
GermanyHitler ruthlessly expanded the boundaries of Germany at the expense
of her hapless neighbors.

It v;as the Fuehrer Ivho. made the fateful^ initial

decision earmarking a. nation for subjugation^ but then the German diplomats
wore given the task of creating the policy to transform this decision into
reality.

VJEEZSAECKFR shares full responsibility v.dth his Foreign Minister

for the creation and utiliza.tion of the'diplomatic machinery which success

fully effected the diplomatic planning, preparation and vrcging of tho wars
ef aggression,
ff«

V

VJEIZS;^KERfs person v:as vfoll suited to fill the important role assigned

to him by Ribbentrop and Hitler,

Ho, it is true, was-in.somo-respects only

a. liikewarm ITational socialist^ but his fervent nationa.lism made him a willing
partner to tho Nazi's plans of aggrandizement.

As an able diplomat of long

experience, ISIZSAECKHR expertly shaped the crude plots of the Nazi loaders
into a deceptive and surprisingly effective foreign policy.
SiA'V V.

In his ovm defense VffilZS/iSCKER strongly contended that he possessed a

Dr. Jokyll~Mr. Hyde coirplex in rcvorsej by day he sinned and at night ho
attenpted to undo his v/rongs,

.During his testimony the Tribunal witnessed

a similar metamorphosis; on direct exajnination he was soft-spoken and seem

ingly candid; on cross ox'T.iination -^nd during questioning by the members
of the Tribunal ho became Gva.sivo, and occa.sionally arrogant.

His memory

faltered, and though the questioning v;a.s pursucant to tho lines of his direct
testimony, he cautiously evaded any direct reply*

He himself frequently

mentioned his "double-tongued" policy (t. 7717); vrhcn his "yell of selfrighteous indignation was drarm aside during his testimony, tho Tribunal

vfas in a position to determine for itself the truth of this solf-character-8-

ization.

•fllfflT

•

VJEIZS/lECKKRj by embodying ell the clengerous chnrecteristics of a

diplomat in the bed scnsc_, rres TTell^uelified to insure the fulfillment of
the Fuehrer's policy Td.th the necessary finesse and duplicity. His reti
cence end inscrutability served to camouflage the l-jaziis objectives end

confuse their opponents. It must be borne in mind that no able diplomat
could be found in the old ranl^s of the party.

VJEIZSAmCIffiH's e:<port knovrledge

and v/holeheartcd cooperation was thus essential to the accomplishment of
Gorman foreign policy,

VJEIZSAECKSR's services v;erc imperatively required during the era of ^
/

aggression to overcome Ribbentropis shortcomings. Hitler and Ribbcntrop^

fully realizing that they were not versed in the intricate nuances of

diplomacy^ needed VffilZSAECKER's long experience and diplomatic skill to
breathe life into their schemes. VJEIZS/^CKER could bo bland and charming

when the occasion demanded itj and over the years this cultured and intclll- ^

gent diplomat had made many friends in official circles of all nations. Thus,,

Ribbcntrop and Hitler, almost instinctively, seized upon him as the man most
capable of executing the ancient formula; divide and conquer,

YffilZSAECKER vmllingly lent himself to bocor.dng, together rdth Ribbcntrop,

the leading exponent of diploma.tic blackmails Hitler and Ribbcntrop could
never hope to gain the confidence of foreign diplomats, but VJEIZSAEGKER

easily acquired their full trust and cleverly used it to further German

plans of aggression. Thus, in an unprecedented move, the Foreign Minister
turned over to his State Secretary alraost all contacts vrith foreign and oven
Gorman diplomats.

The evidence has conclusively establisned that .JEIZS/tECKER was c, mi.star

of diploma.tic finesse and chicanery. His technique was gear-cd to the in
tricate turnings of the Fuehrer's policies. During tlie initial stages of

preparation for an aggressive act, he was often soft-spoken, charming and
seemingly helpful in his conversations vdth foreign diplomats. Through
those methods of duplicity Gemanyts potential foes vrero lulled into a.
false sense of security, and the political isolation of the victim astutely

accomplished. Foreign statesmen heeded his council, and VJEIZSAECKER. by
a skillful blending of half-truths and falsehoods, was thus able to manu
facture the necessary prote:cts that Hitler demanded to clothe his aggressive
-9^

Hlrflr^^tl•^>"liVn^l«i ill II ii?i.Vili ^

.

acts behind n snokoscreen of nlloged provocation.

The fblame the poles"

crjnpaign (pros, Bxh. 144^ MG—20l6_, D- B- 4—P, S2) is an outstanding
exanple of this, VffilZS/iECKER , on 5 April 1939, issued a directive to the
Geriunn Ai-ibcissador at TJhrsav: v/hich stated:
"Our offer made to poland vas made but once, Apperentlv Ihc Polish Government did not entirel^r compre

hend the significance of this offer.
that,

V/O cannot help

fhe future vfill show v/hother'Poland v/as'well'

adviscdri" (pros, Eidi. 144, HG—20l6, D. B» 4-A, P* S2),

rjEIZS/iECKZR also layed dovai' the general lino of policy to be observed ??hcn
he stated;

m.7c must prevent polajid from throvdng the ball back
to us and later on making out that vre had disregarded'

a polish offerc" (pros, Exh, 144, NG—2016, D. B» 4—A,
p. 82).

The evidence also reveals that when it promoted I>ra,3i policy, IJEIZSAECKER

•Would convenientlj'' remove his velvet gloves and bccorae ha,rsh and arrogant.
As vdll be shovjn heroina.ftcr, vZEIZS.^GKBR's stormy sessions with the French

Ambassador Coulondre (pros, Exh. 3537, tTG-^i-SOO, D. B» 97—A, P* 119) on the
very day that Gorman troops marched into Czechoslovakia, poignantly illus
trates this.

^"^EIZS/1]CKIIE to some extent revealed this chameloon-liko change

of character to the Tribunal during his testimony.

The evidence has established that the same pattern of foreign policy

was oraployed over and over again with deadly monotony preceding each novj"
nggrcssivc act, prior to the wa,r, VJEIZSAECKSR actively participated in the
bloodless conquests of Austria and Czechoslovakia;, in essence these tv/o

a.ggrcssivo acts wore diplomatic triumphs, for the objectives were attained
v/ithout resort to the uncertainties of armed conflict.

During this period

"•JEIZS/JIX^KER uncorprorrlsingly refused to surrender any of Hitleris objectives,
Ho cleverlj'- insisted that Europe in the name of peace should stand aside and
permit tlie Third Reich to achieve its "legitimate" interests.

The throat

of total vjar^ unless the Fuehrer's demands vrcro mct^ 'was over in the back
ground of his conversations,

VJhon the Alliod nations at long last refused

to yield, the second 'Torld a/ar erupted.

In the pages of the German ajhite

Book, which reviewed the official Nazi justification for this aggression,
the name of the state sooi'el'''-ry looms large.

After the outbreak of war, VffilZS/iECKER attuned his efforts to the mili

tary roquiromonts. Foreign policy now dictated that pretexts for hggressioh
••10-w

be crcr'.tod c.nd th.-t the country r.ttaciced be conpelled to yield v/ith a mm.
mun of resistance.

The evidence has shor-m that DerLoark, in the fact of

Gernanyfs ovcvv-ihelmiig nilitary strength;, capitulated. Although in vainj
^

✓

other countriesj a.s Bclgiugi^ vfere similarly threatened th270ug*h diplomatic
channels.

The evidence has established that the personal rola.tions between TJKIZ-

S/iECKER and the Foreign Minister vfcrc not cordial and occasionally resulted
in heated arguments. In his defense, VJElZSAECICSR seized upon this point
in an attempt to confuse the issue. At groat length his defense labored

the issue, portraying VJEIZSAECKER as the chajapion of tlie old officials^ and
alone bearing the full force of pahbentroprs venom and scorn. However,

proof adduced from almost all of l^JEIZSAICICER's witnesses and affiants demon
strated how exa.ggoratod and distorted a stor^'" this "U'as.

Vfitness after v/itnoss revealed that Hihbcntrop^vfas a, man of violent

passions, often given to sudden outbursts of tor.pcr. An ardent N^-zi and
I'dthout previous diplomatic osqDorionco, he had few personal friends among
the officials of the Foreign Office, However, they worked vdth him in closest

tcaxw/ork; and it is an historic irony, that the only official in the Foreign
Office who seriously tried to eliminate Ribbontrop vfas not one of the old

diplomats, but Ids crony, Luther, rdio as a consequonco ended in a concentra
tion canp.

The members of Ribbontropis immediate entourage, such as Altonburg,

Sonnleithner, and von Rintolon, graphically described tlie^porsonal diffcroncos that they had vdth Ribbontrop. vrEIZS/^CIGR's affiant, sonnleith^ier,
admitted on cross G:j:ariination that Ribbontrop often spoke rashly and fre

quently shouted that he v;a.s "a miserable bureaucrat". (T. iSkYS)- His
affiant, von Rintolon, related the state of affairs that prevailed in the
Foreign Qf^ico:

"Q. Are there any officials of the Foreign Office

about whom he did not maice any derogatory romr.rks?

TiA. If there are such officials, they arc pobably
loss than ten in nur;i)or. You can count them
on the fingers of two hands.
"Q.

He also swore at you?

"A, I know that very well," (T» 17555)*

It is to bo observed that aU. of tho dofcndants, including stoengracht,
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testified copiously to the str-^incd personal relations that existed between
then and Ribbcntrop. In TEIZS/^CICSRis case, Ribbentrop found abundant

reason for personal dislike, VISIZSAECKSR was cnin, tactful and reserved;
Ri^bontrop v/as blunt^ violent and onotionalc Morcovorj VJEIZSAEOKER vras

clearly the intellectual and social superior of this orst^vhilo champagne
salesman. Ribbcntrop undoubtedly sensed the personal contempt that IffilZ—

SA3CKSR held for him and his amateurish puttering in the field of diplomacy.

However j despite'personal differences^ Ribbentrop could not do vd.thout
TJEIZS.YSCKMj and they collaborated during the most d^manic and aggressive
period of German foreign policy^ namely^ from 193S to 1943. If cither Hitler

or Ribbentrop had been the least dissatisfied rdth the manner in avhich IJEIZ-

S/iECKSR performed his official duties^ he of course would have boon instantlyswept out of office. The defense has attcrpted to cloud this vital issue^
but no doubt remains that his retention vrc.s predicated pirrely upon the valu—

able services that he rendered. In 1943 his expert guidance of forei;^

^

policy "was no longer necessa.ryj for all possible aggressions had boon launched^
and the activities of the foreign servxce had shrunlcen.

Ribbentrop^ moti

vated by personal antipathy and TEIZS/JlCIGPJs lukewarm attitude to National
Socialism^ then transferred him and replaced him by a creature of his ovm
malting. But it is notovforthy that iTECZSfJCCKSR was dismissed only after his
usefulness was at an end.

The evidence has clearly revealed how '.TElZSAECICnR docoivod some of his

closest friends among the foreign statesmen and used then to advance the ends

of Gorman policy. As evinced by T/EIZS/iECKER's numerous general character

affidn\rits^ many are under his spell. Tot no doubt remains that T/EIZS^xECKER

,,

often shamelessly betrayed their confidence; for e^carplo^ his relations with
Ambassador Attolico with whom he was allegedly closely cooper.ating, con-

clusively disclose this^ -as will be shown hcrcinaftor.

„

^

in passing, it is to be noted that ^.'ffllZSAEClGR was a rank opportunist, •
supporting the Fuehrer vrtien the tides of victory were running igh, ^.nd ^
flirting with the resistance groups vriien disaster loomed. On 23 May 1940,
shortly after the military conquest of the Low Countries, VJEIZSAEGK3R va-oto
in a personal letter to his friend, Ambassador Ott:

"For every fon'/ard st©p that the Arny is naldng in
the west signifies far more from a foreign policy

;•

point of view thnn anything thp.t we could ever occomplish vdth our pon r.nd paper vforko n^r.t wonderful
things arc factssaid Disraeli® Those European
facts care of course surely shining out "nd penetrating
clearlj'" to the area of your nain work^ and I ani assum

ing that thereby'you too arc having your"work"lightened."

(pros,

36oa^ WG~5406j d. B. 97-Cj P. IS).

And in May 1942, VJEIZS/JilCKJiE, in welcoming repatriated German diplomats
from posts in the Americas, publiclj'- statedj

"In Germany^ a

find, in contrast to the countries

that you have left, a \7ar vv.aging in actuality, a German stylo of work® H'oro you see no commissarial con—
forencosn hero'there is Fuehrerdom. He??e you hear ho
fireside chats, here there is initiative, decisions,
orders, follow-up and blov;s against the cncrj.'-, 'To are
set Up f o?:* no tiling but for the Fuelirer. His rdll is
ours, his assiu'anco of victory is our assurance of

victoryc'"

(pros® Exh7"3e093 NG-5375^ D. B. 97-C, P. 20).

"(underlining supplied),-.
vrEIZS/iECIOLR served vdth vigor, it must be reiterated, any regime; through
out he remained a staUnch Nationalist.

And i t was under the Third Reich

that ho attained the pinnacle of his career in the foreign service, achiev
ing not only pecuniary advantages, but also great political prestige,
V/EIZS/lECKSR clearly falls rdthin the criteria of criminality as sot

forth in defining culpability for Crimes against peace in paragraph 2 of
Article n, Control Council Lav.'- No. 10, which roads in part as follov/s:
"2. Any person vdthout regard to nationality or the
capacity in which he acted, is deemed to have committed
a crime as defined in paragraph 1 of this article, if he
*

vjas (f) vdth rdforcncc to paragraph 1 (a) if he hold a
high political, civil or military (including General
Staff) position in Germany^®,"
The Gvidonco establishes that VJEEZSAECK5R hold a high political posi

tion in Gcrmary, in which he played a key roln in the political and diplpmatic preparations for aggressive war.

VCIZS/JilCKSR, in his testimony, con

tended that he hold his post in order to influence the Nazi loaders and that
he participated in top-level policy maneuvers affecting not only Germany, but
other na.tions too.

His high position, v/e submit, is an important factor to

be taken into consideration in evaluating his participation in the planning,

preparation, initiation and waging of those invasions and aggressive wa.rs
decla.red criminal by the IMT«

After due consideration, the IMT found Ribbontrop guilty of pa.rticipa-»
tion in the conrnission of Crimes against peace and also of conspiracy (Trial
✓

*

^

of Major Vjr.r Grir.iinals, Vol. 1, p. 2^5/286), The ovidonco herein prosonted
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GstablishGS that TEIZS/vECKER stands as particcps criniinis to hiin and shares

his guilt.

The opinion of the D-IT, concerning their holding as to the Law

of Connon plon^ is apropos;
^

• •-

"Hitler coiiLd not r-iakc aggressive war by'hinsolf. He
had to have the cooperation of statesmonj military

loaders^ diplomats^ and business men,

T'Jhcn thoy^'with

knovrledgo of his ains^ gave him their cooperation^ they

made thonsolvos parties to the plan ho had initiated,

Thoy are not to be doomed innocent because Hitler made
use of then,, if thoy knevr ^vhat thoy wore doing. That
they were assigned to their tasks by a dictator does
not absolve them from responsibility for their acts.
The relation of loader and follower does not preclude
responsibility here an2a more than it docs in the con—'

parable tyranny of organized donestic crime,"
p, 226)0 (underlining supplied).

(Ibid,^

'-
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AUSTRIA.

D-uring the period of preparation for the Anschluss_, WtliZSAECiiKtC^ from
the summer of 1936^ headed the .important political Division ^of the Foreign
,

,

y

Office, (pros. Exh. A, NG-370a, D. B, 1, P. 22). Meurath, who remained
as Foreign Minister until 4 February 193Sj again took chamge at the time ©f
✓

the occupation of Austria, (v^l,

*

p. 334^ Trial of Major War Criminals).

WEIZSAEGKER served as the chief of the German Delegation to the Mixed

Commission^ appointed on the basis of the German—Austrian Agreement of
11 July 1936. (T. S643./42).

m Article II of this agreement^ Germany

pledged itself to a certain course of action:

"Each of the 2 governments regards the inner political
order (including the question of Austrian National

socialism) obtaining in the'other country as an internal
affair of the other country^ upon vfhich it will e^cercise
neither direct'nof indirect influence," (pros, Bxh, I4.j
TC~22^ D. B. 2^ P. 58),

During this period^ the Foreign Office maintained close contact ivith

the defendants Keppler and Veesenmayer who were responsible to the Fuehrer
for effecting Austria is internal dissolution.

Hov/everj the diplomats too

had a vital role, "the application of every permissible form of diplomatic

pressure by the Reich from the outside..,", (pros, Ptdi- 44^ NO—3696, D«
B. 2-A, p. 10).

Further, Keppler himself guardedly admitted that he maintained contact
with the Foreign Office, allegedly to eliminate differences of ©pinion.

(T. I2S8I/882), As chief of the political Division, it vras ^VETZSAECKERis

responsibility t» insure that the Foreign Officers diplomatic activity was
coordinated -.ath and promoted the general plans for aggression.

Keppler was also at least a nominal xfiember of T/EIZSAECKER's delegation
to the Mixed Commission.

(T. 12553)« Although this commission was es

tablished for the express purpose of supervising the_execution of the 193^
Agreement, it met only once, at Vienna, In July 1937- (T. 8641)- WKEiSAECKER stated that this conference demonstrated that his rcle in the
Austrian question was beyond reproach. (T- 77115 testimony of the prosecu

tion xvitness Hornbostel, p. 304/3055 and Weiasaecker affiant Guido Schmidt,
Weiz. Sxh. 42, Doc. 158, Weiz. D. B. 1-Cj

^)*

However, VffilZSAEGKER did not reveal that prior to this conference,
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iV-,.

Keppler had several discussions 'Tith hmj his suhordinatej Altenburg

(referent for Austria and Cseohoslovakia in the political Division)^ and
•von Neurath.

(T. 12554)»

Further^ VJEIZSASGKER failed to disclose that this cenfefence_, at least
in part, cloaked a clandestine meeting betvreen members of his delegation
and leaders of the Austrian NSDAP^

But captain Leopold, the impetuous

leader of this illegal movement, in a letter to Keppler on 7 August 1937^
stated;

iriphat T-'as the situation at the time of the discussion

between-yoirrsclf.. party Member Keppler, Ei^voy VJeiz^
saeckers Councillor Of Legation Altenburg, Ambassador
von paper and myself, which was held on 7 July in the
Ocrimn Logation in V-^enna^ During this conference it

vms stipiiLated quite unequivocally and clearly^ that
Lr- Soyss-Inquart could not be looked upon as inter

mediary or plenipotentiary of the NSDAP, but as schusch—
niggis confidantj mei-ely as a raiddloman<,'' (pros, Exh,
42, NG-32C2, D. B-

Pc 22),

Thus, in this instance, PJEIZSAECIIER v/as a party to Nazi intrigue with the
underground movement, at the very time that he i/as conferring i/ith Austric^n
officials concerning the inaplementation of the Agreement in which Germany
pledged herself to refrain from such actione

For the purpose of brevity, the portions of the prosecution Briefs

against the defendants ycesenmayer and Keppler relating to Austria (in par
ticular the section concerning the ouster of Captain Leopold from the leader

ship of the Austrian NSDAP and his roplacomont by seyss-fnquart) are herevath incorporated by reference.

The evidence further proves that the Foreign Ofj^iee, through von papen,
the German Ambassador to Austria, fully cooperated with Keppler and Veesen- ^

mayer in effecting the removal of Captain Leopold, ilbid; and pros, Exh. 41^
NG-357S, D. B, 2-A, P. 45).

.

.

In a Foreign Office memorandum, dated 7 October 1937^ Altenburg, VffllZSAECKER'3 referent for Austrian questions, further reveals the close cocr-

dination betvrcen Keppler's activities and those of the Foreign Office. Thip.
document, which VJEIZSAECKSR initialed, in part states;
HTho leader of the illegal Austrian party, Captain
Leopold, is at present engaged in violent technical^

and personal'controversies "'.'ith various party ag^-ncies
in the Reich, araong whom there is above all L-nc par y
RoprosontativG for Austrian nuostions, SS-Gi;;upponfuohrer Kopplor. His request to be rocciveci novj y
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the Fuehrer and Reich ChancellCr has been refused for

this reason.,.ThereforCj he has expressed the desire
to be received by the Reich Foreign Ilinister v;ho has

refused such a visit after consulting rath SS-Gruppen-

fuehrer Keppler,'^underlining supplied) (pros. Sidi.
17j NG-2727, D. B. 2, p. 70).

At the beginning of 193Sj mounting pressure v/as put upon the Austrian
Governmont by the Austrian WSDAP^ pursuant to direct orders from the Reich.

On 2 February'' 193S Kcppler informed von Nourath fully of the situation and

•:.::ipnasized that the Austrian Chancellor^ Schmschniggj vras yielding to soyssInquartis demands.

In this letter (received by "ISIZSAlCIOLR's sub-section,

Pol, iv), Keppler in part stated:

"

"In the course of negotiations v/hich arc to be continued
today, Dr. Seyss-Inquart will try to obtaiii further con. cessions and in particular to ensure the realisation of

such. As was discussed yesterday, however, Dr, ScyssInquart vri31 not accept any sort of obi5.gation ralthout

previoug contact,"' (underlining supolied) Qpros, Exh, kh,
NG-369'6, D. B. 2-ky P. 5).
On 8 February, State secretary Mackensen of the Foreign Office, in a

telegram (initialed by VJEIZSAECKER) to the German Iii)assy in Vienna, dir
ected that every possible influence be exerted to thvrart Captain Lcopoldis

intervention.

(Ibid, P. 6).

Thus, the diplomats provided Keppler r.lth all

possible assistance in effecting the internal dissolution of Austria through
cvcr—increasing pressure imposed
by Soyss-Inquart.

On 10 February 1938 a Foreign Office memorandum (initialed by Alton-

burg and bearing the sianp of pol„ IV). vras submitted to the ncvrly appointed
Foreign Minister, Ribbcntrcpt

ft rcvicvrs the relations betrroon Austria and

Germany, and in conclusion rocommonds:

"A prime requirement for a satisfactory'" result of the

conforoncos in progress should bo closest cooperation
botv/oen the men cmpcwoi-cd by the Reich to carry on nogd-

tiations, and the e:qponjnis of the movement in Austria,
in order to prevent the Bundeskanzler (schuschnigg) from
playing off the Reich against the' ruovomont in Austria
and vice versa,.," (ibid, P, 11),

In addition, the Foreign Office from October 1937 onward was defraying
half of tiio monthly expenses incurred by Dr. Morglc of the NSDAP for prri" •

ganda activities in Austria,
"iniTZSAFf'-KKH

(pros, 3xh, Al, MCr-3570, D- Bt 2—Aj P» 37)*

a-.ao avfai'o th.-t in February 1938 largo qu''intit.los of Nntiona..

Socialist pi-o'^aganda material were being shipped illegally into Austria fi'oir
-17-

tno aeich (pros* Kidi* 26j l^G—36ll_j D* B* 2j pi 106)3 obviously f.urther to
influonco the tense situation.

Although VETZSAECKSR categorically denied it (t- S692)j it vras the
Foreign Office, then imder the temporary control of von Neurath, which fab
ricated the diplomatic justification for the Gorman invasion of Austria on
12 March I93S.

vEIZSAECIlERj on 12 March 1938 (the memorandum itself is undated), records
..at von NcuratH presented to the Fuehrer, on 11 March, the basis for the
official coi.imuniques to justify the contemplated Gorman action.

This text

vas also incorporated into Hitler is letter to the puce which ?:as forwarded

.n tnc same day.

The enclosed communique, in von Hourathis handwriting

(T- 8692), established a pattern which was used over and over again to blaze
the Tray for Nazi aggression:
"The only aim of the action is to avoid bloodshed of the
German people in Austria and to secure that the Austrian

po®plG take their fate into their own hands according to

their right of self-determination, Rccognitien of .the
Brenner frontier^" (Pros. Exh. 3514, IIC—4580, D. B. 97-A,
P. 73),

In addition, the Foreign Office, through von Nourath, critended assur
ances to interested nations that the Anschluss, of course, in no way
cifectcd the good relations cx:i.sting between Germany and them,

potential

opponents vrere thus lulled into a feeling of false security, and the victim

isolated,

I

A memorandum by l-'JEIZSAECKER, on 12 March, reveals that Czecho

slovakia, the nation most concerned about Gormanyis grab, was to be assured

on 11 March that in case of dispute, Germany would adhere to the provisions
of the Gcrman-Czech Arbitration Treaty of 1925*

(ibid).

This assurance in

fact was given on the following day (T- 8697); the HIT declared:
"He (von Neurath) took charge of the Foreign Office at
the time of the occupation of Austria, assured the British
Ambassador that this had not been caused by a German

ultimatuiTi, and informed the C^soehoslovakian Foreign
Minister that Germany intended" to abide by its arbitra.t i o n
convention with C2echoslov£ilcia," (Trial of H^jor Mar
Crijrdnals, Vol. 1, p, 334),
It is to be noted that IfEIZSAECKER shared responsibility for the po

litical attitude to be adopted by the Foreign Office.
ci/SIZS.iECKhfRis dcfonsos can be summarily dealt vrith.

His claim of ha.rdly

any participate on am the preparations (T, 7711) has boon rofutod by the r^forv
montionod (..svj.dorico.

^'BflZSAEGKBR also contended that on the evo of the
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'

•

Anschluss he attcoptcd to halt the military invasion^

(T* 7712)*

I'JEIZSAECKER testified that on the evening of 11 iiarch the defendant

Koppler telephoned Altcnburg froni Vienna and stated that he and scyssInquart felt that it vras superfluous to have Gorman troops march in.

^'•Jhon

Altcnburg consulted him, VffilZSAECKMl directed that Hitler be informed at
once.

Unfortunately, Hitler felt that it vja.s too la,to to halt the operatic." •

(ibid; and VJeiz, Exh, U3) Woia. Doc, 2S6, Wciz-, D- B. 1-C,

6),

Kepplor, in his testimony, hov/ever, revealed that he had asked Altcn

burg to inform Hitler on his (Koppler's) behaJi* that a military invasion v;as

inadvisable.

(T-. 12874).

Further, it v/as purely a cucstion of strategj^.

Sincd the Anschluss had boon, bloodles^ly accomplished, it would enhance
German foreign policy in the eyes of the rrorld if Nazi troops did not at one
march in.

The aggression was adready coir^^lotod,

T'lJEIZSAECKER, at groat length, in his tcstimons'' cs^ounded the standard
Gorman •justification

for the Anschluss;

its own accord and a.utomn.ticaJ.ly,,,

"But I saw the Anschluss coming of

I thought it v;as inevitable as a result

of historical dovclopmont." (T. 7711/7712).
The TT.-TT in its opinion, carefully weighed and rejected this defense •
"It was contended before the Tribunal that the anncxa.-

tion of Austria, was justified by the strong desire ex

pressed in nmny quarters for the union of Austria and
Germany; that there were man^" matters in common botvfcen
the tv/o peoples that made this union desirable; and
that in the result the object vms achieved •.•ithout blood
shed,

"Those matto7^=-oven
true, arc really immaterial, for
the facts pli ' r.l.y p?'C'VO that the methods cn^loyed to
achieve the object vrcre those of an aggressor. The
ultimate fvoctor was the armed might of Gorman^' ready to

bo used if anj'' resistance was encountered,,."
of Major ''ja.r Criminals, Vol. 1, p. 194).

(Trial

It is also to bo noted that VJEIZS/UCKER's defonso affiant, Sclzam,

stated that he considered the Anschluss "the first real crime committed under

the Hitler regime Im the field of foreign policy."

("feia. Exh. 7) Mciz,

Doc, X59f Vfeiz, D, b. 1—E> P. 3) < Th^ defense witness Thco Kordt, oxprossed
himself in a similar vein.,

(T. 12292),

T-hc Anschluss was an accomplishment long desired not only by tJx) old
Nazis, but also by G'-rraan nationalists.

E'von though strongly praising the

iLoion, "miZbAEOKER -^.Iso carefully menti.onod in his toptimnny thrt hn had.

.some ijiner qualms concerning the methods onployod.
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(T* 7712). Hov/evcr,

" ."hon ho

vjToto the prcfr.cQ in Apt'il 1936 for tho Nrzi yearbook for Foreign

policy. he publiclj'" pro'clr.imGd quite contrar^y'" scntinonts-:
"Tbe year 1938 as the year of the reunion of Austria
with the Reich wij_l always have a special rani: in C-oi'nian
history. It is good, however, to remember that in
politics too nothing is accomplished by more chance.
Success must be founded on a solid basis. An important
foundation has been established and good preparatory
work has been done for the creation of Greater Qoritany

in 1937*" (underlining supplied) (proa, Sxl"i. 3515^
NG-4748, d. B. 97~A, P. 74).
i"-..osc arc the words of a nationalist iTho in the Austrian aggression made
common cause vd-th more ardent National socialists.

\ ^-
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INTRODUCTION

German foreign policy dictated that after the

fall of Austriaj Czechoslovakia wDuld be the next target,
"The conference of 5 November 1937 made it quite plain
that the seizure of Czechoslovakia hy Germany had been

definitely decided upon.

The only question remaining

was the selection of the suitable moment to do.it."

(Trial of Major War Criminals, Vol, I, p. 194),

The

pattern of intrigue employed so successfully in the
Austrian question was duplicated;

the chosen instrument

to create internal discord and permit the intervention

of the Third Reich was the Sudeten German Party (SDP)
under Konrad Henlein's leadership.

As the evidence

will establish hereinbelow, this party, financed hy the

Foreign Office and other Nazi agencies since 1935, was
a tool of Germany^

Diplomatic and other propaganda

barrages pointed to the alleged oppression of this
minority grou]p and demanded that its ever—increasing
demands be met.

The ultimate objective was the annexa

tion of the Sudetenland, as an initial step in the
iptal dismemberment of .Cz.e.choslQv^la.

The role of the Foreign Office was to separate

Czechoslovakia from its Western allies, England and
France, so that it would stand alone against German
pressure,

WSIZSASCKER in diplomatic negotiations with

Anglo--Fr©nch representatives and in directives to German

diplomats employed this theme with ccnsummate skill.

Fully aware or -bhe PIP' e mere jDretense at negotiation,

he softly and cleverly professed Germany's dlr.i nteT*est
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in the <luestioni as long as the Sudeten G-ermans wet'e
granted their allegedly just demands.

He masked the

Nazi plans of aggression and by raising doubts in the
minds of the Anglo-French statesmen who trusted his

assertions he insidiously turned them against the Czechs.

Through this policy, another peaceful conquest was

diplomatically achieved, and a major obstacle in the path
of German aggression against Czechoslovakia had been
surmounted,

B.

SUMmY OF SVIDSNCS.

The Sudeten German Party had been secretly financed

by the Foreign Office since 1935 (Pros, Sxh. 52, NG-2782,
D. 3. 5-A, p. 8); but V^IZSAFCKSR contended that such

financial support even occurred under the Weimar Republic.,

However, under questioning by the Tribunal, W3IZSAFCK3R
after much evasion admitted that the contributions paid
by the Weimar Republic were solely for cultural rjurposea,

(T, 7765-7767),

Further, the SDP did not then exist.

On 15 February 1937 Altenburg (referent for Austria

and Czechoslovakia in the Political Division) recommended

that for the coming
180,000 BM. to the oDFo

ar the Foreign Office appropriate
In this memorandum, which was

Initialed by WEISSAFOKSR, he in part stated:
"The Sudeten-German party, since its
election success in 1935, has been
currenbly supucrt'^d with funds from

the Forej-gn Ofij.jie for the purpose of

strengtKfc'nin'g 'and"further d_^eloping
ihe party organization."

(underlining suppll'edy"(Pros. 2xh. 52,
NG-2782, D, B, 3-A, p. 8),

A portion of such sum was to be paid to the SDP office

in Berlin (Ibid,); and during the tense days of August
1938 the Foreign Office increased payments to this

oifice, due to greater expenditures that resulted from
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its propaganda activities, its financing of trips to
various -ti^uropean capitals, and other expenses incurred
during the political negotiations with the Czechs.

(Pros. Sxh. 58, NG-1822, D. B, 3-A, p. 10)..
See also:

Pros. Sxh. 54, NG-3607, D. B, 3-A, p. 15,

which further refutes ^IZSASGKSR's contention that

these funds came from an unknown origin and the Foreign
Office functioned purely as "a postman" (T. 7769).
Taking advantage of diplomatic immunity, the Foreign
Office surreptitiously channelled remittances and docu

ments to the SDP via the German Legation at Prague.

On

12 May 1938, the German Minister to Czechoslovs&;iai
^isenlohr, protested against such illegal conduct.

The

telegram, initialed by ^^IZSAECKSR, in part states:
"...approximately weekly, Smbassy
officials forward secret money remit
tances and documents to members of

the Sudeten German Party. Despite
all precautionary measures taken,
the danger that the Czechoslovak!an
Goverr.j7jent might "discover these
activities at any moment, and thus
should be in a position to institute
counter measures, should not be over

looked. "

(Pros. Sxh. 55, Na.2781,

D.B, 3-A, p« 18).

This eridence is in contrast to '^'SIZSAECKSR's contention

that "it is a matter of course that Czechoslovakia

knew that these Sudeten Germans were being financially
supported by the Reich",

(T. 7765).

As mentioned in the preceding section, during the
Anschluss Czechoslovakia was assured that the clarifica

tion of the Austrian ouestion would improve German-Czech
relations,

(Pros. Sxh. 3514, NG-4580, D.B. 97-A, p, 73;

Pros, Exh, 50, TO—27, D.Bfortnight,

p- 2)_

Yal: within a

V/FIZSAFOKER was well aware that the Suc^eten

WQ.O +;Be next objective of German foreign policy.

-23-

Hitler saw Henlein at Berlin cn 28 March 1938; and on

the following day, ^^IZSASCiCBR attended a conference at
the For-elgn Office on the general situation.

Among

those present were Rihbentrop) Konrad Henlein, his

deputy, Frank, SS-O'bergruppenfuehrer Lorenz (.chief of the
Central Office for Racla.1 Germans) and Minister Elsenlohr,
(Pros. Exh. 59, PS-2788, D, B. 3-A, p. 22).
This conference laid the foundation for the joint

policy to be adopted by the Sudeten German Party (SDP)
and the foreign Office,

Rlb'bentrop stated that in view

of Hitler's decision, the SDP was to realize that Germany
would "not tolerate a continued suppression of the

Sudeten Germans by -the Czechoslovak Government",

(Ibid)

He further declared:

"It is essential to propose a maximum,

p r ogram, v^hich as its final aim grants
full freedom to the Sudeten Germans....

The aim of the negotiations to he

carried out by the Sudeten German party
with the Gzechoslovaklan Government is

finally this: t^ avoid entry into the
Government by the extension and gradual
specification of the demands to he made
...

The Reich cabinet itself must

refuse to appear toward the Government
in Prag or toward London and Paris as
the advocate or peacemaker ©f the
Sudeten-German demandsv"
(Ibid.)

Luring this meeting the demands that the SDP were
tc make on the Czech Government were

"discussed and

approved in principle". (Ibid,, p. 23).

The SLP was

also given the discretion to maintain contact with other

minority groups, especially the Slovaks, if the adoption
of a similar course by them might appear appropriate,
(Ibid.)
WFI2SAE0K2R stated that this conference was of no

particular importance and merely suggested that Henlein

acquire equal rights for the Sudeten Germans in Czecho
slovakia,

(X. 7764/7765),
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However, 'VSIZSASGKSR' s affianli,

'0

.m

Minister iiiisenlohrj who a.lso attended the conference,
expressed his reactions quite differently;
"Q.

Is it not correct that at the
conclusion of this conference you

had certain fears of what the

future policy might be?
"A,

It is correct that this conference
caused certain fears to arise
within me,

"Q.

You feared that the Sudeten Germans
would continually extend their
demands, so that there would never

be any real acceptance possible,
is that not correct?

That was one

of your fears?
II

A.

"Q,.

I confirm that this is correct.

You also were alarmed to learn that
the

Sudeten German leaders were to

negotiate with the Slovaks?

"A.

This also alarmed
meant the attempt
State and tear it
lining suppliedT"

me because this
^ separate the
apart." (Under
(T. 16475),

Even iLrich Kordt testified that after lea,rning that
Ribbentrop on 29 March instructed Henlein as to the
general policy, he believed that "a new adventure was

starting,"

(T. 7457)

WEIZSAEGKER further contended tha.t this conference
revealed that Fenle.1n was "not to obtain his instruc

tions through dv-; Foreign Office".

(T. 7765),

But

the minutes expressed a contrary policy;
"For further cooperation, Konrad Henlein
was instructed to keep in the closest
possible touch with the Reich Minister

and the head ox bhe Central Office for

Racial Germans (VOMI), as well as the

German Minister in Prague, as the
local representative of the Foreign
Minister. . ," (Pros, Sxh. 59, PS-2788/
D,B, 3-A, p, 23) (underlining supplied).
Further, Minister •''^isenlohr on cross—exajnlnat-lon stated

that he maintained "regular contact»^ ^-ith Frank,' whom

Henlein appointed as liaison to him (T. 16473), and that
only political questions were discussed. (T. 16509),
-^25-

Immediately thereafter, '^IZSASCKER, as the newly
appointed State Secretary, on 2 April 1938 saw the Czech
envoy and sta.ted the disquieting news had been received

that Czech border patrols had been increased to an unusual

extent.

When the envoy mentioned that warnings had been

received concerning doubtful intentions by the Third

Reich toward Czechoslovakia, WEIZSASCKSR adroitly handled
the query:

^

"I told him in connection with this,

that these warnings were too obvious

to be taken seriously*

his country

would take the necessary steps in
favor of the Sudeten Germans,. then
it need not worry concerning German-

Czech relations."

(Pros. Exh, 61,

NG-3020, R.B, 3-A, p. 33) (Underlining
supplied),

WiblZSAECKER thus softly issued the veiled threat that

Germany would intervene actively, unless the demands of

the SDP, which he was aware would continually increase,
would be met.

It is true that- Hitler made the final decision for

the military attack on Czechoslovakia on 28 May 1938
after the weekend crisis; but as early as 21 April dis
cussions took place with regard to Case Gruen(the code

mame for the military attack on Czechoslovakia), ^'showing
quite clearly that the preparations for the attack on

Czechoslovakia were being fully considered". (Trial of
Major War Criminals, Vol. I, p. 195), WEIZSAECKER could

not recall whether his military friends, like Admiral

C-naris, had disclosed these preparations to him,

(T.

8698).

However, on 25 April 1938 WEIZSAECKER, in a top
secret decree, informed the German missions abroad that

the Foreign Office preparations for m-olibization had made

further progress and that corresponding, secret measures
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must be taken by their offices "without delay". (Pros,
Exh, 62, PS~3572, D. B. 3-A, p. 34).
Further, WilZSAtijCKSR was present when

Hitler met

Mussolini at Rome in early May 1938 (T. 8698); and his
memorandum of 12 May for intra-departmental use dis

closes that the question of Italian support and the
possibility of "^nglo—French intervention "in the event
of a conflict between Germany and Czechoslovakia" were

fully discussed,

(Pros. Exh. 3516, N&-5034, D. B, 97-A,

p. 75). The memorandum indicates that long before the
weekend crisis of 21 May, German and Italian policy was
being coordinated with regard to German action against
Czechoslovakia.

(Ibid.),

Further, on 12 May ^VSIZSASCKER also reported the

contents of Henlein's conversation with Ribbentrop,
prior to the former's visit to -England,

Henlein was

instructed to place the blame upon the Czechs and make

the fulfillment of his far-reaching Karlsba,d demands

the condition of appeasement,

WEIZSAICKilR also states,

in part:

"In London, Mr, Henlein will deny to
net on -rders of Berlin,,. Finally,
Henleii". will try to create the im
pression in London that the Czecho-

slovakian state is gradually decompos
ing, in order to discour'ag:¥ tKose"
circles which still consider i t

practicaT'to uphold the struc^re

of this state"" ""(Pros, Exh. 63, NG-3555,
B.B, 3-Aj p. 38j (underlining supplied).

Defense affiant Eisenlohr testified that his task wag

to support the Karlsbad demands (T, 16478), even though
due to discussions with Frank and otiH's he felt that

the full demands were unacceptable to the
ment.

(T. 16488/16489).
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Czech Govern

After a conference on 28 May between Ribbentrop
ajid Hitler, Ambassador Hewel informed Erich Kordt who

in turn informed WEIZSAECKER that the military attack
on Czechoslovakia was irrevocably decided upon« (t.
7457).

Despite his alleged secret cooperation with
Ambassador Attolico, VVEIZSAECKER on 9 June 1938 directed

Eisenlohr, Cerman Minister in Prague, to employ an
evasive policy toward the Italians. This letter, which
was seen by Ribbentrop before it was dispatched, pro

vides an indication of the type of diplomacy "/7EIZSAECIiER advocated:

"Our recent exchange of telegrams with
Mackensen will show how v/e deal with this

problem in our conversations with the Italiens

.

.

. They will indicate to you that, even

towered the Italiens, we h8.ve used £enerali^i^s
and have thus reserved our freedom of action.

T7e_musjt c.void £iving_the_impre£s^on ^hat_w_e
have_s£cVe^s_from ^h_em_, , "(underlining supplied)
TPros.EyJi.3517, NG-2324, D.B 97-A, p.78)
In this aame letter V/EIZSAECEER advises Eisenlohr how

to deal with ticklish diplomatic queries:
"...I think it would be best if, in conversa
tion wich persons, all the details of this
alleged conversation be described as untrue.

If, for insta.nce 1 were__a£k^d__here; ':Vhat
about the gap in the West and the fortifica
tion of this weak point?' 1 ^h_ou2.d_s_tajte_
wijfch^ujfc he£i^ajfcion_that we had long ago
rectified our previous omraissions. No French
man would dare to attack the wall which has

been erected in the meantime." (underlining
supplied) (Ibid).
In passing, it is to be noted that Minister Eisenlohr,

!?SIZSi..ECKER« s subordinate, testified on oross-exai'fiina

tion that he had no knowledge that V/EIZSaECKSR was
engaged in any resistance activities. (T. 16471),
On 23 June 1938 WEIZSAECKER, in agreement with

Ribbentrop, informed Mackensen, Oerman Ambassador at

Rome, that, there wa.s great Interest in the eagerness
-28-

with which Italy tried to reach an agreement with
England,

Wi]IZSA3CK£IR in part stated?

"Up to now one may rightly assume that
the Italian fate is closely bound to
the German destiny, i.e. that the

Italians would hardly be in a position
to consider themselves as completely
unconcerned in the case of a stronger
engagement of Germany in another dir

ection. "

(Pros, Sxh. 3518, NG-5021,

D.B. 97-A, p. 79).

German foreign policy dictated that Italian political
support for German demands against Czechoslovakia be

secured as an additional deterrent to intervention by
England and France.
On 25 June 1938 W3IZSA3CKFR forwa'i^ded to various

German missions a secret memorandum on the German

attitude toward the German-Czech Arbitration Treaty
of 1925,

He revealed that Germany did not deem it

politically opportune at this moment to cancel the

treaty, after repeatedly recognizing its validity.
WFIZSAFCKSR stated;

"I would like you to omit the sub,5ect
of the validity of this treaty from
your discussion in conversations about

the Czech question. Should this subject
be brought to discussion by others, I
suggest you make it clear that it

would
very doabtful if this treaty
which originated during the period of
Locarno could, in view of present day
conditions, be applied."

(Pros. Exh.

67, NG-3314, D. B". s^A, p. 63).

On 18 July 1938 Ambassador Henderson informed

WilZSAiCKER that he had dispatched observers to deter

mine the truth of the allegation that a partial Czech
mobilization was taking place; and their thorough inves

tigation revealed the falsity of the accusation.

Henderson concluded that he hoped TtsizsaSCKER could
prevent the p">^ess "from adding to the difficulties- of

a situation, already difficult enough".

NG--3210, D.B. 3-A,

88).
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(Pros. Exh. 72,

ilZSAiLCiCdjR
Iiclvo sGizod "tliis oppo!>?tjUnit;y
to decrease the mounting tension. However, in his
20 July he flatly stated that "according to

i^^'o-^iDsition available here", a contrary impression
is reached.

(Ibid, p. 90),

It is also to he noted

that in this draft, wherein ^^IZSASCKSR states that

his conclusive information is based "upon eye—witness
reports", the accompanying phrase "by German tourists"

is deleted, for obvious reasons.

(Ibid., p, 89),

TOIZSASCKilRi 8 answer is fully in accordance with the

policy of splitting England from Czechoslovakia by
charging the Czechs with constant provocation.
Despite WSI2SAECKER^s assertions, his contention

that the Foreign Office was not kept informed of the
activities of the SBP leaders is without merit.

His

own affiant, Eisenlohr, not only maintained continuous

and regular cojntact with Henlein's deputy, Frank (T,
16475), but between Ap.ril and September 1938 he was in
constant contact with officials of the Czech Government,

Einsenlohr, in principle, adhered to the official
diplomatic policy of supporting the demands of the SDP

(T, 16484/485)c He informed the Foreign Office about
the most important of these discussions.

(T. 16486),

Further, constant' reports were furnished to the

Foreign Office and seen by W^IZSASCKER, detailing, among
other things, SDP negotiations with the Czechs and also
suggesting that the English and French support of the

Czechs must be removed.

These reports clearly revealed

to WilZSAECKER that the SDP leaders were adhering to
the prescribed German polioy of merely pretending to
negotiate in earnest. SeeJ Pros, Sxh, 69, NG-3560, DB,
p. 78 and Pros. Exh, 56, NG-3211, D. B. 2-A, p. 81,
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both dated 21 July 1938; Pros jSxh. 77, NG~2826, D^B.
3-A,

95, dated 14 August 1938; Pros. Sxh, 78, NG-

2952, D.B. 3-A, p. lOO., dated 24 August 1938 and Pros.

Exh. 86, NG-2825, D. B. 3~A, p. 120, dated 8 September
1938.

It is to be noted that in the latter two exhbits

(reports from the German Legation in Prague) reference
is made to previous reports which these are in continua
tion of.

As the Sudeten German crisis grew graver in the

summer of 1938, the English Government in July dispatched
Lord Runciman to serve as an unofficial mediator between
the Czechs and the SDP.

This move was a concrete 'effort

to settle the dispute peacefully and, therefore, we
submit,

the activity of WEIZSAECKER in this connection is

of paramount importance in weighing the extent of his
participation or alleged peaceful endeavors.

WEIZSAECKER in his testimony briefly mentioned

that "1 was in. sympathy with this mission but I was
skeptical with regard to its success,"

(T. 7777). On

29 July 1938, however, WSIZSAEGKSR informed Ribbentrop
that he had instructed Minister Eisenlohr to keep the
Foreign Office promptly Informed about the Runciman
Mission, "to enable us to influence the Sudeten Germans

and possibly Ix)ndon still before Runciman's plans com©

to light".

(Pros. Sxh, 75, NG-.2626, B.B. 3-A, p. 94).

After instructing Eisenlohr neither to seek nor avoid
contact with Runciman, he stated;
"I told him that German cooperation
•With the Runciman mission is out of

the question.

It goes witBout saying,

that Runciman must poj^ be relieved of
the arM.^.y; t-Hiaf"vne C'z^ch quest iori

Woujf? t".ke"a dang'eroua""^rn,' if Runci-

ian'^i' propo'sals do not satisfy the
Sudetoxi Garmanso"
supplied),
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(Ibid.) (underlining

In his defense, VEIZSA5GK5IR made no comment on this

quoted diredtive establishing the policy to be adhered

to.

(T, 7777).

In sabotaging the efforts of Runciman,

W3IZSAH1CKSR clearly revealed that Germany would only
cooperate if her demands were fulfilled.

As the possibility of a forcible solution of the

Sudeten question loomed^ Hj^tler conferred aboard his
yacht, on 23 August 1938, with Admiral Horthy, Regent
of Hungary, and his Hungarian advisors.

As minutes of

this conference prepared by WEIZSASCKER reveal, on the

German side only Ribbentrop and he attended.

Hitler

clearly disclosed his intention to employ force, if Czecho
slovakia refused to give in.

The Hungarians were reluc

tant to commit themselves to military support, due to

the present incompleteness of their rearmament program
and the uncertainty whether Yugoslavia would attack them
from the flank if they marched against Czechoslovakia,

(Pros. Sxh, 79, PS-279S, D. B, 3-A, p. 102).
To Justify his participation in this important
policy-making conference, WEIZSASCKER relates how his
action before this conference exemplifies his peace

making endaavors:.

When the reluctant Hungarians arrived,

WEIZSASCKER's wife met the train to inform them "peace
must be maintained".

WEIZSAECKSR then claims that-when

the Hungarians stated to him they did not want to Join

in the spoils at this time, he urged them to maintain
this stand at the conference,

(tr, 7719),

However, the facts reveal that the Hungarian
attitude was long knoiwi, WEIZSASCKER himself on 25 July
1938 informed Ribbentrop thnt the Hungarians, during a
visit to Rome, had expressed the fear that Yugoslavia
would attack thenx 1f Ozachoolovakia was invaded by the

Hungarians without cause, (Pros, Sxh, 74, NG-2390, D. B,
3-A, p^ 92), Further, at the August 23 conference, Hitler
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himself stated that "he demanded nothing of Hungary",..

(Pros, ixh, 79^ PS-2796, D,B, 3—A, p. 103) •• "^his example
illust.rates WSIZSAEGKSR's ex post facto consti'Tiction of

facts,- twisting them completely out of the context of

their times.

His minutes clearly reveal that German

foreign policy did not then require the support of
Hungary, for the issue was not pressed; and, further,
that Hungary was eager to participa.te in the contemplated
aggressive step and share in the rewards, if the uncertain

ties of a Yugoslav attack could be eliminated,

(Ibid,). »

Four days later, on 27 August 1938, WEIZSZFGKER

instructed his witness, Theo Kordt, as to the policy to
be observed in diploma.tic conversations with -^glish
statesmen, (We shall subsequently discuss, in the
section pertaining to WEIZSAECKFR's defenses, the efforts
of the Kordt brothers and of himself allegedly to maintain

peace).

In this personal letter; not seen by Ribbentrop,

and initialed by von Kessel before transmission through
Erich Kordt to Th^o Kordt, ^^IIZSSSCKSR recommended:

"...As to mo-^e general German-English dis
cussions, you too Cran of course not take
a completely negative attitude in London

and dash Ine .hopes of those •'Englishmen
~£.

such discussions.

I should; how.jve.r, always stress the point,

-^^c,t without a settlement in the burning
Gzech problem, there could be no question
of discussions looking further .aheadT"

(underlining supplied) (Pros. Exh, 80,

NG-2583, D.B, 3-a, p, 104),

Such advice on the ma.nrie.r of conducting diplomatic conver
sations, was in full accordance with the over-all Nazi

policy to express a willingness to compromise, but only
at the expense of complete capitulation to German demands.
Subsequently, Theo Kordt replied that he would continue
to employ WF"!Z.qATTOJfV.nb Iiib tr-uctiona, oc/n-iainect in this

letter of 27 August, as guidance for further conversations.

(Welz. Exh, 59, Welz. Doo, 356, Welz... D.B. I-C, p. 38).
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fj''
*

On 3 September, R:^.bbentrop informed VvElSSASCKSR,

v*- I '
.* I

In a memorandum initialed by the latter,

that in conver

sation with the British lAmbassador Henderson, he had

attempted to induce the English to withdraw their sup

port from the Czechs.
3-A, p. 110).

(Pros. Bxh. 83, NC-2961, B.B,

And shortly after the Nurnberg Party

Rally, W3IZSASGK2R initialed a report received by the

Foreign Office from the Reich Ministry of Interior,
This report" fully revealed the' futility of the negotlationsi

"During the night from the 11th to the
12th and from the 12th to the 13th of

September from midnight to o,400 hours
all Czech inscriptions on sign posts and
oommercia.1 establishments in Weipert
^

;

(Cze oho Slovakia) are to be removed or
painted over by voluntary security ser
vice at the Instigation of the Sudeten
G-erman Party, , , Sudeten German Party"
received instructions to provoke inci
dents.

Provocations are

to reach a

climax on Tuesday." (Pros. Sxh. 87,
NG-2749, D. B, 3-iA, p. 123)
(underlining
in original).

This clearly refutes the credibility of testimony that
the Sudeten Germans were being oppressed,
•ISIZSAECKFR's

role in. the events of the period

preceding the signing of the Munich Pact will be dis

cussed in the following section analyzing his defenses

to this specification.

.However, It is noteworthy that

3 days before the signing of the Munich Pcact, ?i,^IZB^OK.SR,
in agreement with the Foreign Minister, suggested on

26 September to Keltel that in the event of a peaceful
the

annexation of/Sudetenland, the Foreign Office should
have a representative with the military occupation

authorities.

(Pros. Sxh. 89, KGw2l27, D. B. 3-A, p. 126).

On 29 September 1938, the Munich Agreement was

signed, ceding the Sudetenland to Germany.

An Inter

national Gommissloh was provided for, to consist of
-34-
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rGpresentativGs of England, Prance, G-ermo-ny, Jtaly and
Czechoslovakia.

WHlIZSAii^C^R ^"'as selected to, head the

German delegation.

(Pro's, Sxh, 96, TO—23j.D. 3. 3-3,

p, 228; Weiz. Sxh. 69, Welz, Doc, 25, Welz. D,B, I-C,
p. 6^).

?he Pact in part stated:

^hVhen the question of the Polish and^

Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia
has "been settled, Germa.ny and Italy

for their part wiil give a guarantee
to Czechoslovakia."

(Ibid.)

'Munich was the decisive turning point in German

foreign policy, for this second bloodless increase in
territory greatly enhanced Hitler's prestige at home
and abroad.

^ySIZSABCKSR stated that as a result of

this diplomatic coup. Hitler "was considered to be a
sort of a magician".

(T. 8720),

On 3 October 1938,

WSIZSASCK'IR sent a circular telogr?jn to all German

'

missions:

••Sij
"The

result achieved in the historic

conference of the four leading states
men, which completely satisfied the
demands listed in the German memoro.ndum.
means an overwhelming success of the

Fuehrer' s policy in general and in_
the Sudeuen Germa.n question in oartl-

culaJr. "

I^ros. Sxh. 3520, NG-1789,

D.B. 97-A, p. 82).
supplied),

(underlining

But W2IZSASCKSR' s affl'^t, Hlisenlohr, declared that
the annexation of the Sudetenland "was a political

and economic mistake",

(T. 16489),

Clearly, Hitler's

acquisition of the Sudetenland withpqt resort to arms

spurred him on to complete the already considered
\

further diemembdrment of Czechoslovakia.

We submit that the Munich Pact, though not a

separate aggressive act, grently accelerated the longcherished ple.n of German a ggression against Czecho
SAJ',. •

slovakia; and, further, that it was entered into in
-bad faith and with \concealed reservations, by the German
signatories, as will be shown hereinafter.
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WH:iZ3Ai:CKi]R testified thit he strove for a peaceful

solution of the Sudeten'question (To

7717); and he

referred to several memoranda of conversations, with

Rihbentpop .dHrin| July and August 1938.

(prps,.Exh. 70,

D-41, D.3. 5-A, p. 85; Welz. Exh. 56, Welz. Doc. 346,

'p. 31/34, and Weiz. Exh. 58, Welz. Doc. 355, p. 36/37-fi,
Welz. D.B.

I-G).

WEIZSAECKER's contention that he

employed Na.zl terminology designed to influence Ribhenh'

I'i.

trop and the Fuehrer and oloah his humanitarian efforts •
does not measure up to the proof adduced.

We do not

deny tho.t WSIZSA3GEER recommended a pe^aceful solution

of the crisis; however, an analysis of the evidence
establishes that WEIZSAECKSR's motiVration was not as he
,

'

i

alleges.

; >/i(

WEIZSAECKER wn.s a far more experienced diplomat

than Ribbentrop, and the evidence establishes that
Rlbbentrop continually sought his advice upon the course

German foreign policy should take,

(Weiz, Exh. 58, Ibid.),

It is clear that WEIZSAS.CKER's recommendations for a

solution through negotiation were based upon strategic
reasons.

On 9 July and subsecuently, he pointed out

'that German military preparations had become known, and
consequently:

"...we must shortly make'new decisions

in the Czech affair, as the moment of
surprise has already bean missed,

Tunderllning supplied) (Weiz, Exh, 56,
Weiz. "Doc. 346, Weiz. D.B. I-G, p. 31).
It has been established tha.t the surprise element was

gone, and that the military preparations were known to,
England and France.

(Pros. Exh, 76, NG>«3359, D.B. 3~A,

i

I

,p. 36).

Therefore,, WEIZSAECKER^ a contention that he

deliberately employed specious arguments and "double talk"
-36-
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(T,7717) in this instance is without foundation.
WSIZSA^CKSR also pointed out the perils' involved
to Germany in emharking upon the uncertainties of -^ar.

However, nowhere is proof adduced that he ever suggested
that the acquisition of the Sude tenland, the goal of the
I

Fuehrer's foreign policy, he abandoned.

On the contrary,

he fully participated in his official capacity in pre
paring for this aggressive step.

As .an expert in

diplomacy, h© was astute enough to recommend a policy

that was most advantageous to Germany and which was
finally adopted.

-In an .amicable discussion with Ribbentrop on 19
August, he stated:

"I again opposed this whole theory and
observed that we

should have

to awa.it

political developments until
lost interest in

the

English

Czech matter and

would tolerate our action, before we
could tackle the affair wi thout undue

risk. "

(Ibid., p. 33) (und'-rlining

supplied),

These suggestions as to the political timing of the
operation bolstered its possibility of success.

When'on 30 August, the Foreign Minister desired
his review of the political situation, WHIZSAHICKER

•

'A'l

stated: '
"Britain and France want to prevent
the war with a l l

the means

in

their

power, but are not yet ripe for the

decision to sacrifice tHelr friendship
for' Czechoslovakia to the interest of "
peace.,..
and

"We do not, however, have to sacrifice
the fruits of our Czech policy up to
the present, when switching our opera

tion away from war.,," (Welz. Exh, 58,

Doc. 355; Welz. D. B. I^C, p. 36/37)
(underlining supplied).

•

V/< '':r. ,

1'^

•.

•:

\^EIZSA3CK3R himself discloses that these conver

sations with Ribbentrop were friendly and devoted to

estahlishing the best foreign policy.
WSIZSAKCK3R observed:

On 19 August

•

"Otherwise the discussion was without
Incidence and as between two close

confidants.

In it Ribbentrop tried

to emphasize his point of view with

many military considerations, " ('Veiz.
Exh. 56, Doc. 346, Welz. D.B. I-C,
p. 34).
The evidence also discloses that at this time,

'VEIZSAECKER was not unique ajnong Germnji leaders in his
opposition to the necessity of a war-like solution. As
has previously been mentioned, a peaceful solution was
the better one. Like tha Mbehrer, IEIZ3AECKER .advocated that

political pressure, underlined by threats of aggressive
military action, be employed to achieve German aims,
Goering too for military and political consider.ations,

was among the advocates of such a policy (T,. 7543t
testimony of Erich Kordt; Weiz. Exh,. 65, Doc, 39, Weiz.

D.B. I-C, p. 51: excerpt from Henderson's "Failure of
re.

a Mission"), and he certainly cannot be considered a
man of peace.

Other members of the government shared the same

policy attitude.

In a note on 31 August, sent from

Danzig to the Foreign Office arid seen by 'VEIZSAECKEH,

a convereation between Greiser, President of the ^azi
Senate of Danzig, and Professor Burckhardt Is reloted:
."Since he (Greiser) had, however, dis

cussed these questions wi^h Professor
Burckhardt, he could inform him that
he knows, that all German Ministers
were against a war as far as the
Sudetenland question is concerned.

That had been confirmed only the other

•lay by the German Minister of finance,
Count Schwerin-Kroaigk;, and that
Herr Minister president Goering had. i

Ov-i'

ri'V

'declared emphatically thp.t he desired

a peaceful solution of this conflict."
"(Pros. 3xh. 82, NG--3299, D.B, 2-A, p,
83) (underlining supplied).
The generals who plotted a putsch in September
it

1938 were motivated "by the fear that m^litapy prepara

tions were nqt gufflplently a<3-Vanced as yet to under
take a war.

In the subsequent Polish campaign, they

registered no opposition, because the timing of the
war was considered favora.ble to Germany.

'

In considering the same defense as voiced oy
Goeringj the IMT in its opinion held: .
"3ven if he opposed Hitler's plans

against Norway and the Soviet Union,
as he alleged,

it is clear that he

did so only for strategic reasons;
once Hitler had decided the issue,
he followed him without hesitation,"

(Trial of Major War Criminals, Vol.I,
p. 380).

Prancois-Poncet,

the French Ambassador, in review

ing the pre-Munich atmosphere, on 4 October 1938 stated:
"With the exception of ^ few fanatica,
very few Germans thought that the .
Sudotens wore

worth the

risk of a

European war."
(Pros. Fxh. 0-328,
2943-PS, P.
204, p. 20).

A discussion of WSIZSA-FCKFR' s defense that he

participated in the planning of German military leaders
for a putsch if Hitler waged war over the Sudetenland

question, and of the contacts between the Kordt brothers

and the Fnglish authorities, is dealt with In deta^-^
the prosecution Brief discussing WEIZSAHCKSH's alleged
resistance activities.

This brief is incorporated Into

and made an integral part of this section of this brief.
However, a short further analysis of the Koadt brothers'
actlvitiea is provided.
i't
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The defense relies solely upon the testimony of
the defendant and the Kordt brothers to substantiate

their contention that they tried to '^^arn the British .
Government of the impending disaster, and that if

S^ngland would mahe a firm declaration that she would
fight, then a "secret opposition" group would execute

a coup d'etat if Hitler declared war,

(T, 7386/381).

Despite' numerous character affidavits, no s.ffidavits
I

of British authoritsies were presented by the defense to

prove the specific nature of the contacts nor their
effect.

The contacts are not denied, but" we submit

that their nature and effectiveness has been grossly
distorted and exaggerated.

Erich Kordt testified that the essence of their

aims was to have the British Govetnment mahe a public

declaration that they would enter the war if Hitler^
marched.

(T. 7588/7589).

Stripped of its. ver biage,

that is the sole substance of their effort.

However, WEIZSAEGKER himself conclusively rebutted
the feasibility of such a course of action.

He testified

that when the foreign press proclaimed publicly that
Hitler had backed down before a public display of force

by the Czechs during the May 1938 weekend crisis, the
Fuehrer was so incensed that he ordered a war—like solu

tion of the Sudeten question.

(T, 7717).

/

However, as will be shown subsequently, WEIZSAECKER
at great length bitterly condemned British diplomacy
in the Polish affair for making public their intention

to oppose Hitler's next aggressive move.

(See;

T. 7738-t

"only the method here was too noisy for rao"; and T, 7747:
British opposition harmed peace because done by public
utterances... "one had to do these things diploma,tically '
and secretly^'; etc.).

I. :

Thus,

s defense poses two *diametrically^

opposed and, thus, incompatible theories.

In the fall

of 1938, the British G-overnmeht erred in not mahing

public their determination not to yield, in not mobiliz

ing their* fleet, and otherwise informing the Fuehrer and
the world of their determination. However, before the

Polish aggression they allegedly destroyed any hope of
I

peace by adopting the opposite course of a.ction.
Further, what new elements of information were

brought to the attention of the English authorities?
. As early as 9 August, the Foreign Office was aware that
the British knew that German mobilization would be
♦

-

/

completed by the end of September 1938

(Pros, Exh. 76,

NG-3359, D,B, 5-A, p. 36),
Theo Kordt also testified that in September 1938

he was in contact with Sir Ht^race Wilson (twice), Lord
H7lifax (once), and Lord Va,nsittart (thrice) and that
he urged -that the British fleet be mobilized, a general
be sent to negotiate, and that a public declaration of

England's position be made.

(T, 12015/12023).

did

not disclose the exact nature of these contacts. However,

the defense provided that,Information,

In a private

letter to 7/EIZSAECKER on 1 September 1938, Theo Kordt
• st at e s:

"In the course, of yesterda.y, the British
Government received information according
to which the Fuehrer intends to solve the

Czech question by force.

These items of

information chiefly originate f^_m_ Churchill,
In
Vansittart and Christie,
— Ye s_ te rday ^
talk with Lord Halifax, "^hurchili pointed

out the necessity for timely and energetic
action on the part of 'the part of the
British governraant if they still wanted
to prevent the outbreak of

a war.

therefore suggested'the following meo-sures;
concentration of the avy in the North Sea,

coupled with at least partial mobilization,
Berlin at the same time to be warned

—

'

ag?.lnst any attempt to solve the

.

I

/

•

Czechoslovak question by force;
in -oonnection vfith this, a 'fair

offer' to be submitted concerning
the Sudeten German problem."

(Weiz, ilxh, 59, Doc, 356, D,3, I-C,
p. 38)

(underlining supplied),

Churchii;:). was nqt plaimed as a collaborator of the •
Kordts,

and' V^-nsl'ttart has disavowed them.

In this

illiLminating document, Thoe Kordt also states:
"I did not expect a different attitude

from the Foreign Office (British), where
^

have any friends apart from

a few Junior officials. As reported ' •
already repeatedly by the Embassy, the
Foreign Office stands in hardly dia-,_,
guleed opposition to Chamberlain,"

(underlining supxiliedj (Ibid., p, 39),
!£oreover, Iheo Kordt thanked WEIZSAECKSR for his letter

of 27 August "which shall be ijiy guidance during further
conversations."

{M

(Ibid., p. 40).

This.letter has been previously discussed, but due

to its-relevancy here, a portion is re-quoJ?ed.

It is

I

to be noted that this private letter by VffilSSSSCKER,
(

on 27 ,August 1938, was transmitted through the channel
I

of von Vessel and Erich Kordt, and thus the language
r^.

was not for the eyes of Ribbentrop,

he stated:

"As to, more general Gorman-English dis
cussions, you too can of course not -

tajce a completely negative attitude
in London and dash the hopes of those

Englishmon who ent'ertain hopes for
such discussions. I should, however,
al^^.-a.ys stress the point, tha.t without
B settlement in the burning Czedh
problem, there could be no question

of discussions looking further ahead, "

(Pros. Exh. 80, NG-2583, D. B. 3-A,

p. 104) (underlining supplied).

We respectfully submit that these doouments reveal

the substance of the contacts between the Kordt brothers
and various English statesmen,

Erich Kordt even admitted

that in all these alleged contacts, only the malnten-'^nce
of peace was discussed, 'but never was the question of a

hi

solution of the critical issue; the Sudeten question,
discussed.

(T. 7538/39).

Theo ICordt mentioned Lord Vansittari? as one of

hl§
rJrincipal
contacts,
I
.
v
.. j ...
. ..

[T.
12022/023).
^
_
V
^
j.

Suhseo^uent

to the introduptioa of i^ebuttal affidavit^

JTaiislttart,

:^h6 dpfsuse reversed themselves and sharply attached
his iDerson.

Howsver, the indisputable fact remains that

in effect the defense represented Vanslttart as one of
their most important collaborators; he Is, thus, best
qualified to testify to the varacity of their contentions.
He in part stated:
"During my conversations ^^'ith the

Kor^S; I never had any Impression
that they really intended to take

action against the regime or that .
they were associated with any persons

or groups ^'ho would do so," (Pros.
Lxh. C-65, NG-.5786, D.3, 204, p. 3).

C.

The allegation that WZIZSASCISH was responsible
for the calling of the Liunich conference can be summarily
rebutted by his own testimony:

"Q. Turning to the time of 'Munich, on
28 September the French Ambassador
in Berlin presented ra demarche to

Hitler, and on the same date tho

English Ambassador in Rome presented
a demarche

to Mussolini proposing

further negotiations.

is tlmt not

correct?

"A, On 28' September — yes, that is
right.

'Q.. And Mussolini, acting on^the British
suggestion, proposed to Hitler tha.t
the Munich conference be called, is
that

correct?

"A. Not that way. Not the way you, put
it. He advised him to defer for
twenty-four hours and mobilization
or the marchlng-TrO"*^ers he planned,
so that time might still be given
for an International meeting.

Aii

"Q^-You personally do not claim credit
-for the calling of the Munich con
ference, do you?

TT'i. I can't rememher having done so,"
(?, 8714/715)

Von Kessel's attempt in his subsequent testimony to

revive this contention, by stating that ".TSIZSAECKSR
denied calling the conference because of his,inclination

to meJie understatements, requires no oomr.rGnt,

(T, 9464).

WEIZSA£CK5R also claimed that he co-authored the

draft of German proposals that subsequently^ became the
•Munich Pact,

It is notevrcrthy that in two defense exhibits

describing this historic d.ay ('¥oiz, Sxh^ 65, Doc. 39,
Welz. D,B, I_G, p. 51: Henderson's book, "Failure of a
Mission"; and Welz, Sxh. 67, Doc, 377, Woiz, D.B, I-C,

p. 58:

Luciolli's book, "Mussolini andFurope"), no

mention is made of W3IZSASCKFK.

'

'

Further,' Goering in his testimony befo'-^e the IMT

'

referred to von Neurath as his collaborator in efforts

to maintain peace, but in npwise mentions V/EIZSAICKER.

(Pros. 2xh, G-326, NCl-5865, D.B. 204, P. 16).

Therefore,

^^SIZSABCKBR's role, if my, in prep-aring the. proposals,
"^as an extremely minor one,

WBIZSABCKIR testified that ho p.artlcipated with

von Neurath and Goering in drawing up a peaceful
u... »

ki'

settlement of the Gudeten question; and after the draft

f>V

was approved V/SIZ^ABCK3R,

(<t'

to circumvent Ribbentrop,

forwarded it iinmo41atGly via ,^ba0Rador Attolico to
Muesollni,

Thus, Hibbentrap the following day was sur

prised when the Duce prevented his introduction of a

more radical plan by submitting the proposals as his
oani.

(T, 7723).
However, a careful analysis of the clouded evidence

presented reveals the following:
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VfEIZSAiCICSR himself

stated how the

draft was allegedly made;

, Poliey ras not 'brewed up in a

Giosed room whe">^e you were sitting
around a

table In Hitler!s Reich

'-'hancellor^'", but it was developed
when people were standing around them's were porh-apa twenty of them
standing around there, and every
body had his word to say, even the
youngest adjutant, and during these
occasions.I succeeded in mixing with
these circles and having my sai''. "

J
\

(T. 7722(K
b.
the

'G.

The draft provided that Germany rooieve

Sudetenland.

(T» 7723).

7f5IZ3AHlCK5R testified that i t wa.s Goering

'who took the draft to Hitler, and the Bkiehrer

a.pproveci of it,

(T. 8715).

d. Despite his contention, ^-^nd othei:* evidence
adduced to support it, that he deliberately

by-passed Ribbentrop,
was revealed

the following evidence

by 'yRIZSAZCKSR under cross-

exai'iiinationS

"Q,. At the time the draft wa.s prepared

in" the Reich ^Chancellery, Ribbentrop
was not present,
Ao I

is that correct?

think he wa.s present

"Qo Ribbentrop was informed of the
draft, was he not, prior to the con
ference?

"A, You mean before the iv'amich con

ference.
I think that Ribbentrop at
any rate on the eve of the conference,
still prepared, a draft of his own,
possibly containing counter-proposals.

At least he may hay£ tried, though itv
never saw the light of the da,y.

I

0anc t sa.y fojr certain whethe.r Ribben
trop actuaTly had" Lhls paper on hand '
a t tHat time or "ncTb^
"Q.. You did not inform Ribbentrop of
this draft?

"A.

X don't know for certain vhether

he actually had it - whether he got i t
from me or perhaps from Goering or
from von Neurath or from Hitler himself,

I don't know«

In Any case he made a

dr.aft of his own.

But the possibility exists that
you gave him that draft, doesn t
as you h^^ve Just said?

it,

"A, I don't wish to be more precise

%
:v:

r>-

c'",f,.,

:

ft';:.
L/')-

atoout that point because I ^

not

so "cor-taln as to what a.otuall,y
happonod.-,. • •

•-. •

!'Q,. Waen Ribbent.voj) had this addi

tional draft prexDared, he took ^t

tq Hitler, did he not^ or ore you
hot'certain of the'f acts?

'< .f

|[A. I ohn't say, nor dq I knqw whether,

fgr InqtancQ, that'night'Rlb'^ehtrgp "

•V

wenf'to Munich in'Hitler's 'train, or
whether he went in a

I can't say.

train of his owrn.

It's possible that he

mot him in Munich but l

that for ce^rtain, " • ( t7

don't know

ruhdrrXihing~supj511ed),
gV Vjl

e.

The signing of the Munich Pact dest.'"02''od

. •

ail hope of a Giilitarx^ xoutsch, the very

J

(

V

plot that V/RlZSilRCiCXR allegedly was abetting,
(T. 7549),

Thus, from the testimony of T7SIZSAS0K:5R and his '
own witnesses have arisen the contradictions

appear rabovo.

that

In'fact, it is difficult from the con-

fllcting defense testimony to determine whether.

'^EIZSASCICXR deliberately circumvented Hlbbcntrop to
any great extent, or whetht^r Ribbentrop prepared any

other draft, or whether the -^uehrer saw it.

.

It too

must be noted that hitler, who made the final decisions,
approved of this peaceful solution which contained the

proviso that the Sudetenland be ceded to G-ernany,
although allegedly a member of 'the plot to remove
(

Hitler, IVSIZSAHCKRR simultaneously claims co-authorship
of the very policy that crushed the reeistg.nce,

;

At most, this defense reveals that V\fSISSARCKRR
functioned a a top-level pol 1 cy-ra••-'ker,

that he was

able to influence the Fuehrer, and that he participated,
in creating the Munich Pact,' the scene, by 'yElZSARCKSR' s

admission, of Hitler's greatest diplomatic triumph.
(T,8720),

ii;-, -"a,

,:'?3
•'c'l'

2.

POST-MUMCH CHAPTSR.
IDITRODUCTICN

Events quickly rover led thnt the Munich poet rres morely the stepping
1

stone for the total dismcinbormcnt of now hapless Czechoslovakia,

Al

though the liunich pact was a four-power pact v/hich vras accepted^ though

rW

reluctantly, by Csochoslovakia, the evidence has revealed that it v/as
entered into by the Germans with mental reservationso . It to.s one of a
series of camouflaged moves of German foreign policy which eased the

attainment of the ultimate goal, the con5)letc subjugation of Czecho
slovakia,

Repeating the pattern of the prioi aggressive acts, German

foreign policy was double-pronged:

the internal dissolution T;as effected

by intrigue culminating in acts of secession by the .Slovakian and carpatho/

Ukrainian minorities, coupled with the custoxnary allegation of persecution
\\

of the German minority in Czechoslovald-aj and in contravention of the

Munich Agreement, Germany refused to enter into a colloctivc guarantee
because conditions allegedly had so altered that Cscchoslovakia had become
the unilateral concern of the Third Reich,

VJEIZSAECKER played a particu

larly significant role in cooperation with Ribbcntrop in the formulation
and execution of this policy, which permitted Germany to continue her ex
pansion oa.stvxard.

Ambassador Coulondre of France accurately described .the prevailing
German diplomatic attitude:
"The Munich-Agreement, completed bj'" the Ahglo-Gorman
and French-German declarations, meant in Gerna.ny's

eyes the right for the Roich to organize Ceatrai. and
South-Eastorn Europe as she v/ishod, with the tacit
approval or at le-^st the complaisance of the great
Western povvors. For months this version found daily
expression in the groat Gorman novrspapors, officially

inspired, as the reports from the Embassy have often
sho\m, I myself have moro than once noted the sajnc
state of mind in Horr von Ribbcntrop and Horr von

-•Ml

Woizsacckor3 both of whom expressed a certain astonislimcnt whenever I have dra.-m their attention to

the fact that France, as a great European power,
intends to bo consulted In all that pertains to

li.i

Europe, and that on this, misunderstanding did in

fact exist."

' •

(pros, Exh, C-32S, 2943—PS^ D. B« 204a

P, 31) (underlining supplied), -

^

sir Iii.RY OF BVIDRMCE

''JSIZSkSCKSR testified that the Munich i^greement satisfied him
I

and in rather mystical- language vaguely asserted that it gave

"Fate" a chance to right things(T.7723/2U); and"only during the
second vfeek in March 1939 i t became quite clear to me and the

persons in

confidence^ what Hitler's a:jj:as Tfere"(.T.f791).

In a circular letter on 3 October 1938,vfhich designated
"v;hat language our missions v/ould have to use^or v/hat terminology
they WGuld have to use,if in diploraatic conversations they
/
I

should be asked about the Munich conference"(T,8721),VrDlZS/JilCI3R stated:
" The fears cropping up in tho press of various countries
in Southeastern "Europe that the Munich result v/as

dictated and ©cnstituted only the stepping stone to
further German territorial demands in Southeastern

Europe,are completely without fcundationilPros .rxh,3520,
NG-17d9, D.B.97-A., P.82) (Underlining supplied)
A.t this tirae VJEISSAECIIER was v/ell aware that the acquisition of

the Sudetenland did not mean the culmination of German foreign policy.

Ten days before Munich,••Toerraann

on 19 September 1938 had proposed to

7JEIZ3/iEGKER and Ribbentrop;

"As to the fate of the rest of Czechoslovakia, of the
many possibilities ranging from a siiiiple annexation to
full national independence vfith and ;d.thout an inter

national guarantee, the most far-reaching possibility,
namely that of an annesatioh is out of question for the
time being, since othervrise, there v/ould be no sense in
discussing tlie terns of the right to autonomy of the

Sudeten-Germans," (Pros.Exh.C-385, NG-5639,D.B.206,?.l)
(Underlining supplied)
After reviewing future aims of Hazi foreign policy, he concludes:
"Under no circumstances must the solution of the Sudeten-

German ques'tion be dela^/ed by negotiations and discuss
ions on the aforementioned problems. For these reasons
we v/ill have to see to i t *that in future discussions

v/ith the British, tho Sudeten-German problems on the
one hand and the other problems on the other liar/i be

treated differently ^.vith regard to the time."(Ibid P.U)
(Underlining supplied)
Moreover IVEI2SAECKER as chief-of the Germn Delegation attended

the meetings of the International Commission on 2-U October 1938 and

admitted that the Gerraan military demands were most extensive,though
he alleged he tried to curb them(T.8722). Moreover the French

Ambassador on h October 1938 reported;

\
'

".-(.Their influence(Gerhian)is felt v.atliin the Inter

national Couu.iission it-self ,v;here they assurae the atti
tude of victors v/ho liave the right to'formulate im

perative demands... .i.t the very moment when the German
army is occupying the mountains which have hitherto been
the historic frontiers of Bohemia, they are scanning
the horizon^ in search of nevr deraands to formulate,nev;

battles to fight out, nev/ prizes to conquer" (Pros ,Exh.
•>328,

29l;3-P3, D.B.20li,F,21)

i.nd on 5 October Woermann recommended to V/SI23iiECI3R and RibbenI

trop h:l:iat an independent Slovalcia "would be a weak political
organism and hence would lend the best assistanse to the German need

for advance and settling space in the tiast.'(Underlining in original)
(?ros.Sxh.98,HG-3056, D.B.3-B, P.2U^.)
On 10 October 1938 V/SI23l1ECI\KR sent a circular telegram to
German missions abroad, stating that the German diplomatic" attitude
would be to support Hungary^s demand for neighboring Czech territoryj

and in the Slovak, Carpatho-Ukranlan and Bratislava questions,he stated;
\

"We vjill not at the moment take any particular action
in any of these questions. The comon slogan is:

Self-deteruiination"(Pros ,Sxh,99, NG-32ul,D.B<,3"3,P.2U9)
vUnderlining supplied"!.
See also examination of I'JEIGSiiECKISR by Tribunal on this Exhibit
'J

I

(T.7788/7789).

v

• V

Ambassador Coulondre comraonted in retrospect on l6 i;ferch

ay

1939 on this slogan of "self-determination";

"It is the principle of the right of peoples to seiCdetermination that Germany now invokes in support ^

of the independence (in any case purely illusory) of
Slovakia, but this same right is refused to the Carpatho-Ukranians abandoned to Hungary, and to the_ Czechs,
who have been forcibly incorporated in the Hoich"

(Pros,Exh.C-328, 29U3-P3j D,Be20U, P.27).

V/EIZSAEGIOUR introduced evidence and testified as aforementioned,
that liis role in the International Commission V'/as to smooth

things out and insure that the radical German military demands v/ere

pushed ipto the background.(T.8722).However,the following were the
actual scope and results of the Cominission's work;

"Actually, it very soon appeared, during the work of the
International Goimnisaion at Borlin at the beginning of
October, that the German negotiators were guided far more
by strategical than by ethnographical considorations.The
numerous interventions of ohe \/0hrriiachts ObGrkommando dur

ing the coui^sc of these negotiations showed that the
German loaders intended above all to draw a frontier

which would deprive Czechoslovakia of all her natural
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defenses and fortifications and vrould reduce her to

complGte railitarj'- irapotence, Indeed^the boundaries which
the hrague Govemuont had to accept in October meant

the inclusion of 8^0^000 Czechs witliin the Keich".
(Ibid, P,26)(Uiiderlining supplied).
Further, "/EIS3AEGICSR informed V/oormann on 10 November 1938 that he saw

the Czech rep:r:esentatiye,Mr Stoupal and pressed for close Czech
CQoperatiop with h^ermany.^yEISSi^CKSR also stated:
"ivS Ilr, Stoupal started to speak of the border question,
I told him brutally that in this respect his government
had made a bad mistake and v;ould have to react positively

to the solution proposed by us today", (Pros.3xh,10U,
NG~3250 ,0.3.3-3,p.261).
Though IKISSifcECKSR testified that Hitler as a result of the itoich

pact regarded hua as a "defeatist"(T,7725)jon 12 October 1938 he received
..

M

a lengthy report from Godesberg on Hitler's discussion with Ribbontrop
concerning the activity of the International Commission and

future German policy toward Czechoslovakia (ProseExh,C-3U8,
I®

NCi-5750, D.B.20h,P.ll). %

Thus, it is clear that V/EI23AEGISR was fully informed that Munich

was not the end and that he was participating in further Gerraan designs
on Czechoslovakia,Further since V/EI23AECKER claims such close contact

with the highest military circles,it is noteA7orthy to mention that the
N

Fuehrer on 21 October 1938 issued the military directive for the

"liquidation of tpe remainder of Czechoslovakia" (Trial of iajor Vlar
Criminals, Vol,l,P.197).
During November and part of December 1938 i.lEI23i».RCKSR was on

vacation(T.7725,7729), Shortly after his return he .on 22 December 1938
sa'^thc French /unbassador Caulcndre i.'ho brought up .the question of the

German guarantee to Czechoslovakia, VEIZ3iiECI'!ER flatly rejected the
guarantee and now defends his course of action on two shaky bases:

Firstly, Hitler v/as not desirous of giving it. Thus ViSIZSAECISR did

not wish to perturb hira by having the question raised again(T,7790),
Secondly, he states that Ribbentrop on 6 December 1938 had conferred
in 'Paris with the French Foreign Minister, Bonnet, and they h£-d agreed
that the French would remain disinterested in questions of
(T.8813).

-:5CH

tern Surope.
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HoTTovor, in ijnbassador Coulondre's report of the conversation,

the accuracy of which

adiiitted (T.3813/15), it is stated;

"lith regard to the international guarantee envisaged in
favor of Czechoslovakia, Baron von ' •eizsaccker v:as
reticent. Vflion I ruaindcd hira tk-.t in Paris Herr von
Ribbentrop had expressed his intention of recxaraining the
question, and asked whether there were any new dovelopiuents,

ho ansvfored in the negative," '(Pros.Sxh,
D,3. 20U, P»23) (Underlining supplied).

29U3~P3,

On cross-examination too, T/EIZ3iJ]CISR admitted that the French had not
abandoned interest in the guarantcic question, as he previously had
\

alleged." (T,88lii) The report continues:
" 'Could not this matter', ho (Woizsaecker) asked with a
smile,'be forgotten? Since Romany's predominance in that

area is a fact, would not the guarantee of the Reich bo
sufficient?' l(CoulondrG) did not fail to remark that
obligations entered into cannot be forgotten, and placed
the matter in its true liglit. But I received the impression

that my interlocutor iiad already made up his mind"(Ibid)
^.Underlining supplied)"^
Vfe submit that this document affords an excellent illustration of the

soft,but effective,manner in v/hich vrH;i23u-,SCICER occasionally conducted
his diplomatic negotiations .".TEIhSAECKSR tried to persuade the French

representativo that Gorraany should for the sake of harmony bo lightly
excused from her obligations under the luunich Pact and Hitler bo given
I

'

a free hand toward Czechoslovakia,
\

on 28 December 1938 informed Ribbentrop of his
conversation with Count Hagistrati,Italian Ghargcl d'^J'fairos,on the
guarantee question:
",,.I told iiagistrati instead that I recently explained

to the French ij:ibassador vdthout any restraint tliat

Czechoslovakia depended c^lusivoly on Germany. The
guarantee of any other pov/er was of no use.The
Czochoslovalcia of today is different from that of the

times a guarantee v;as under discussion.(Pros.mxh,112,

NG-2786, D,B.3-B,P.301) (Underlining supplied)

^8 on 30 December I936 TfKISS/iBClGR similarly informed the Hungarian
representative (Pros.nxhll3,NG-3l29, D.B.3-B, P.302), ,
tostir,iony of his activities during the period from

the Coulondrc conversation on 22.Docomboi 1938 till 10 liarch 1939 was

evasive and solf-contradictory,Ho on ono hand stated that only about
10 March did Hitler's intentions bocome clear to him and his

collaborators (T.77325 %7791)jand that nobody in the Foreign Office

r

i '.rl'.-if
\

knovf "vrhat vias being cooked up"(T.7731) •, On the other hnnd he
testified that when he returned frou leave in Decombcr 1938^110
"found out that Hitler would herdly remain-peaceful" and that

v/arsavf or Prague was the next target (T.7730) 5 also on crossoxaraination ho stated, "But I Viras alanaed during the ontire winter"*

(T.8831).The afgreiaentioned and subsequent recitals of cvid-ence
establish tiiat VJSIZS^SCICEK was fully av/aro of the goal of Gorman
foreign policy and participated in effecting it,

Jirs.Radlova, daughter of the late- Czech President Kacha testified
that the German radio from January 1939 onward 'incessantly broadcast

false reports of alleged ill-treatment and porsesution of Goriiians in-

Czeehcalovakia(T-519/520)- although V/I]I213idilGI-CER refused to state whether
he was alarmed by the stories of alleged persecution of these Germans

which wore played up in January and February 1939 in the German Press,
he admitted;

"I was alarmed, and I didn't need the newspapers for
tliat.I h^d other and more impbrtant information and
news" (t.8811)^

1

On 8 February 1939, the British and Frehch Governments
</

presented identical notes to the German Govornraent which declared

that they vfere of the opinion tliat the moment had come to settle the
.

%

question of a collective guarantee in favor of Gzecho-Slovakia, as
I

•

provided for in the -Ilunich P^ict; and the opinion of Germany was

•

rGquestedCPros.Sxh.3523, iIG-5358, D.B,97->., P.89).
On 22 Pcbruaryj ''/EIZ-S^iECICER received the Czech Chargd d'iiffaires

who handed hir.i a Note of his governraent which raised the guarantee/

'

question.Czechoslovakia vias prepared to give a pledge of strict neutrality

and absolute Non-intervention in the! disputes of tliird powers. The
Czech representative further stated that similar Notes vrere handed

simultaneously to the other nations concornod in the guarantee

question namely,England, France, and Italy. VffilZS-'^ECKER in his reply sai^^;
"Vmether the step taken by' the Czechoslovak Government
was taken here in Berlin half an hour earlier or later

did not seem to me to be relevant. It" struck me, however,
that the Czechoslovak Government applied sir.iultaneously
to all the four Hunlch Powers in such a question, without

first entering into discussions with us alone.,."(Pros.Exh.
3522, NG-5357, D.B.97-i., P-85).
-5^
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Such a course of action naturally upset Geraan plans to restrict
the guarantee question to bilateral discussions bctviroen
Czechoslovakia and Gornany, to the former's obvious disadvantage,

T/GI2SfJ5CIQ3R reserved the ans".'cr of his government(Ibid).

Prosecution Exhibit 3523(NG-5358^ p,B_97r-n-j P.89)
contains a series of drafts, and the final memorandum of the

German Foreign Office's reply to the Notes of 8 February,
The second draft is followed by a handwritten page by i7EI23f-ECESR,

containing his recomra? nendations of the reasons to be ^employed
as alleged justification for rejecting the guarantee question.
He proposed;

" The geographical situation of Czechoslovakia, the
political events of last autu-ian, in vfhich the
entanglement of the country in far-roaohing
international political agreoments have played
a part are increasing the crisis and also the
development of.events in Czechoslovakia since
the conclusion of the ilunich Pact mt.ko i t ~
seem questionable whether- a collective '

guarantee of the Czechoslovak state is really
corresponding to existing natural interests"

\ -v?
\

(Ibid, P,91)(Underlining supplied)
(It is to be noted that the underlined theme was also

subsequently employed by VffilSSiJlCNER in condemning the British
guarantees in the Polish question, as shall bo shovm hereinafter#)

-'A -
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The tenor of rETZSASCKER^s recommendations, though not the exact

rrording, vrere incorporated into the final note that -.:as transmitted on

2S Febrv^ary 193S to the British and French Governments (ibid, p* 91-94).
VEIZSAECKER on cross-examination so admitted (?• Co21),

It may be noted

that prior to a discussion of this exhibit, t/EIZSASCKSR had emphatically

declared that he of cqursp v;oul!i

the decisive person

fayo:ced 3 guarsntee if he had been

S821)^ if so, ^at did not prevent him from play

ing a prominent part in formulating just the opposite policy.
On 3 March 1939 YJEIZSABGKIE Informed the Czech Minister in Berlin,

Mastny, that the German view in regard to the Czech incuiry of 22 Febru

ary could be seen from the German replies to England and France on 28

February,

(pros. Sch. 3524, KG-5302, D. B. 97-A, P. 95).

This indirect

method of repl;?- to a Note by a government Germany maintained diplomatic re—
lations v;ith iras most irregular.

Mastny was most nervous, V/EIZSAECKER

noted, at this unusual -treatment of the Czech inquiry.

'Tuen Mastny stated

that he was of the opinion that time for a guarantee was ripe and v^oiild
aid Czechoslovakia, "EIZSAECKER curtly replied:

'qrithout discussing this objection, I replied to Mastnj'' tnat
our information prompted us to take the opposite viev^; v/e

just wanted to avoid backdiig up'the disturbing elements by
a premature guarantee," (Ibid,, p. 9^).
The v/itness padiova testified that she had heard pr, Hawelka, Chief
of the Czech presidential Chancellery, inform President Hecha that _

"EIZSAECKER had refused to grant an audience to the Czech diplomat Huber
Masarik (t. 520), Although first denying the veracitj'" of her testimony,
bJEIZSAECKER on cross—examination disclosed that he had refused to see

MasarilCj who subsequently ^-ivas seen by Altenburg, referent for C'-'Ochoslovakia, upon orders of Ribbentfop (t. 8831). 'TEIZSAZCKSR on 3 March

1939 had himself reported to Ribb'entr6p:

'T'l

"M' stny at last tried to bring to me Chvalkovj'sky's (Czech

Foreign Minister) messenger, the Czechoslovak Minister Masarik,
vrtao happened to be in the Foreign 0"fice building- Knowing
vdaat Masarik had on--his mind, I turned aside the suggestion."

This proof confirms Radlovais testimony,

' -'ibj

clearly, VEIZSAECKSR acted

on his own initiative, rather than on orders from Ribbentrop and took the
unusual step of refusing to see the Czech diplomat.

The eve of the aggres—
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sion against Czechoslovakia was on hand.

Before preceding to a discussion of the last daysj the crisis period
between 10 and 15 liarch 1939,

s own statements on the situa-.

tion are most pertinent. He testified on direct examination that frpm

Deeember 193S'onj there was "open hostility" between uibbchtrop and him
(T. 7725); and, further, only about the lOth of mardi did information
leak through concerning Hitler's intentions toward CzedioslQvakia. He
I

testified:

/

Uell, if you take it in its essence, nothing was done
through diplomatic channels at that time-. No preparations

were made. At least none by the For^gn Office." (T. 7732).
.-Und he further stated on cross-examination that Ribbontrop kept him comr^letely in the dark dur-ing'tho last days:

"Q: .... let us drop this guarantee question, 3.n?on, and turn
to the last days - the crisis - v.hich you stated from 10 to 15
I.iarch you wore not kept continually informed by ilib:>entrop and

so forth. Novf, you personally thought though, as Secretary of

State, that you should have been informed of developments in
the normal course of. affairs. Isn't that correct?

"A: Undoubtedly, if' a relation of corifidenco had existed, the
Foreign lb..- stci would certainly have had to inform his State
Secretary about everything that he, the Foreign Minister, knew,

'"Q: .A-h, consoquently, to you this •'.Jas just another confirmatiion, was it not, of Ribbentrop's singleiianiling of his and
Hitler's ventures, is that not correct? '
"A: 1-. what respect all alone or singlehanded?

"Q: -.jellj 1 meant in the respect that he did not consult or .inform you fuir.y - but rather hL.iself, with Hitler, and a few of

his close cohorts, as

theSo other affairs, worked out the

solution thamsolves, isn't •Uaat correct?

"A: vTao more it went on, "the more correct it turned out to be.
O-;-- 7 eb.._t3.onship continued to doVelope along those lanes.

">2: And during the course of tlio period ironi 10 or 11 to 15

March, you wero mori or less completely ignored by iiibbentrop,
v/orc you not?

"A: Of course 1 d^n't know exactly what Hbbentrop told mc

during this peri-od of four days, out 1 believe it i^ correct,
I believe it v/as very little. I drew the conclusions, however,
from otiier information that 1 received.

"Q; .From Canaris, do you mean'
"A: I

beli.:.ve

that these v/Gre/..jieces of information 1 got from

hose
Dr. KcjT'dt in thos

days."(T. SS2o/SS27) (UiUerlining supplied).
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Tho folloYiing evidence denonstrr.tes tjiat '•JEIZSAECKER not only shared
/

the. full confidGncG and vaas kept fully informed by tho Foreign Minister^

but that ho also participated actively in the diplomatic phase of this
aggressive step,
Tho portions of tho prosecution Briefs against the defendants Ti^oesgn-

mayer and Kopplerj outlining thoi?; rqlc -in ef|!octiiig the secession of

Slgvalda pifier the d:Lrcptipn pf the Fpnoign pff^ccj are inqprporated heroin
by reference and ma.de a part hereof.
✓

In a circular telegram to the Gorman missions abroad on 10 March 1939;

VEIZSASCKER in detail reviews diplomatic relations r/ith Czechoslovakia

up-to-date,

1VEI2SASCK.1R again refers to tho aforementioned visit of

Mararik and discloses that the Qzochts message vjr.s one of appeasement:

Czechoslovakia promised tho closest coopera.tion vrith the Reich in economic

and financial questions-, Germany v:as to control the disarmr.ment of tho
Czech armj^ and other concessions v/gre to be granted, obviously to prevent
any further aggressive act by Gcrma.ny,

VffilZSAECKSR states:

"The reply to Masarik ivas that the questions broached
could onljT- be discussed betvfcen^Minister and Minister.

Apart from that, it Yvas our viev; that tho Czechoslovak
Cabinet still had a groat'number of other questions to

solve.M

(pros. Exh. 3526, NG-5311; D. B. 97-A, P. 100).

A similar approach by tho Czech Legation at Berlin on 9 H"nch vras also

rejected (ibid).

VJEIZSASCKER admitted that Ribbcntrop had furnished this

information to him (T, 3S29),

v/EIZSAECKER on tho same day, 10 March, initialed a telegram sent by
tho Germa.n consul at Bratislava, Slovakia, which contained a report by

Vcesenmayer to tho Foreign Office.

Vcesenmayor declared that Tiso, still

Minister President of Slovakia, vrould not sign tho appeal to tho Fuehrer

for help, but had ompovrered Burcanski, one of his ministers, to act in his
name,

(pros. Exh. 3525, NG-5356, D. B. 97-A, P. 97), VJEIZSABCKBR admitted

that Tiso adopted such a course because he still held official officd,

(T* 8828);, ;^.nd further,' I"JEIZSAECKBR stated tb"t ho vras now aware that tho
final crisis was on hand (ibid).
The following day General Keitel forwarded to the Foreign Office tho

military demands for a proposed ultimatum against Czechoslovakia. This high^
ly secret informhtion was distributed on 12 March to VEIZSAECKER (pros,

'

Exh. 118, NG-3956, D. B. 3-B, P. 313)- On 15 March, Hacha vras forced to
I

u-.-i;.
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agpoe to those terms. (i.'SLZS.-iJia.-SRis copyi FroSiSiii* 123j NG-3917, Di3. 3-3
P. 331 - card D).

On 11 Jfe.rch

vJEIZSASCKER in a private letter informed

Mackensen, German Ambassador to Italy, that for the next two days
Ribbentrop and he will avoid contact vath foreign diplomats. He

stated that an acute state of alert had been established^ and that,

similarly to the Anschluss with Austria, Italy will be kept in the

,

liiformation for the Axis friend are supposed to be given
at this stage in a similar manner as a year ago"

(Pros.Sxh.3527, NG-5362, D.B.97-A,P.10l;

(A discussion of USIZSAECKJIE's relations to Attolico, and their
alleged cooperation in efforts to maintain peace, will be reserved

to a subsequent chapter, treating with defensesybf VSIZSASCKER in
connection with the aggression against Poland.)

j^SIZSAPCICER saw Attolico on 12 I-larch at a performance at the

Berlin Opera House. In conformity'" with Ribbentrop's instructions,
jEIZSAiCISR made no disclosures to the Italian Ambassador. (T.8832).
That same Slay, he informed Ribbentrop in detail about this encounter:
"As a matter of course, -"-ttolbo also asked me about the
present political situation. I gave evasive answers and

agreed with him when he told me that he opposed the
pessimism dispj.ayed by the ^ritish Ajnbassador. I told him
that according to my knowledge the situation was confused
and hazy; nothing was kno^vai of a "lenaan attitude-toward'

the events..." (Pros.Exh,3528, NG-5390, D.B.97-A,P.102),

.'JEIZSAECKER was similarly eva,sive in his encounter at the Opera

House with the Czech Minister^ as his memorandum to Ribbentrop on 12
'•arch indicates (Pros .3xh.3529,

NG-5389, D.B.97-A,P.103). V/ilEZSAECKER

cautiously admitted that he was pursuing the prevailing policy of not
disclosing Ggrman intentions to foreign diplomats (T,8839)«

The evidence thus conclusively establishes that WEIZ3ABCKER was in

close and constant communication with Ribbentrop; and that there was
full cooperation and exchange of information between the two, "^here-

fore, VviilZSAECKER's assertion that he did not possess the full confidence
of the Foreign Minister during this period can be given no credence.
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VJEIZSAKJKSIi also received a memorandum of 12 March^ containing
Keppler's report from ^ienna on the situation in Bratislava. In this
memorandum Ker^ler is addressed as State Secretary, and it is stated

that he was remaining in 'Vienna on instructions from Hibbentrop,
(Pros.Sxh,117, NG-3045, D,B,3-B,P,315)• ^his is in contrast to
•7SIZSA3CK3R's aforementioned contention that the Foreign Office
had no role in the Slovak question.

On 13 liarch 1939, >v'SrZSA3CKER informed Woermann that •'^^ibbentrop
at 9 P.M. that evening received Attolico at the latter's reouest,

('i'his was on the eve of the Tiso-Hitler conference: Pros .Sxh,120,
PS-2802, D.B.3-B, P.322). VSIZSASCKER testified that he w.^s either
present or that Ribbentrop shortly thereafter fully informed him

(T.8S40). Ribbentrop reviewed the situation of the past few days
and informed Attolico that Tiso had been invited to Berlin, and he
further revealed that the Hungarians had been given a free hand by
the Germans with regard to the Czech Carpatho-Ukraine (Pros.Sxh,
3530, NG-5386, D.B.97-A,P.104).
•^hus, it was Ribbentrop himself v/ho made limited disclosures to

Attolico. Ribbentrop did not express the German attitude or proposed
course of action, but mex-ely stated that the situation was being "
carefully observed and Germany's reaction was uncertain (ibid,P.105).
..-iZ^SAlCxvER in a.'i memorandum to Ribbentrop on I4 March states that

Ambassador Attolico that morning remarked:
11
♦

•

•

it might be asVced in Rome, why we had given a free

hand bo the Hungarians as regards Carpatho-Ukraine,

without first contacting Rome", (ibid, P.106),

.'vEIZSAj3CKIR saw Ambassador Henderson of England on this tjame
morning of I4 llarch, ivoermann in summarizing this conversation
stated'

To the question of Henderson whether we wanted to dis

member or maintain Czechoslovakia, the Sfcate Secretary
answered that we were only interested in the establishHenderson than advocated the establish

ment cf direct contacts between Germany and Czecho
slovakia. whereupon the State "^ecretary replied that
we are too interested in realising legitimate German
interests

in a decent manner, IVhen Henderson
-.58-

mentioned the Munich Agreement, the State Secretary
remarked

that the Munich -Agreement aimed at and

achieved the maintenance of peace and for"the rest was '

already 'a matter of the past"
D.B.97-A,P.110)

(Pros.jS3fh.3532, NG-i+844,

(Underlining supplied)

\SIZSAli)CK5IR admitted the accuracy of this reproduction of the

conversation (T.8B44), but he claimed that he gave Henderson a
"hint" of coming events.

He stated that Henderson's reproducti©n •'

of the conversation bore him out (T.7732, 7791)* However, a thorough
examination of this defense exhibit (Hendersons's book, "Failure of
a iiission")

reveals no such veiled hint.

Rather, Henderson stated:

"I found "/eizsaecker completely noncommittal,

all that he

could assure me was that whatever was done would be done

in a ' decent' manner,.
once.,,

He repeated that phrase more than

yet I cannot blame Vveizsaecker," Hitler had taken

his decision on the preceeding afternoon, and that v;as
the end of the matter.

Weizsaecker could not have

told me less, but he equally could not tell me more."

"...^"'hen I

had sooken in the strongest terms against the

use of troops, V.'eizsaecker had protested that the behavior
of the German ^rmy was always 'decent' " (?/eizsaecker

Ibdiibit 82,Doc.37^ VJeizsaecker D.B.l-C, P.91)
(Underlining supplied )

'^^hus, itwas Henderson, not V/EIZSAj2CK3R, who brought up the

question of the use of German troops for aggressive purposes. Further,
it must be recalled

thcat Henderson enjoyed excellent personal relat

ions with VJSIZSAIUKSR.

'iJEIZSA3CKjSR's cryptic description of the

German action being "decent" requires no comment.

On 14 fferch, ^'iTSIZoAECKiS

and Ribenntrop were informed that as a

consequence of the declaration of independence by Slovakia, the

Carpatho-Ukraine had followed suit and aopealed to the Reich far

protection (Pros.3xh. 3531, NG-5391, D.B.97-A,P,107).
The sands were running out,

6.P.M. that evening, Ribbentrop

again saw /ambassador -^ttolico, as V/ZIZSASCKER's memorandum discloses,
Attolico was informed that conditions in Czechoslovakia were chaotic,

that President Hacha had requested a conference v/ith the Fuehrer,

and that ^enrian troops were about to march. (Pros .IMi,3533,NG-53S5,
D.B,97-A, p.112), *"'TSIZS.IECKER admitted that Ribbentrop had provided
him with thir information too

(T,8846), obviously to keep him

completely posted.
-5.9-
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On the evG of tho Hachn conference

sent out on

/

14 March a circular belegraia to all missions ab road for official
vordinga

He recounted the alleged chaos in Czechoslovakia_, the

"persecution" of ethnic Oerms.ns there^ the invasion of the Carpatho—
Ukraine by Hungarian military forces; and then he furnished the
diplomatic pretext for anticipated German intervention:

"In this serious situation ^'the ^eich government was forced
to take the necessarj'" steps^ conscious of its responsibility

for the securing of peace in Gentral Europe and for the
purpose of eliminating the chaotic conditions on the Eastern
frontier of the Reich v/hich are intolerable to the interests

of the ^^eich"

(Pros»Ech,3534/ HG-4B45j D.B.97-AjP• HA-) •

At about 4 P.K, 14 tiarchj German troops invaded parts cf
Czechoslovakia (Maehrisch-Ostrau) and limited fighting ensued (T.524)
T/EIZSAECICER was one of the few high-ranking officials selected
.a^
to be present at the ^hha-Hitler
conference, which was initiated at

approximately midnight between 14 and 15 March (Pros.Ejdi, 122,

PS—2783, D.B,3—BjP,325)»

In regard to this conference^ which b ore

an uncomfortable parallel to the Schuschnigg conferenco

of the

preceding year, MEISSAE3IGR stated:

^a

• '•'1

" Q» You were aware, hov;evor, that the fate of Czecho
slovakia was sealed before Hacha came to -derlin, is that
correct ?

" A. I feared that -

yes,"

(T,3846)

The minutes of this conference clearly

disclose without

elaboration that President Hacha vjas presented with a fait accompli;
and that he only signed the sham agreement vihen Hitler bluntly
infomrcd him that the u^nriran invasion would be launched at 6 A.M.

and resistance would be futile (Pros,Exh. 122, PS-278S, D,b,3"B,P.325:)
(See also:• T,526),
summoned Hacha

1'he wit'ness Radlova's statement that Hitler

(1,523) wa.s contested;

bub at the conferende Hitler

stated that "he^gret-ted that he had to require this Journey of the
President" (Pros,-^1.122 supra, P«326),

VJEIZS/iSEKER bsstified bhit he vfis only present for bhe first

part of the conference^ about 45 minutes, and he then left (T,8883)j
\

and that he

"oaly had the role of a stagc-h^nd"

(T,7733),

However, "^'JEIZSAIiCKER did in fact participate in more than a nominal
fashion in this

conference•

The minutes of the conference state:

"After the conference between.Hacha and Chvalkowsky
with our gentlemen, at the conclusion of which one had ^
come to an understanding cn the wording of the agreement,
the gentlemen mentioned at the beginning of this memo

randum came together to a final discussion in the Fuehrer's

'study"

(Pros .^.122. PS--2738, D.B.3-B, .F.329)

(Underlining supplied;
Further, before the conference v;as ended

(T,88S3) UHIZS-^FCKFR

directed that a telephone call be made to the ^eiman Consul, von
Druffel, at Bratislava, to state that the .^hrmcht will also occupy

Slovakia by 6 a.ri^ and the cooperation of the Slovakian government
• is to be secured.

T'BIZSAEDKiiR said:

"Vie take it for, granted that the occupying 'German troops
will not meet any resistance, but, on the contrary,
be afforded ever -y necessary assistance" (Pros.Exh,3535j

NG-5304, D.B.97-A,P.116)
Von Druffels

reply stated

that UEIZSAECKER^s order communicated

throu^ Lltenburg had been executed

by 5 J 20 a.m. (Ibid,P.117)-

VffilZSAPCKER himself Admitted the call had occurred about the time

"vhen it was known that Hacha would be read^?- to sign" (T.8BS5).
'f-i

As German troops were invading Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939

VvEIZSAECKBR sent a telephone message bo various '^ermtan missions:
action in Czechoslovakia takes place in full
agreement of the Czechoslovakian govemmort "

(Pros.Exh, 123, NG-3917, D.B.3-B, P.331-A).

Attached to this communique in 'JBIZSABCKFR's file was a copy of the ^
Hacha Agreement (lbid,P.331-B). lirs, Radleva testified that after the
conference her father informed her that there were two misrepresent•

ations in the agreement: firstly, ho had desired to say that "the fafee ^
of Bohemia and Moravia is in Hitlers hands",

but the-ggreoment statf^d

"he placed' the fate" of his country in Hit-lor's hands; and secondly,
Hacha in defining his
of his Government"

authority deleted the phrase

"in the name

from the final draft and that the agreem-^nt
-61-
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•w,is thus not binding

(T.526J,

"'.rsiZS.iiCK^.t^ copy of the agreement

confirms the voracity of this testimony.

Vjhen ^ibbontrop journeyed on the morning of 15 March to Prague
✓

•

"with Hitler, he left IJEIZSAECKER, as his deputy, in full charge

of the foreign Office in Berlin . (T,889,5)

vdth the important

Responsibility of gently breaking the news o'f Germany!s latest
aggressive act to the diplomatic corps.

V7e submit thatjthis

demonstrates the confidence Hitler and -^ibbentrop had in VHSIZSAiCKHH's
ability to ma]i:e the aggression

palatable to other n?.tions, or at least

lessen the si ock as skillfullj'* as he could,
I

,

•

VvZIZSAZCKER admits- this, though he attempts to twist it to his
own advantage:

.vV

"Once the catastrophe had occurred, .all we could do
was to absorb the unavoidable international shock"

(T.-7792).

fVw

'

While Ignoring the role he played irl provoking the catastrophe
;V

"7EIZSA3DK2R contended

it ivas far.better for hLm, the man of peace,

to handle the affair so that n general conflict would be avoided
(T.7734).
On 15 March 193 9 ' h*SlZ3A2XIKIIR telegraphed jimbcwssador Mackensen

at ^^'rae that Prince Philip von Hessen, as Hitler's personal messenger,
was proceeding to Mussolini to explain the necessity and usefulness

of the '^Qpman action for"the

i

•4

joint strixing power of the Axis

powers"(Pros.Sxh. 129, ,KG-3406, D,3,3-B, P.320),
• :S"'I •'

V-I3IZSA5CICiSl saw ^fjnbassadojr Atbolico on • this morning of 15 March,
f

"ilhen the latter inquired about the extent of autonomy that

any

would grant to Caochoslovakia, VffilZSAZCKZR ropiiod that one could not
speak of a

"remainder of Czechoslovakia"'; and that Befoemia and
A

Moravia would'be placed under "German pro beet ion (Pros

3536,

KG^2976, ^,B»97-A,P,118), Hox'/ever, the wit fpss Radlova testified
that President Haclva was totally surprised when on 16 March the

Ggrmnh Foreign Minister* ahnour^ced the establishment of the German
?{{.•

^
/
\'k

r

..vA./if. •
- Ky . v,

• ••••• '

•M

Protoctora'te . (T,529)>

in viol-^tion of the proinise of autonon^r

contained in the Hacha AgroGment-• (Pros.Ebch, 123^ NG-S?!?^

D,B»3-B5 P.33I-B.) VrSIiSAZGZ^SR admitted Icnoviing as early as Xk
March of the veiled '^erman plans to establish -the Protectorate
(T,8880).

•

A'SEZSiilCKER's interview with Ambassador Coalondre at noon on

15 March illustrates the striking change in character tha.t h"i)IZSA!3CK2R
could assume.

It demonsSates hovj ably ho handled the ticklish role

^

of receiving the diplomats of other countries at this critical moment
and why his person was considered so necessary to the schene of
Gjarman foreign policy.

Ambassador Coulondre registered the Franch

Government's protest in regard to the Czech action in violation «f

the Munich Agreement.

(Pros.Ex;h.3537> WG-4800jD,B.97-A, P.119).

V/EIZSAFCK3R testified that his-mission was to reject abruptly any such

protests and that the conversation v^e.s allegedly "highly unpleasant
for me" (T.8887).

He contended that his role was to smooth things,^

but during this conversation he stated;
"I treated the ."unbassador from the beginning in a rather
harsh manner, told him that he should not^talk about the
Munich Agreement allegedly violated by us^ and abstain
from giving us any lessons.
Munich had contained two

elements, namely, the preservation of peace and the French
disinteressement in Sastern questions. Prance should,
after all, turn her eye towards the tVest upon her Empire
and stop talking about things where his participation,
as we icnow from experience, does not promote peaces.*
."^he -Ambassador then came back to the premature entry of
Gonnan troops into Moravia. I skipped over this matter
.and then adopted a more trustful tone
"It w.as not worth while to exaggef'ate this matter,

our common task, on t-he contrary, was, as far as possible,
not to allov; ^rman-French relationship to be affected '
by it," (Underlining supplied) (Pros.Sxh. 3537, MG-4800,
D,B.97-A, F.II9),

.'

After first being arrogant, A^SIZSAECICfiR then employed his winning

ways in an attQap."t to have the ^Vsnch swallow this bitter pill. • "
"Fhis was in accordance with the official foreign policy, to face

the world with a fait racconpli' arid then 4Doldly assert it is desirable

not to further Jeopardize the peace by cojnplaints., but rather to

cooperate - until Germ.'^ny pr-5sented a, new category of

''4
-j'i

•

"legitimate"

demands,

M.. •
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TIEIZS.yEK^R on IQ I^nrch informsd Ribbonbrop that that aftornoon

ho told Ambassador Hendsrson over the tolephono that a personal

discussion v^ould bo of no usg^ -and it "vould bo best if Honderson

omitted sendin.;^ any note,

Howevor, r/hen Henderson stated that he was

compelled to submit a protest^ W3I2S,^SCKER replied that it would be

better to do it in writing (Fros.Sxhc 353^: NCt-.3906j D,B. 97-rt_,P.122),
The following excerpt from the cross-cxanunation £%isbcablishcs
how "dEIZSA^KSR twists facts so as to buttress his contention tthatr, his

endeavors w^re alvjays peaceful,

''"ith reference to this 18 March 1939

conversation with Hondersonj ho testified:
"Q. .And you also suggested that ho not "bother to send
a note, since it should be of no Vralue. In this part
of your talk with Henderson, wore you actiiig on orders
from Ribbonbrop ?

"Ao Not altogether, n'o. I oxcoodod my instructions,
Ribbontrop had issued a dir ctive bo me not bo accept
any protests, .^nd ho said that Hitler had stated that.
And I told the British Ambassador over tho telephone
that if ho had --.nything to hand over in writing, he

should submit it to mo hy courier or by mail, instead of
bringing it to me in person.

"Q.

Did you first suggest, though, that ho not send f^note

at all which w^s rather an unusual diplomatic stop to take?
'A.

It may bo that the conversation began first by my

suggesting to Henderson thalt it TOuld bo best not bo send
anj'" note at all, since Ribbentrop had suggested that;
but later I added if he absolu, toly had to, he • should

do it in writing and not personaily.

"Q.»

Now you mentioned that in doing this you had more or

less

oxceedcd

from ^Hbbontrop.

bo a certain extent your instructions

But of

course you promptly reported

bo him that you had done this in telephone conversation with
Hgndorson, didn't you ?
n j

I don't know that

"Qt

Pardon me ?

"A.

That is improbable,

but I don't know it any more."

(Underlining supplied) (T,8890).

w-'
p."'

WEXZSA.dlCKSR'S second interview with iimbassador

at

Coulondre

lp.u. on 18 March 1939 demonstrated how well ho executed the

current policy, ^he ^rqach diplomat placed a note on V/SIZSAEGKSR's
table and requested that ho read it.

However, befor' picking up the

note, h'EIZSAjjDICKR inquired what it contained,

V.hen informed it

'i I-' i'-" i f I iWii-i-iV III -•"'rliilfriM

^', •>;:

contiined a'probostj ho said:

"I iramcdir.toly pat the nobo back into'its onvolbpo
rind pashcd lb back bo bho .'unbassador, with bho remark
bhab I rofused mosb decidedly bo accept any protest

from him regarding the Czechoslovak matter"

(Pros^ilxh,

3540, NG-5392, D.B.97-A, P.126).

^TEEZSASCIvER reiterated the legality of the '^erman-Gzech agreement
and then stated:

"I could not think that the French Government was holier

than the Pope and wished to interfere in'm?.tters which
had been agreed upon in an orderly fashion between

Berlin and Pr<?.guo" (Ibid, P.127).
VfEIZS-iFCKlR G'ontendod that at

last ho took the note, thus permitting

a protest to be registered. (T.7S33).
memorandum reveals a

However, hUZS/i-'ICKSR's own

different construction:

"The ;\mbassador refused to the very end to take back his

nobo, which was lying on my table, at the spjne time
asking the question as to whore the Franco-Gorman
relations would drift if we would no longer accept'
offici^il notes'handed in by their roprosenta.tives,

I, for my part, .doclinod to take notice of the paper;
should it remain between us, I viould consider it as
delivered to us through the mail."

(ibid, P.127/128)

(Underlining supplied).

^^"•i^IZSAlGKZR's reply, to the unspoken question of why no attempts
were made by the alleged resistance circle to halt the aggression
✓

against Czechoslovakia, was that there was no foreign nation interested
in opposing Hitler.

However, in a complicated non-sequitur, he at

the same time stated his efforts were dir«-;cted

to maintaining

European peace after Germany acquired the remainder of Czechoslovakia,

(1,9253). •'•he evidence is-, however, clear that there was during this
period no resistance avithin ^e^many (T.9466, 7389).

hEIZS.iECKSR

defined the type of rvjasbance he inwardlj'* would have desired:

"Judge Haguire:

Just one other question. Before Hitler
marched into Prague, did you want anyone
bo oppose him .among the European powers ?

'A*

A diplomatic discreet warning of the situation,
I would have considered useful, but nob open

resistance"

(T,9253)
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(Underlining supplied) ,

A. IM'RQDuCTION^
With the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia ef

fected, i-oland became the next

objective.

German leaders

had long considered compelling loland to surrender uanzig
and the Polish Corridor in order to permit the further ex

pansion of Greater Germany eastward.

As early as.24 ivovem-

ber 1S38, Hitler had ordered military preparations for the
t

occupation of nanzig (I'rial of i^iajor ^mr Criminals, Vol. 1,

I

P. 198/199).
The pattern of German foreign policy that had hithertofore been so successful was again employed-

Poland was

subjected to constant diplomatic pressure, bacxea by the

f

threat of armed Intervention-

In order to Isolate roland

V

(. »'>^v •

politically, a widespread diplomatic campaign was launched

to blame the Poles for refusing Germany's "legitimate"
claims.

Ganzig was secretly militarized, and incidents

were manufactured, under German direction.

The Poles were

accused of oppressing the German minority in their country.

When hngland and Prance guaranteed to support Poland
militarily in the event of an unprovoked German attack, they
were accused of encircling Germany-

•..ni

The Hon-Aggression ract

with the U*S.3,R. was concluded and, thus, on the eve of the

conflict, hnusslan military support to loiand was eliminated,
when it became clear to hitler that his plans of aggression

could only be achieved by resort to arms, the attache against;
Poland was launched on 1 September 1939^

As the evidence will establish, the defendant vi/EIZSAliCivRH

played a particularly significant role in the diplomatic
preparations for this aggression.

The recital of his activi

ties lays bare the entire anatomy of German aggression
during this period.
-
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B.

DEF£i2TSiiS.

At this point a brief analysis of the defendant ^VEIZ-

SAEGKER*s defenses will be submitted; prior to the presenta
tion of the

evidence

in chief.

V^/EIZSnECi^S»R stated that until mid-July 1939 he endeavor
ed in his private capacity to calm things dovm^ however,
v;hen he definitely ascertained that hitler was determined

to resort to war, he started "to carry the alarm",

7747).
serted,

(T. 7746/

The method he employed was most complicated, he as
On one hand, he attempted to induce the British

and French representatives to inform the Boles that they

would not support Boland if holand continued to carry out
arbitrary acts designed to provoke hitler.

On the other

hand, he desired that the rjritish and i-renoh inform Germany
through diplomatic cnannels that they, under all circum

stances, v/ould abide by their guarantee to Poland.

(T. 7747) ^

He also stated that he did evei'ything possible to delay
matters attaining a climax prior to 1 oeptember, since he

believed that war v/ould be at least teruporariiy averted
if Hitler could be prevented by dilatory tactics from launch

ing it on schedule.

.-vi

(T. 7d49).

However, the evidence establishes that WhlZSAECiiEii'S
activities

were

in accordance with the

foreign policy of that period.

official Germn

He alleged that he v.-as

secretly conducting both roles.

However, his conversations

with the British and r-Tench diplomats, charging Poland with
continuous provocation and attempting to induce the British

and irrench to abandon their guarantee, were reportea in
fullest detail to Hibbentrop. As a consequence, Aiboentrop
and Hitler v;ere confirmed in their belief that

jiilZh-iECivJrBv

too indorsed and promoted the official policy (that Germany
should stress that roland was aggravating the situation and

through this propaganda slogan, English and irench support
-
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of Poland would be withdrawn).

Thus, wSIZSAhCiOiiR was destroy

ing by his own efforts his alleged endeavor to convince the
Fuehrer .that ii^ngland and France were not bluffing.

Furtner,

although VvTilZSAhGilER alleges that his memoranda to Ribbentrop
were written expressly in Razi'terminology, the reports of
the other partners to the conversations v/ith iVBilZShECKbR are
also included in the evidence, and both in tone and substance

substantiate the accuracy of vJPilZSASChiBH' s reproduction of
these

conversations.

'•>.

If this aforeraentioned defense is not sustained,

WhlZSnECjiLbR has fallen bacic upon the second line of defense.
He stated that the foles were, in fact, deliberately ag

gravating the situation and oppress-lng the German minority
in Poland.

It must be recalled that not only the Fuehrer,

but also German ^''ationalists, strongly desired the absorp

tion of Uanzig and the Polish Corridor; and in this in

stance WhlZSAriCjUdR again made common cause with more ardent
Rational Socialists.

alleged that

In most undiplomatic phraseology he

Poland was known as a jackal", and he also
; ''.Ti'

described Poland as "a kind of hyena''.

(T. 7736; 7836).

This characterization was standard Razi terminology during

the campaign to place the entire blame for the aggression
upon the other party. • wPjIZSAhCihiiR's entire defense in this
respect is predicated upon the official German thesis, which

was rejected by the luT, that Poland was destroying the
peace by its arbitrary conduct.

vvhIZSiihCiuiR stdted during

his direct examination;

"After all, peace could only be saved by
solutions v/nich can be stood and which can

be maintained by all sides for a long
pei'iod of time, but this solution did not
exist in the German-Polish relations, pvite

independ ently of whether Germany v/as under
a i'jabional Socialist regjme or not,

curing

that period the Polisn attituae vms^qo
rigid and too stiff-necked." (T. 783'^.

TOnderlining supplieaTT
wjiilZSAACRhit also employed a tertiary line of defense
-

..L?
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when he declared that the j^ritish guarantee to Poland extend

ed a blank check to the Poles, whereby they were encouraged
to coimrdt further acts of provocation.

WEIZSAECiCBR coni:ended

that the british were encircling Germany with this netp;ork

of guarantees.

In this discussion he deliberately overlooked

the fact that these guarantees

were defensive in nature and

that Pingland promised Poland military support only in the
contingency that Poland was attacked.

Purther, the official

German policy at that time was to seize upon the British
guarantee as an example of British encirclement of Germany.
As will be subsequently shown,

GijIZSAiiCiJiR, as v/ell as

hibbentrop, disregarded the repeated assertions of Polish,
I

P'rench, and British diplomatic representatives that, this
guarantee would, only come into effect if Germany committed
an act of aggression against Poland and would not be ful

filled if Poland made an unprovoked attack upon Germany.
In another part of his testimony, VvBIZSABCAiiR adiiiitted
that the guarantee question was a result of hitler's absorp

tion of Czechoslovakia, and he even stated, "from the moment
on, it became quite apparent that every nevtf move of Hitler's

had to lead to a general conflagration".

(1. 7734).

more

over, whlZSAiiiCidiiii' s own witness, Theo Kordt, declared that

both the slogans of blaming the Poles and of charging the
British with encirclement were propaganda lines adopted by

hitler and Hlbbcntrop.

(T. 12897),

Adopting another tack, VvEIZSAEGiihR said even if the
English declarations were justified by the course of events,
the public nature of these- declarations would tend to antag

onize the P'uehrer.

As previously mentioned, wEIZSaEChER

testified, in this connc-ction, that during the iuunlch crisis
of September 19od he tried to induce the English Government

to ma.^e a public di^claration of their opposition to tnc
P'uehrer,

raobilize the British fleet,- and otherwise express

-
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publicly their determination to resist.Hitleraggressive
plans with force.

Therefore, in the instance of Holand,

he adopts a diametric.aily opj.osite and incompatible position.

VYhen the British Government did adopt this policy of publicly

announcing that any further act of aggression by Hitler would
result in a general war, he condemned such practice and
charges that it was one of the causes provoking the conflict.

Throughout, vVHIZSiifiGKiiR evades the reality of the sltua^
tion.

Hitler was determined to obtain i^anzig and the rolish

Corridor, and as his previous course of action so clearly
revealed, he had not deterred from this course.

pHIZShhCiiEJi

stated upon examination by the Tribunals
'iifell, another question: Was there any

doubt in your mind, in the spring and early
summer of 1939, that Hitler, with or with
out discussion, intended t'o bring the

Polish problems to a head and dispense of
i t and obtain his

"a.

aims?

I always was greatly concerned and

'worried; in the first tiiree months of the
summer I had periods when I thought that
the question would arise,

for example,

in June on one occasion 1 was notified ac

cordingly by our headquarters, but from
July onv/ards I became very much concerned.

'1

I was very much worried, and I was afraid
that war would break out.

"<4.

Well, just what trust do you think that

either france or hngland should have paid to
either Hitler's protestations or any state
ments made by the iteich Government as to
peaceful or lawful Intentions, in view of
what had happened in CzechoslovaKia, where,
according to your own statements, it ?/as a
clear breach of international obligation
and a

clear invitation to war?

"a.

I believe, your Honor, that, as far as

the trust is concerned, that was placed in

Hitler--ln London, and in Paris--thi3 trust
had been cut dovm 'to as

possible.

•M

.a

bare as minimum as

Both Chamberlain and Laladier,

in the spring—that is, on the 15th of
iviarch 1939--ielt that they had been de
ceived and betrayed; ana surely they
placed very little confidence in Hitler

from that time onwards."

(T. 9042/43)•

Luring cross examination WEIZSHhCiiLH admitted that Hit

t-'.

ler and Ribbentrop utilized, for purposes of exerting
-
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pressure upon England and x-rance, tne "blank check" and
"blame the Poles" slogans.

(T. 9012).

WEIZSAEGKER, during his lengthy testimony, never once
alleged that G-erniany should abandon Its quest for the ac
quisition of Eanzig and the Polish Corridor by diplomatic
pressure, backed by a threat of war, nor do the documents
reveal such evidence.

As a skilful diplomat, WEIZSaiijCAEk

may have inwardly felt that the successes achieved in
Austria and Czechoslovakia could be reproduced by similar
methods without resort to arms.

of war,

Up until the very outbreaiC

Gerinany foreign policy consistently attempted to

secure these territories by methods of diplomatic pressure
and without recourse to warj however,

i t was quite clear to

WEIZSaEGKER that the x''uehrer would employ force if necessary,
WEIZSAECiCER's defense establishes that he played -a
major role in the formulation and execution of the foreign

policy of the Third Reich.

Re allegec his attempts not only

to Influence the leaders of the German Government, but also

the statesmen "of other governments.

The evidence herein

after presented reproduces tne reality of the situation and
demonstrates the official activities of "wEIZSaECivjiR.
discussion of his defenses vi/ill

be

entered

xi'urther

into when tho ap

propriate evidence is discussed.

C.

SmmHY OF iiiVIDERCEc

The Treaty of Versailles declared Danzig a Free 'State
and placed it under the League of Rations IWandate.

A High

Commissioner vi?as appointed for Danzig, but the State was

permitted to maintain its own form of government.

Poland

was entrusted v^'ith the conducting of the ioreign policy of
the x'ree State and vi/as granted the right to regulate the

customs of Danzig.

However, ever since the Versailles

"Diktat", German nationalists had sought the returui of
Danzig to Germany.,
-
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Shortly after the rise of iJational Socialism in Germany,

Danzig was completely iMazified.

The only political party

permitted was the IVazi iarty, and Danzig was even considered _

a Gau.of greater Germany.

(T, 3d97).

As early as 15 October 1956, when the defendant held
the position of Chief of the rolitical Division, he pro
posed in connection with a visit from -L^anzig Gauleiter

^'orsterj that tne following policy be adhered to:

"1.)

...The jJanzlg Senate must co-operate

closely wltn ^he .foreign Office.

^

"2.)

It must be the goal of the Danzig

policy to liberate Danzig and to s=;e tnat
it becomes a part of Germany again.
At
present, this woulci not be possible, save
for a coup d'etat.
Such a coup d'etat is
not being considered for the present, since

j
'

it would involve the still unsolved Cor-.

ridor problem.

"3. ) As long as

j->anzig is still^govorned

by the League of ^'^ations through Interna
tional ls.w this situation remains a regretable f a c t .

"S.)

The High Commissioner's right to

interfere in the political affairs of

Danzig constitutes an evil encroachment
on the rree City. This interference,
however, is permissible according to a
legal status which is unshalceable at the
moment,..

"6.)
Cnder these circumstances it is ad
visable for i^anzig .. .

'b)

Danzig Aazis to maice no con-

cess 1 ons to'ToTand duFing~^Hese dis
cussions

whicn

later

on

could rendc^r

more difficult the re-integration of
Danzig into the rtelch.

~

"d) To keeo :^n close contact with
the foreign viflce during negotia
tions

with Toland."

(rros. hxh. 132,

NG-I9dd, D, n. 4-rt, 1. 17/ld) (Underlining
supplied).

This document, formulated over two years prior to the first
overt acts of aggression, reveals i/VLI33AE0Ki;iv's basic theory
on the Danzig question, and we submit that the evidence will
reveal that he never altered his opinion.
-
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In diplomatic conversations in the fall of 1938 between
Ribbentrop and Ambassador Lipski of Poland, Ribbentrop

proposed that, in return for certain concessions, Poland

permit G-ermany to annex uanzig.
D. B, 4-ii, P. 31).

(Pros. JiiXh. 134, TC-73,

Poland expressed its desire for friendly

understanding with Oermany and offered to replace the hoague
of i%tions guarantee by a bi-lateral Polish-G-erman agreement
covering Danzig.

However, tne incorporation of Danzig into

Germany could not ba permitted.

(Pros, iiixh. 135, TG-73, D.

B. 4-A, P. 33).
During early 1939 Germany did not press for a solution
of the Danzig question,
been resolved.

since the Czech question had not yet

WEIZSiiRCiUli-i, as previousl;/- mentioned, had

testified .that during this period he was in disfavor with

Ribbentrop for his role in the preparation of the munich Pact
and that he v;as, of course, barred from the formulation of

policy,

tiovi/ever, on 2 January 1959 he submitted a memorandum

to Aibbentrop in reference to the anticipated visit of Polish

Foreign Minister Beck.

V/ElZSAhCivEJt proposed that Ribbentrop,

in the coming discussion, adopt the following coursej Poland
must do more for the Geriiian minority? and he concludeds

"...

c).

It will probably prove to be too

early at the time of the talk, to settle
Poland's attitude towards other points of
oUr Eastern Policy.

Beck must realize that

we know hov; very v/eak his position is, and
are

waiting for

the

time v/ncn he will be

more yielding." Xp^QS' -^xh, 156, ^iG-1995.

DT B. 4-A, f. 35)

(Underlining suppliea).

On 10 January 1939, JvEIZSAECiiEn dispatched a telegram to

the German Embassy in taris y/hich disclosed that during the
reeent visit of the Polish I'oreign xviinister. Buck, it was

confirmed that the Polish-Gtirman Treaty of 1S34 would con

tinue to form the basi? for German-Polish relations.
Exh. 137, UG-1772, JJ. B. 4-a, P. 37).

(Pros.

However, three days

later yvEIZSAECKER was officially informed of a conversation

between Ribbentrop and Gauleiter Forster.
-
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During this

conference itibbentrop instructed ^'orstcr to withhold the
introduction of certain proposed meiisures until he returned
frora his visit to harsaw.
measures

Among others,

these'proposed

included the introduction of the Hitler salute and

the German swastika, and the forraation of Death Hoad dnits

of the 3S in Danzig.

(Pros. BiXh. 13d, NG-2771, D. B.

F. 39).

On 15 march 1939, the disraeinbernient of Czechoslovakia

had been completed, and Uurman diplomats turnea their un

divided attention to the Polish probloia.
r

Iheo ivordt testi

fied that after the aggression against Gzuchoslovakia it was
unlikely that Hitler would keep any promises.with regard to
Danzig.

(T. 12296).

On 29 iv'iarch 1959, vV£iI2SABCj:iFiK informed '^^oermann of his
conference with President G-reiser of the Danzig Senate and

Dr. Boettchor, Chief of tPm Senate's i'^orulgn Department.
VJEIZSABGiiEH reviev/ed the German treatment of the jJanzig

problem during the past icw mentns and particularly the
conversations' between Hibbentrop and Ambassador uipski on
21 and 26 inarch.

"i/VBIZSAECiSxiH told Greiser that ho did not

consider it advisable that the Danzig Deaguo of nations

High Commissioner, Professor Burckhardt, return to l^anzig

until further notice, since the Polish.diplomats th^re might
abuse him.

^\ihen Greiser inquired whether ho should accept

an invitation of the Trl-Partite Commlttoo at London,

\(1jEIZSAECKBR stated;

"...1 replied that it would bo better for
him to refuse any such invitation, since
•

it was to be feared that ho would be merely

heard, unworthily treated and then sent

away by the Tripartite Committee." (ires.
Exh. 141, nG-2015, D. B. 4-a, P. 57).

WEIZSAEGilEii advised Dunzig to adopt a moderate course
for the present, and he also stated:
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"...I considered it possible now to push Poland
toivards a s^ort_of 2.oli^y_oi attrition (Zer-

muerbungspolitikj, in order to make the Polish
Government

lined t_o_solve_certain

German-Polish questionsattempted by usj to
which belongs the Danzig question. Danzig
should go on acting just as in tho last
weeks and months." (Ibid., P.56) (Unaerlining supplied).

On 29 March wDlZSAj^CivEu,! informed Ribbentrop that

in conversation with thu Hungarian Ambassador, Sztojay,
he had rejected a Hungarian proposal of mediation

between Germany And Poland concerning the Danzig
question. He, in conclusion, told the Hungarian

it •

Ar^ibassador:

m:

"...

i-'or the rest I told Sztojay only that

our discussion with the

Poles

was

still

in progress.
Of course- up to now Warsaw
was showing very little understanding.
It
must and will still have much of importance

to learn."

(Pros. XiXh. 140, H&--2003, D.

B. 4-A, P. 55).

The following day ivHlZSaLCKHH informed Ribbentrop that he
had told the Italian Charge d'Affaires during a discus
sion of the Rolish questions

"...

I

added that the Poles were playing

rather deaf at the present time but would
doubtless learn to show themselves more

amenable, particularly in vi^=w of the fact

that Danzig obviously belonged to Germany."
(Pros. Hah. 142, i\tG-201'7^ Do B. 4-ii, P. 58).

• f"

'•".>•

•,

It is to be noted that during the preparations
''M' '•

Kji!

for

the aggression against Poland the ^'oreign Minister chose
WPllZSAECKHR to conduct the diplomatic conversations.

And

as the evidence shall subsequently unfold, there was olose
and constant cooperation between them.

This evidoiice re

veals that VvEIZSAEGKER not only executed tho prevailing

. policy, but also constantly mads decisions himself and
formulated policy in his almost dally contacts with foreign
diplomats and subordinate officials In the Foreign Office.
^

-'..ef:-

fttrfinitfen
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Alarraed at the rumors of a

provoked attack on Poland

and resolved to forestall a repetition of the Czech epi
sode,

the rsritish Prime iriinister. Chamberlain, on 31 li^arch,

. announced in the House of Commons that the following as
surance had been given, pending further consultation,
the

b r i t i s h and i^'rench Covernments

"...

to

the

by

Polish Government 2

As the House is aware, certain con

sultations are now proceeding with other
Governments.
In order to make perfectly
clear the position of His i^'iajcsty's
Government

in

the

meantime

before

those

consultations are concluded, I now have to
inform the House that during that period,
in the event of any action which clearly

threatened Polish independence, and" wni'ch
the i-olish Government accordingly con
sidered i t

vital

to r e s i s t with their

national forc^^s, His majtjsty's Government

4^..

would f e e l

themselV'^s

bound

at

once, to

lend the irolish Govurnmeiit all support in
their power,
ihey have given the Polish
Government an assurance co this eiTect."

(Pros. PlAh. 3545, HCt-5609-a, g. B. 97-a,

P. 136)

(Underlining supplied).

The Gorman leaders immediately seized upon this

declaration as a slogan to be employed in their^campaign
to separate Poland by diplomatic pressure from Bngland
ana Prance.

It was contended, as the evidence will.sub^

sequently reveal, that this guarantee provided the Polish
with a "blank check", encouraging tiiem to commit excesses
. *.•

against .German interests.

It is to be noted that the

above-mentioned declaration appeared in the German Ki/hite

Book, which was Issued by Hibbentrop suosoquent to the

outbreak of war to justify Germany's action against Poland.
(Ibid).

This wording shows distinctly that the British

government made the support promised to Poland dependent
on two different precisely defined conditions, vizs
1.

That there was an action .clearly threatening

Polish independence, and

2.

That Poland herself resisted that action with

her armed forces.
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The f i r s t

condition has a

factual character,

or not this condition was fulfilled in a

'/^h-other

certain case did

not by any moans depend on tiie opinion or decision of the
Polish Government.

In case thar^ was

an action directed

against Poland, it was, as with all othur known kinds of
treaties of alliance or promises of assistance, for the
British Government to arrive at the

conclusion whether

the

casus foedoris existed, viz- if the action v;as to be regard
ed as a clear threat to relish independence,

The Polish

Government might bring their own opinion to the notice of
\

the British Government and enter into a

them on the question.

discussion with

The British Government, how.over,

was not bound by the Palish view of the matter,
/'

but had to

docide on thoir own responsibility wheuht-r or not they

.

might consider this first condition for British siipport as
fulfilled.

Wlienov-^r the British Government, on theix* part, answer

ed this question positively, their duty to 1 .uid support then
depended on the second conditions that the relish Govern

ment opposed the action by military res5.3tan.;c.

Only this

resistanoo which, beyond the first condition, constituted
an additional

condition' of British support, depended on a

decision of the Polish Govornraent.

But tbi a does not alter

the fact that the fulfilment of the first condition, the

existence of an aucion clearly threatenixtg Polish indepen
im

dence, was outside the sphere of opinion and decision of
'I

l: f''

the Polish Government.

if, therefore, the Polish Govern

ment opposed some action by military nmans, the course they
adopted was not decisive for the British appr.vciation of
the main question, namely whether that action clearly
threatened Polish independence.

l> O

The wording of the nritish guarantee deviated from
the v/ordlng of other promises of support insofar as it
-
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does not follow the usual pattern of mentioning an unpro

voked attack by a third power, but speaks of an action

threatening independence.

But this is inmaaterial for the

• .•
i -ij
, Ny.J

question discussed here, v/hether the British promise of

, , -^J
k

support might'bo regarded as a "blank check".

Lven if

one may assume that in this respect the condition of the British promise was not restricted to cases of unprovoked
attack, this docs not alter the situation that it was
not within the discretionary power of the Polish Gtovcrnmont to get the first condition fulfilled.
It will not bo difficult to reconstruct from the

political situation as it v;as in spring 1959 the considora-

t

tions which may have induced the British Government to
formulate their promise of support in this special way.

One of the possibilities which had to bo taken into ac
count at that time was a sudden occupation of the
)

City of -o-anzig by uermany.

In such a case it might per

haps have been argued, adducing argucndo considerations,
of a purely formal nature, that such occupation did not
constitute a direct attack on roland.

Especially

close at that time vi/as the possibility, which later on bo-

camo reality, that Germany, following the pattern o± the
Sudeten crisis, virould base a military intervention in
Poland on contentions about tne ill-treatment of the u-er-

man minority in Poland,

In order to establish beyond any

doubt that Great Britain would not bo shaken in her poli

tical attitude by specious German argumonts of that kind.
It was considered appropriate to take as casus fooderis

not the concept of unprovoked aggression, but that of a
clear threat to Polish Independence,

fiowever, in substance

this British declaration is identical with and does not in

scope exceed other types of treaties of alliance or promises
of assistance that are predicated upon an unprovoked
-
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1

attack by a third party.

Clearly, G-er^J^-S-ny had no fear that ihngland, France or
Poland would attack her.

merit.

Such a

contention is without

Ambassador Lipski's comments on this question are

apropos

After the Polish-British guarantee,
the Germans altered their tactics.
Pur

posely avoiding all further talks with the
Polish Govornment,

their endeavors were

centered on putting Poland into bad odour.
The aim became

tion.

to achieve

Poland's

isola

Thus the German propaganda machine.

was put to work and one of its products

was the slogan of the 'blank cheque'
given by the British Government to
Poland.

-

"I should like to maxe i t clear that the
v/hole idea of the 'blank cheque' v;as pure

invention.

In reality it v/as quite the

other way round.
Iho British-Polish
guarantee imposed on Poland the duty to
coordinate

its

actions

in matters

which

might have evoked friction with the Germans,
with both the British and the P'rcnch

Governments.

The Polish Government took

ware to observe this provision as strictly
as possible and was extremely cautious in
all its actions, as can well bo seen from
tho diplomatic dispatches of the nritish
and the i-'ronch Ambassadors then accredited
in Warsaw.

-

"From information which I kept on receiving
in the last months preceding the outbreak
of war from my colleagues from the Berlin
Diplomatic Corps, especially from the
French and British Ambassadors, I knov/

that State Secretary von Woizsaecker had
been swamping them with arguments pur

porting Polish responsibility for the

growing tension."

(Pros. hiXh. 0-334,

NG-5370, D. B. 204,. P. 67).

It is noteworthy in this connection that when tho
defendant "WFIZSAhOilEH as aforementioned, made certain

policy recommendations for the rejection of a collective

guarantee to Czechoslovakia in February 1939, he Included,
among his reasons: "the political events of last autumn,

in which the entanglement of the country in far reaching

International political agreements have played a part in
increasing the crisis...".
D, B. 97-A, p.. 91).

(Pros. Exh. 3523, Nu-6358,

Parenthetically, the German attack
-
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on this British declaration bears a striking siniilarity.

On 3 April 1939, military preparations for fall Viteiss
(the code name for the military preparations against Po

land) were ordered by the j?'uehrer.

(Trial of hajor har

Criminals, Vol. 1, P. 199).
On 3 April 1939, Vt/EIZSAhCi-i!Ekt informed the German
Ambassador in Warsaw that the British assurance of 31 j.uarch

was only temporary and desired unequivocally to state the
B»nglish position during the time that consultations with
f

other governments were being carried on.

WEIZSABCivhK con

cluded :

"... The speech which the ihohrer made
on Saturday at wilhelmshavcn clearly ex
presses our attitude toward the British
attempt at encirclement, and defines the
dangers incurred by those countries v/hich
allow tnemselves

attempt."

to be di'av>/n into

(Pros,

D. B. 97-A, P. 137)

this

3546-A, nG-5509-B

(Ohderlining supplied).

This document, which subsequently was us^d in the German
White Book, establishes that the i'uohror, from the very
inception of the British guarantee, indorsed its use as

another means of bringing diploiriatic pressure to bear upon

hngland and roland in order to effect their separation and

of furnishing some pseudo-justification for his demands.
wBilZSAEGxebit, on 5 ^pril 1959, informed the Gorman Am
bassador at Wc.rsaw that when n-mbassador Lipslci returns
to Berlin he will bo informed:
Our offer made to Poland was made

but once.

Apparently the Polish Govern

ment did not entirely coiaprehond the

significance oi this offer,
we cannot
help that.
The future will shovif whether
Poland was well advised."

(Pros. mxh.

144, i\G-S016, G. B, 4-A, P. 82).

(Under

lining supplied). •

WBilZSA-BiGiVliJR concludes by directing tho Ge-rmaii Amoassador
to adopt the followiag policy in his contacts v/itn Polish
officials:

-

i^-1
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.tmrns.

It is requested not to go into any
further

discussions

about the

G-erraan offer

and the Polish counter proposal.
'We must
prevent Poland from throwing the ball back

to us and later on making_ out that v;e had
disregarded'a Polish offer.
t a n t missions

are

likewise

Other impor
i n s t r u c t e d not .

to enter into any material discussion v/ith

regard to the Polish question, but rather
to evade the issue calmly and give no in
dication as

future."

to German intentions

in the

(Pros. hxh. 144, wG-2016, D, B,

4-A, P. 82).

(Underlining supplied).

It is to bo noted that this document clearly lays down the

policy for the first time of preventing further negotia
tions and putting the blaine upon Poland if she declines to
yield to German pressure.

N

On the following day, 6 April, WBlZSAECjiER recuived

the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, who informed him that Poland

would abide by the Polish-German Agreement of 1934 and that
the Polish-British Agreement was "bi-lateral and of a purely

defensive nature".

\JEiIii3ilbGiUiiA's reply demonstrates the soft

but threatening manner which he occasionally employed during
the course of diplomatic negotiations:

"...

These remarks of Lipski I accepted

with somewhat of a smile and then replied

to him about as follows; ... Nobody in
Germany except the ^'uehrer could have had

and carried through with Poland the grand
conceptions of 1934. ... Instead of gladly
grasping it and completing the work of
1954, all of a sudden v/e heard a romarkable rattling of sabres in" Polanci. . .. The
Fuehrer v/ould make such an offer to Poland
only once

•VP

"...
But if what was to bo found in the
press alreaay about the Beck discussions
was true,

then I

Polish attitude

would not know how the
could s t i l l

be harmonized

with the spirit of the treaty of 1954.

"To this last point Lipski wanted to reply
that the Polish-PrcnCh Treaty also had

been compatible with the Treaty of 1934.'
(Pros. Lxh. l45, NG-2018, D. B.' 4-A, P.

34-a/84-B)

(Underlining supplied). .

WEIZSAECKER thus announced for the first time tbait Germany

would use, despite Polish protestations,

the British

guarantee as a pretext to sever the Gefinan^Polish
81
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Arbitration Treaty of 1934.

"iVElZSAECKEH, in his memorandum

to Ribbentrop, characterized his behavior as haughty and

calm.

(Ibid, P. 34-G),

In all his v;ritings to Ribbentrop,

vvElZSAEGKER attempts to create the impression that he is

conducting German foreign policy in the vigorous mariner that

Ribbentrop and the fuehrer advocate.

As will be subsequent

ly shown by a comparison v;ith reports of other partners to
the conversations, his memoranda accurately reproduce the
atmosphere.

In the German-Polish Agreement of 26 January 1934, the

two nations had agreed under no circumstances to omploy
force to settle their disputes.

D. B. 4-A, P. 12).

(Pros. hxh. 151, TG-21,

Although this treaty vvas for a period

of ten years, Germany unilaterally denounced it on 28
April 1953.

(Ibid., P. 12).

On 15 April 1939, President Roosevelt appealed to

Hitler to provide assurances to the nations of Europe and
the I^ear East that Germany would not attack them.

Exh. 377, NG-1429, D. B. 4-A, P. 35).

(Pros.

vi/EIZSAECKSR objected

to the public nature of President Roosevelt's action and

suggested that this appeal should have been directed through

diplomatic channels.

(T. 7841/42).

He consistently over

looks the fact that appeals of this nature, whether made
publicly of through diplomatic channels, would have been

disregarded by Hitler, unless they could be incorporated
into his plans of aggression.

lAirther, WEIZSAECKER belittles

his own role in the rejection of this appeal.

Gorman

missions abroad were directed to inquire whether the
countries they were accredited to considered themselves

menaced by Germany.

When the Latvian foreign Minister,

Munters, desired to consult his Government, WEIZSAEGREIR
informed woerinann on 18 April 1939:

-
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.
Mr. Munters was making out of that
ridiculous piece of American propaganda a
case on which he wished to consult his
Government.
I f Munters did not answer

our question with a downright
should have

to add Latvia

to

'no% we
those

countries which are making themselves

wilfil accomplices of Mr. Roosevelt."
(Pros. Bjth. 377, i'^G-1429, D. B. 4-A,

P. 88).

(Underlining supplied).

On 26 ApriU VffilZSAEGKER saw ^imbassador Henderson, and
his memorandum on the conversation v/as subsequently incor

porated in the G-erman v^hite Book. ' Henderson explained that
in connection with iuigland's institution of compulsory

military service, the British Prime Minister wishes to make
it clear that ijnglish policy was one of peace.

i

And further,

Henderson clearly stated that the Polish guarantee was
limited:

"The Government had no aggressive inten
tions and did not wish to be drawn by
others into aggrossivo actions.
If they
had openly declared tnc;mselves ready to
oppose the aggressive actions of a third
party under certain specified circum

stances ,

this had been done in the hope

of avoiding incidents vdiich could lead to
war,

but was-meant in no way to encircle

or threaten Germany or Italy."
(Pros.
Kxh. 3546-B, i\tr^U9-C, D. H. 97-A,

P.

138}

(Underlining supplied).

Like Ambassador Lipski's aforementioned statement, this defi

nition of the British guarantee, wc submit, should have been
♦

grasped by vVhlZSAECi-uER-, if his intentions wore peaceful,
in this memorandum to Ribbentrop, in order to calm down

the situation, as he testified he' v/as' privately attcrrpting

during this period.

Hov;eyor, WEIZSAECKER, in his reply to

Henderson, furnished Ribbcntrop with further justification

to pursue the aggressive policy in which Germany was ong^g'-d,
f

"There was one remark which I could not

help making: the British guarantee to

Poland was certainly the means most
calculated to encourage Polish subordinate
authorities in their oppression of Germans

there.

t

V.''T

Consequently, it did not prevont,

but on the contrary, provoked incidents
in that country." (Ibid.., P. 139).

-
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On 8 May 1939 W3IZSASCK£R received Ambassador
Coulondre,

(This memorandum too appeared in the

German ^^ite Book.)
the conversation

WSIZSaSCISR reiterated during

thst Hitler had made his offer only .

once; and further, that the action adopted.^"by the'

demi-gods" in West Poland toward the German minority

appeared dangerous.

(Pros. 3xh, 3546—C, NG—5609-P,

B.i. 97-A, p. 140).

Thus, for the first time

WSIZSAECKSR raises the routine refrain of persecution
of German minorities.

Coulondre replied thst France

was cautioning Warsaw against such action.

WSIZKAECKER

concluded;

"... I had rather failed to see the
wisdom of the British Government in
the last few weeks.
The British •

guarantee to Poland was like offer

ing sugar to an untralnted child be
fore it had learned to listen to
reason."
(Ibid,, p. 141).

Reference is here made to that portion of Ambassador

Lipeki's affidavit, on which he was not asked for

cross examination, concerning the alleged persecution
of the German minority in Poland;

"... As to Herr von Weizsaecker's
statement regarding the alleged abuse
suffered by the German minority in
Poland in the period preceding the
German aggression, I wish to state

,

that the Polish Government was well

.f

aware, thanks to the Czech precedent,
of the Wazl methods of

minorities as an implement

action and diversion.

It was for that

reason, when the Germans embarked upon
a war of nerves ageinst Poland, using

Danzig and the minorities problem as

a background, that the Polish Govern

ment gave express warning to the
administrative authorities to

the greatest care in dealing with the
infringements on the part of German

minorities and to take action

with regard to instances of sabotage
or open provocation.Polish

Prime Minister was in constant touch

with the Voivods /Provincial Governors/
and had regular conferences with

in the presence of representatives of
•
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the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,"
(Pros. Fxh,
p. 69),
#

CM334, N&-5870, D. B.

204,

On 16 May, W3IZSA3CKFR informed Woermann that
• he had learned from reliable

sources that Ambassador

• t

Ooulondre asserted that he was concerned about the

m

Danzig situation, since he had fdiscovered that 2,000
SS men ha.d been sent to Danzig in civilian attire,

W3IZSAECK3R directed Woermann to clear up this

incident.

(Pros. 3xh. 147, HG-2021, D»3. 4r-A, p. 147).

%rlng this period, war economic preparations
between Germany and Italy were being coordinated.
•*/

. t-

WSIZfiAEOKFR, in his defense,

continually. a.lluded to
,

his exclusion from policy making affairs.

However,

•' v«

on 20 May 1939, he forwarded to' Ribbentrop the points

to be discussed in the coming conference with the

Italian Foreign Minister, Ciano.

He mentioned that

the agenda should include the establishment,
vided for in the German-Itallan Treaty,

as pro

of military

and war economic commissions, and also suggested that
•i

\

a Joint Axis policy with regard to Turkey and the
Balkan entente be discussed,.

5145, D.B. 97-A, p. 144).

(Pros. 3xh. 3548, NG-

On 26,i^ay, he informed

Ribbentrop that he had discussed the organization of
military and war economic commissions and the coordina

tion of the Axis press with Ambassador Attollco. (Pros.
Exh.. 3549, NGw5155, D.B. 97-A, p. 146),

On 22 May 1939, the so-called Steel Pa,ct was con
cluded between Italy and Germany. (Welz. Exh. 103,

Doc. 215, Welz. D.B. I-D, p. 42).

WEIZSASCKSR testified

that he approved of this alliance because Mussolini

would put a brake upon Hitler's aggressive aspirations.
However, in the same breath he stated that within

eight days after the completion of the treaty, Mussolini
»

L5
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informed the Fuehrer that he would require 3 or 4

years "before Italy would be prepared to wage war.

(T. 7738).

Thus, from this early date. Hitler well

knew that the Italians, although supporting his aggres
sive plans, would not participate if war resulted.
Therefore, i t is not realistic to subscribe to the
\

theory that Italian non-pa.rticipation would deter the
Fuehrer.

The evidence will subsequently reveal that

in nowise did Hitler consider participation of Italy

I

'4

a prerequisite to the aggression against Poland.
WSIZSAFCKFR himself, during his direct examination,
partially admitted thlst
"Q,. The Italians at that time were
still acting as a brake?.

t.

"A. Well, at least there was no better
one.
The relationship, between Hitler .

I

and Mussolini had, at that time, al
ready passed the culminating point."

(T. 7749).

(underlining supplied).

In addition, when Hitler received Mussolini's message

Wr!^

on 5 June 1939,
i

expressed his agreement with the

proposed Italian course of action. ( Weiz. Exh, l03,

Doc, 215, Welz, D.B. I-^, p. 42).
On 8 June 1939, WSIZ3A3GKER,

In a personal letter,

Informed. Ambassador Mackensen at Rome that he received

Mackensen's letter- of 2 June, inoloclng a report' on

the latter's conversation with the British Ambassador.

'.'iElZSAFCKFR expressed his interest in this conversation,
1

since it revealed "once again how poor the British
/

arguments in support of the British policy of encircle
ment look"; and ^VSIZSAICKSR stated that he transmitted
this letter to Rlbbentrop,

D,B. 97-A, p. 153).

(Pros. Exh, 3552, NG-5408,

In so Informing Rlbbentrop,

WSIZSAFCKSR, rather than calming the situation down,
further increased'the tension.

Such argumc-nts merely

l^uttreseed Rlbbentrop's belief that WEIZSAECKii-R was
-
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fully in accord with his views and favored stressing,
for purposes of policy,, the propaganda slogan that
Kn^lland was encircling Germany,

Further, he encouraged

Rihoentrop to believe that •'England would be compelled

to abandon this "poor argument" (that she was not encir
cling Germany) and be forced to withdraw her support
from Poland,

\7EIZSASCK2R, in concluding,

remarks:

,, The cold reception which the
British iknbassador received at his
f i r s t official visit from Mussolini

seems,

by the way, to have produced

at least the one useful effect that

Sir Percy Loraine will once more thor
oughly reconsider the question of
Danzig,
I hope that i t will contri

bute ^
more

lead London gradually
uaXly to a

considered a t t i t u d

7 ^-blS.f

(underlining supplied),
On 13 June 19392SAECK2R received Ambassador

Henderson.

During the course of the conversation

WSIZSAFCKBR stated that England 'was permitting Poland to
gamble with her destiny; and if^ there was any logic at

all in English policy, it was that "Britain is determined
on a-preventive war and is working in that direction".

Henderson rejected this interpretation of England's'
intentions.

\Vhite Book.)

(This document also appeared in,the German

(Pros, Exh. 3553, HG-5609-E, D.B. 97-A,

p, 154),
In another German White Book memorandum by

- WEIZSASCKER, dated 17 June 1939, he stated:
X then told the French Anbassador
that if there were a danger to peace,

it lay with the Poles, who saw fit to
play fast and loose with their French
and British friends,"

(Pros, Exh, 3554,

NG-5609-F, D.B, 97-A, p. 156),

On 30 June, WEIZSASCKER again saw Ambassador
CCulondre.
tr'

WEIZSAECKER commented that the British policy

of encirclement which apparently was intended to intimi
date Germany, had a contrary effect., WEIXSAECKSR further

.'I,

.
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stated that they were not on the eve of a,conflict
unless it was provoked by Polish excesses..

If so,

"That would certainly mean finis Poloniae". WSIZSAUCKSR
then T^ote":

Goulondre thereupon remarked,
as he had done before., that France
wbuTd not be bound in the case of
Polish provocation, but if war broke
out on account of arbitrary actions

on the part of Danzig,

then neither

France nor Great Britain could help

being involved,"

(Pros, Bxh, 3555,

NG-5609-G, 'D.B, 97-A, p. 157), (under
lining supplied). (Document included
in the German White Book),

WBIZSAFCKBR concluded that his remarks expressed his
own personal opinion,

(Ibid.),

Thus, the French, English and Polish diplomatic
representatives had clearly expressed to the German
Government the defensive nature of "yie guarantee.

On 28 June 1939, ^VH:iSs:ASGKFR was informed through
Heyden-Rynsch, the Foreign Office liaison official
to OKW, that a German na.val demoiistration wa.s scheduled
to be held in the near future .outsid,e of Dnnzig, -^"dth(

out prior notification of the Polish Government,

Such

an act would violate the Polish-Danzig Agreement of

June 1923, which provided that Poland was to handle

the diplomatic correspondence pertaining to visits of
foreign warships to Danzig.

WSIZSASCKSR informed the

German fcvy that this was a political question in which
the attitude of the Foreign Office would.have to be

considered for the report to the Fuehrer. (Welz, Exh,
87)..

WEIZSAECKSR testified that he realized that such

open provocation might lead to a crisis and that
Hitler, Rlbbentrop and the German

opposed his viewv .

Then he issued his warnings, and first Rlbbentrop agreed,
Then through the Italians and Ambassador Hewel, he
^

£8
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influenced the Fuehrer, and as a conseq^uence, the Naval
visit was cancelled.

(T, 7847, et,seq.).

However, an examination of the pertinent evidenae

presents a different picture.

On IB Julj'- WEIS5A3CKSR

informed Rlbbentrop that;
"We must always keep an eye on a warlike
solution of the Danzig question, and we

must put the "blame for this on the Poles."
(Pros. Exh, 162, NO-2023, -D, B« 4-B, p. 4) ,
WEIZSAECKSR felt that the sending of the fleet woyld be

internationally interpretddd as the commencement of the
'German-Polish conflict.

(I"bid.).

Ri'bbentrop indorsed

this policy recommendation of WEIZSAEGKER's.

There is

no evidence that Ribbentrop ever favored such a Naval
visit.

Further, it,was self-evident that such an

opinion and flagrant provocation on the part of Germany
in nowise was compatible with the careful foreign policy
r'f •-

being formulated to place the blame on the Poles,
WEIZSAECKER's advice was a question of political strategy

and expediency which Ri'bbentrop adopted.

Thus, at most,

WSIZSAEGKER's defense reveals only that he could and did

4

t

influence .the policies of Germany during this period.
From the whole course of the evidence, it is quite clear
that both the Fuehrer and Ribbentrop relied upon his

.. •*

expert knowledge to avert any diplomatic mishaps that
their proposals might provoke.

On 4 July, WSIZSiiSCKSR Informed the German Charge
diAffalres at Washington, D. 0, , that the German 'Embassy
in London stated that false reports from Danzig concern

ing German preparations for an act of violence originated
in Jewish—American circlesJ

w
fu.]''

Request that everything be done in
an appropriate appearing m.^ner, ^

enlighten the competent circles i^ega
ing these connections and frivolous
lies." (Pros. Exh. 154, Na-2024, D.B.
4-A, p, 150).

,
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As the evidence •v'.rill

disclose, WEIZSASCKiiiH v'as fully

aware that the re-militarlzation of Danzig was going
effected in violation of the Versailles Treaty and

Polish-D-nzig Agreements.

On the same da^, 4 July,

\'yEIZSADGK12l initialed a memorandum by Altenburg which
disclosed that .iltenburg had visited Gauleiter Forster

at Dahzig and discussed the question of intensified
propaganda regarding Dnnzig and the Corridor, particu

larly toward Fngland and France.

It was agreed that

propaganda measures in Danzig were to "be coirrdinated
with the German ^^oreign Office,

(Pros, Fxh. 155,

WG-2025, D.B. 4-'A, p. 151),
•»

And on 4 July 1939^WFIZSASCKSR sent to German
missions abroad Ribbentrop's directive concerning the

language to be employed in diplomatic conversations on
the Polish question,

Ribbentrop stressed the usual

theme, that difficulties could only arise if the radical
element in Poland overcame the moderate element, Germany

is maintaining a close watch on the political events,
«

^

^WSIZSASCKFR concludes with his own personal remark:
"Please state our case in suitable

terms when the opportunity presents

itself.

(Pros, Sxh, 153, NG-2323,

^-I

D.B. 4-A, p. 149),

In commenting on this documont in his direct testimony,
WFIZSAECKFR stated that this language was basic "and

as far as I can see,, it does not harm peace" (T, 7844),
quite ignoring the fact that the slogan of Polish excesses
merely camouflaged the designs - of Germany against Poland.
On 29 June 1939 WEIZSASCKHR informed the Foreign
9

Minister that the Hungarian Minister expressed the
desire of his Government to Join the Axis Powers in

their preparatory war economic efforts.

NG-2767, D.B. 4-A, p. 144).
-

(Pros, Exh, 151,

On 9 July^, \VEIZSAECKER
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"T.Kll

informed the defendant Hitter that Rlbbentrop favored

such collaboration betT^^een Germany and Hungary. WSIZSAIJGICSR
had only briefly informed Ambassador Attolico of this
request and stated that, Germany did not desire that

Hungary participate as a member of the German—ItPlian
Commission.

Ribbentrop indorsed this suggestion.

Exh. 15^, HG-2848, D. 3.

(Pros.

p. 147; and Pros. Sxh. 158,

NG-2a74, D. B. 4-A, p. 158).

On 14 July 1939 ^^VEIZSAECKER announced an inquiry
of t^'ield Marshal Keitel.

Keltel had inquired whether it

were politically advisable to display publicly the cannon
now in D.-^nzig or whethe-p it would be prefera,ble to conceal
the presence of these guns.

WEIZSAi-CKii/K replied.

«... Tell him also that i t will be

advisable to wait a. while longer before

displaying the cannons In public, driv
ing them through the city and training
with them in the open field, and tell

him that the Poles' will certainly commit
a new "blunder, and they cp.n then be

answered by a public appearance of the
batteries,"

(Pros. Exh. 160, KG-2029,

D. B, 4—3, p. 1) •

WEIZSAECKER in his testimony made two comments with ref
erence to this exhibit.

He stated firstly that his

intention was to prevent greater provocation (T. 7846).
In this connection it is to be noted that his suggestion

was not only in accordance with the official foreign

policy, but also that a marginal note reveaJs that .

Ribbentrop approved of his recommendation.

(Ibid,).

WEI2.SAEGKER also testified that he "wasn't very much

surprised to see that the German military authorities ^

had transported such weapons to Danzig, because on their
part the Boles had concentrated troops around Dai^zlg*

a.s Lipski even admitted during our conversation in April ,
(T, 7846). Since Germany had no legal right whatsoever
to participate in the internal affairs of Danzig,
-
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W^IZSA^CKini^ s Implied approval of this activity is most

Illuminating,

Further, the Polish concentration of

troops around Danzig in April was concurrent with rumors
of a projected German surprise move to seize Danzig
shortly after the aggression against Czechoslovakia had

been completed (Pros, Sxh. 149,^ NG-2018, D.B, 4-A,
p, 84a),' and no overt act was taken against Da,nzlg,
Ambassador Coulondre reported to the French Foreign

Minister, Bonnet,- that during a discussion on 13 July
with WSIZSA3CKSR concerning Chamberlain's recent declara

tion In the House of Commons, the latter stated:Hut Herr von Welzsaecker did not

agree in this,' Such a speech, according
to him, could have no other effect but
that of still further diminishing the

>

chances of a friendly agreement by

stiffening the present attitude of the
parties. What hope could there "be that
the Poles, thus encouraged,- would show
conciliation?

Moreover,

the precess .

of intimidation could have no effect
upon the Reich,
(Wei"z; ^xK7 91, Doc,
2l0i Welz, D.B. X_D, p.- 19). (underlin
ing supplied);

In the latter part of July 1939, the so-called
customs officials dispute between Danzig and Poland grew
t

in Intensity,

As previously mentioned, the Free State

of Da.nzig was completely Hazlfled, and was acting under

the direction of the German. Foreign Office and other

|i; If

Reich agencies.

Between the 20th of July and the 3rd

*

of August, WFIZSAECKSR was informed that various D.^nzig
and Polish customs officials had been involved in serious

incidents.

(Pros. Exh. 163> HG-2030', D.B, 4-B> p. 5)..

The discourteous note of President Grelser of the Danzig

Senate on 29 July concluded that Danzig was no longer
bound by the treaty regulations governing the rights ofths
Polish customs inspectors,

The Polish diplomatic

representative In Danzig, Ghodaokl, on 3 August, mentioned
-

-
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thnt the obstacles placed in the path of Polish customs

officials had no other purpose "than to open up the way

for the widespread smuggling of weapons and ammunition".
He pointed out that the storage of weapons in the City
of Danzig was illegal, and further, that the Polish
customs officials had been exposed to continuous atta.cks.

(Pros. Sxh. .164, hC-2033, D. 3, 4-B, p. 10).
The following day, Chodacki notified G-reiser that
he had been informed that the Danzig executive authorities

intended to prevent Polish inspectors from carrying out
their functions,

he warned that the Polish inspectors

will be armed, a.nd any interference will be considered
an act of violence against Poland's officials during
the execution of their duties and will invite retaliation,

(Pros. 3xh. 165, NG-2032, D. B, 4-B, p. 50).

On 7 August

l939,Greiser replied that such action was a pretext for
sending Danzig an ultimatum,

national provocation,
D.3. I-D, p. 29),

and merely served as inter

(^^reiz. Bxh. 95, Doc, 22, Weiz.

As occurred during the Sudetenland

crisis, these incidents were being deliberately manu

factured by Germany in order to afford a pretext for her
intervention.

This will be subsequently confirmed by a

discussion of Veesenmayer' s mission to Dai^zig.

Poland

was obligated to assert its legal and moral rights or
bow to German pressure.

On 9 August 1939, WBIZSAECICBR handed a German note

to the Polish Charge d'Affalres.

This note stated th'^t

the German Government was astonished at the demands in
the form of an ultimatum and thethreat of reprisals

imposed by the Polish Government on the City of DanzigThe note in part stated:
"... The Government of the Heioh feels

itself obliged to point out to the Polish
•

.
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Government that a repetition of such
demands In the form of ultimatums to

the Free City of Danzig and the threat
of retaliatory measures would "bring
about a tension In German-Polish
relations for the consequences of
which tb^ Polish Government alone

would be responsible and for which
the Government of the Reichmust

already disclaim all responsibility

(Pros, Fxh. 165, NG-2032, D.3, 4-B,
p, 16) (underlining supplied).

WFIZSAFCKER, in his testimony, regarding this exhibit,
assumed that Poland was in the wrong in the customs

officials dispute.

He again referred to the "Polish

excesses ajid breaches of contract which had for years

remained to be settled between Germajiy and Poland",
(T. 7750).

He termed the German note as '^a warning'

a.gainst even greater disaster".
'•ffilZSASCKFR

(T, 7751).

Moreover,

considered the Polish reply on 10 August

•as most dangerous.

In its communication Poland stated

that it took note of the German declaration ^''1 th sur

prise, since it could not perceive

le^al foundation

Justifying German Interfewence in the relations between
Dgnzig and Poland.

The note continued;

They will in the future oppose by
such means and measures as the Polish
Government alone consider adequate,

any attempt made by the authorities of
the Free City of Danzig to jeopardize
the rights and interests that PoloJid
possesses in D.^nzig, on the "basis of

the agreement to which she is n p-art,
?Jid that the Polish Government will

consider as an aggressive act any
possible intervention of tte Govern^
ment of the Reich which may endanger

these/rights and Interests,"

j 'U

(Welz.

Exh, 96, Doc. 373, Welz, D.B, I-D,
p. 30).

'..'M

•M

It is to be noted that Poland, astonishing as it may
have seemed to Germany, was merely affirming her longestablished legal position,

German intervention in

the relations between Danzig -^nd Poland had no legal
basis.

-
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On 15 August 1939, two of the most illuminating

and Important conferences in this period occurred.On
that morning trSIZS.i3CKZR saw Ambassador. Coulondre
and submitted a lengthy., four-page memorandum to

Ribbentrop and other officials of the Foreign Office
on this conversation, V/hen Am* assador Coulondre

mentioned the increased tension between Germany and
Poland, WEIZSAZCK3R replied:
Then I went rather far back and quoted
all sorts of arguments in order to charac
terize Poland's unbridled suicidal policy-

,

. , Coulondre then wanted to make a little

excursion into the past and to represent the

Snglish-Frenoh pledge to Poland as the in

evitable result of the German establishment
of the Protectorate in Czecho-Slovakia.
h

Moreover observers assert that, according to
, the French report from Warsaw,

"bravado in_evidenc£. There, £nJ%.e_con3''^a'^^j

Yhd FoTi"sh ^v£rm£n_t l.s_k£eping^a_cool Head.
"I contested this very vehemently, I said
that the Polish government moreover was

not ruling at all. ,,, Such excesses only

proved Polish confidence in the two big

brothers In the West, who would help. We

could not, and would not, tolerate thb
further continuance of such a Polish admin
istration. Poland was "bringing its fate

upon itself as a runner amuck.
"I then went on to say that,

like every

stupidity, the polish one also had a certain
merit;

"1) Poland's friends would see from it what
they themselves had brought nbout, and

"2) Poland would therewith free_her_friends,
sU2port,

"For one could not Imnglne that France^or

Sngland would wTsH to £tak£ their

ln_favour of"tHeTr_frienH

HaH run wild.

When Coulondre asked me what these oo^

elusions were I told him two things: Pol^h_
would have to comp_ly^w^th Gepman^'s
flHoTe cT.aims an3^ would Have to change her

generaT attitude towards Gor.aany completely.
-
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"Finally the Ambassador said that his i^jj^yernment

would not agree to pressure being exerpl,sed on
Warsaw as it had been exercised the previous

year on Prague. The positions then and now were
different." (Pros.HIxh. 169, HG-203lj D.B. 4-Bj

P.33, 34, 35), (underlining supplied),
Thus.lt is clear that ^.VSIZSAilGKSR was adhering to the

official policy of trying by all means to have England
and France abandon their support of Poland and demand
as in the case of Czechoslavahla, that for the sake of

peace, Poland surrender to Germany's "Justifiable"
demands.

W3IZSAEC1CER testified that his intentions were

twofold, namely that France express a strong attitude
towards Germany and, on the other hand, that France
moderate Polish excesses. (T. 7853). WEIZSA^CLiR con

tended further that his notes to Ribbentrop did not
reproduce the actual character of his conversations.

(T. 9433). WEIZSAECKER himself referred to Ambassador
k

Coulondre's report on this very situation as supporting
hie contention. (T.7852).

In Ambassador Coulondre's report to Bonnet on

the above-mentioned conversation with WEIZSA:iiCK:ijH he.
in part,

Is quoted as stating:

"Fortunately it's an ill wind that blows no
body any good. This Polish policy mu^t have
the advant<age of ultlmate_l^ loos^enlng _th£
bonds be^w^en you anj
^ refuse to
beTleve" "that France intends always to

screen these Polish pranks . . .

"Herr von v.eizsaeckor then Interrupted me in
order to ask me whether this automatic action
would come into play even if
Question of an 'unio^ovolte^ aggressio .

vised Him no'f ^o'lose

aiiipr

the fact was that if any of the three Allies,

France, England, and Poland,
the other two would automatically bc> at her
side.
-

96

-

•-!

niwfitAl

4

"After allj everything I had seen while in

Paris had convinced
moderajtion aBd_
even of the caution of_tHe_PollsH

"S^overnmentj^ I H?,d been able to observe that

^

it""turned a blind eye to the importation of

arms into Danzig, although the re-militari
zation of the City is prohibited by its Statute.
.

doubt* retorted the State Secretary, 'but
the Statute could not foresee that the City
would have to defend itself against its
guardian'

.

, .

"I quote this phrase because it is

tyoical of_the^state_of

_the

s-t'rass^. I aS^ded tHat if minor incidents

occurred in regions with German minorities,,
the same was the case in Germany in regions

i'

with PDlish minorities." (Weiz.Sxh. 106, Doc.

27, Weiz.D.B, 1-D, P.67/68) (underlining
supplied)•

Therefore, it becomes obvious even from this defense

• exhibit that, though the wording naturally differs,
WEIZSABCKBR's memorandum to Ribbentrop in all sub

stantial respects does reprod.uce the'tenor of his
conversation with Ambassador Coulondre.

4.

«

Further, if WEIZSAECKEH desired to pursuade Hitler
and Riobentrop that France would abide by its guarantee,

it was totally unnecessary to include, in this lengthy
memorandum to Ribbentrop, that the blame rested

entirely upon Poland and that Polish atrocities left

Germany no -recourse except to arms* Acceioting ViiilZ—
SAECKER's theory, arguendo, it defeated his purptose
to Include in his report the advice he gave to

Coulondre to curb the alleged excesses of the Poles.

Further, if WEIZSAECKER desired to have Ribbentrop
and the Fuehrer clearly note that F^--ance would abide
by its guarantee, he dissipated this warning by in
cluding, In the memorandum to Ribbentrop, extensive
arguments why F-^ance cannot continue to support

Poland and why Germany's justifiable claims should
-
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be conceded.

In actuality,

stantially revealed,

as the evidence has sub

this was the very policy that

•RibOentrop was ur^jing in a last-minute attempt to

separate the ^^estern Powers from Poland. 'VSIZSAUCKSR,

in his ex post facto construction of these documents,
?,:rasps upon a few ambiguous statements of his in
order to cloud the

fundamental issue.
•

' v

'VRIZSASGKSR

presented a similar defense in

regard to his conference on 15 August 1939 with
Ambassador Henderson. WSIZSA3GK5R, in reviewing this
conversation in his memorandum to Ribbentrop and
other officials of the Foreign Office, stated:
"... To the matter of the customs inspections
Henderson linked the allegation that weapons
were being smuggled by Germany and .that

Danzig was being militarized on a vast scale,
thus affecting Polish right and interests,
without Poland having remonstr-ated. I vi^or-_

0U£l^ denied__tha^ _thc mill_tary_mea_sure_s _ln__

DaHz_ig~"'^r£ H^J.n^t3^fIeE. D^mzig was doing

nothXng elXe but protecting itself against
her protector. And that, of course, should
be permissible. For the rest I pointed out

once more, how the British policy bestowed a
Polish liberty upon the Polish government,
which was now being use"? by Pol.and to .an

unlimited advantage, England must realize
now where her so-called 'policy of encircle

ment' had lead to aid sh^ ^hould^hardly ^e_

3.n£l_in£d_or obli|_^ated Jto_be led _injto_disas^er

^y]^h£r polisE friend^ who Eave___gbn^

•—

"... Henderson, resp. his government stated
that Poland was reasonabl.G___and^order_lyj_ and,

he denied that pElancT was in a position to

commit an act of aggressipn against Germany.
In all other instances, however, which
raXuTt in a ^eXman-Polish clash, the British
government feols obligated to render military
assistance snd is definitely resolved to
fulfill this obligation.

"Moreover, Poland would not take any decisive
steps without being assured of an agreement
by London.

"... For my pa'^^t I was unable to offer any

other advice, except that Poland proraptly
9t

nmiiri'h'iiil' ri'1111' I ..e.

come to her senses with rer-nrd to the acute

problem of Danzi[.-5 as well
her entire
attitude towards us. II (pros.Hxh. 170, NG--

200S, D.B. 4-3, P.36, §7, 38) (underlining
supplied).
WEIZSA3CK3R also declared that at this time he was

orivately endea.voring to delay conditions reaching a

climax until after 1 September, the planned day of

the•attach.
Henderson,

However, during

his conversation with

the question was posed:

The ambassador then raised the question
yhethex
it w.^^g not
possi_ble _to_p£s_tpon£
_isr
-TV
"5". .""ts
3" —
r>
•♦••irifi

the DanzTg-Pol£n5^

until a. time when

Tt^couTd^be" 'solved'"in a calmer atmosphere.
He would then be confident of a

better

success for us, too. Henderson thought that I
may not be in a position to answer this

question. However, I replied by saying that

his question was a

_theore_ti£a3^ on£

since Poland would utilize a postponement

of the problem for no otho-'^ purpose than to
increase the harm it had already done, so

that it was ^bjtirel-y^out^of £he

sp£.ah of_an improv£m_en£ of_the__atmos2he_re_. _

TlbiR., P.SBT Tunderlining suiDplied)

If T^IZSASCKER was acting in opposition to Hibbentrop

and attempting, by telling each one individually a
different story, then he destroyed his effectiveness

by reporting to Hibbentrop the full contents of both
sides of the story. We subuilt however, that W3IZSA3CiaR,
durinjii this conversation too was adhering to ohe

official Gsrnan policy of atteijptlng, through constant
diploiaatio pressure, to separate Poland from her Allies
in order that, peacefully or by means of force,

Germany would recover Danzig .and the Corridor.

In his testimony, WIIZSAilCKSR contended that this
interview with Henderson was also .expressed fqr the

ears of Hibbentrop alone and that Henderson's report,
which he had introduced as a defense exhibit, was an.

accurate reproduction of what occurred. (-Tr.7852/53)..
-
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Henderson, on 16 August, in his report to Lord Halifax,
pertaining to his conversation with WEIZSAUCKSR on
15 August, stated in part:
"Deterioration was due firstly to Polish
ultimatum to Danzig Senate of 4th August,
and secondly to last sentence - which
he (Weizsaecker) quoted - of Polish reply

to German Government of 10th August, but
also in general to the unmistakable set

policy of persecution.and extermination
of the German minority in Poland,
"I told

Baron von Weizsaecker thcat

was quite another side

there

to the case.

Polish note of 4th August had been
necessitated by the

succession of measures,

and particularly military ones, undertaken
in Danzig with view to undermining the
Polish position there; Polish reply of
loth August had been provoked by German

verbal note of 9th August, and moreover
only described as aggression 'acts to the
detriment of Polish rights and interests';
and Polish Ambassador had only the day
before complained to me of the number
of cases of persecution of Polish minority
in Germany.

"State Secretary replied with some heat
that though isolated cases of persecu
tion of Poles had occu'ared, there was
absolutely no comparison between them and
that was being done in Poland,
Hitherto,
he said, not too much stress had been
laid in the German papers on what was
happening in this respect, but there was
a limit to everything and that limit had
now been reached.

"He admitted the militarization of Danzig,

but said th^t its object had been entirely
defensive in order to protect the town

against what should have been Its protec
tor.

I told Baron von Weizsaecker that
the trouble was that Germnny could never
see but one side to any question, and

always wHhted everything modified in her

favour.

W£ disputed with acrimony about

the rights and ^'^rongs of the case without
either apparently convincing tbe other.
With these details I

need not trouble you.

The position had been finally defined
in your Lordship's speech at Chatham i^ouse

i

on S9th June and

the Prime

Minister's statement in the House

of Cormnons on lOth July.

Prom that

attitude we could not deviate.

"... I told the State Secretary,
that
were talking in a circle.
The Polish Government had shown

extreme prudence hitherto, and would,
moreover, tp.ke no major step without
previous consultation with us;

just

p.s in accordance with their milltar:'"

agreement I understood that the Ger
man Government would take no irrevoca.'ble

stej) without prior consulta.tion with
the Italian Government-.
His Majesty* s
Government had given their word and
must he sole judges of their action.

It was consequently hypothetical to
speak of 'under -?.ll circumstances'
or of blindly 'following Poland's
lead'.

"...

There

is no doubt

that Baron

von Weizsaecker was expressing, as
he assured me very solemnly tha.t he

was, the considered views of his Govern
ment and the position as he himself see^
"(Weiz. Exh. 110, Doc. 326, 'Yelz.D.i;.

I-D, p. 77/79) (unde"'^lining supplied).

At the most, it can he stated that ';7EIZSAECICSR, in his
ricochet policy was unahle to convince either the

French or English Ambassadors that unbeknown to them

Poland was committing serious excesses and deliberately

provoking Germany.

Even if true, arguendo, German

diplomats had cried "wolf" once too often.

In an exhibit taken from the French Yellow Book,

Caraoon, French ^harge d'Affaires in London, on 18

August, informed Bonnet of a conversation, with
Ambassador Henderson concerning the latter's conference

with 17EIZSAECKER (probably between 15 and 18 August.),
Henderson described WEIZSAECKER's behavior during
this conversation in the following manner:
"...

In the course of this conversa

tion, the German State Secretary was
particularly aggressive and even

brutal tov^ards Poland, on account of

the notes sent by Warsaw both to

Senate and to the Wilhelmstrasse, and

of the treatment meted out to the
-
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German-speaking population in Polish
territory.
Without referring to the

possibility of -Sngland remaining out
side the conflict., he declared that
the' last limit of German patience has
now been reached.

"According to Sir Neville Henderson's
account, he replied with equal vigour
and put forward the other side of all
these questions.
Not for one moment
did he feel that he was even holding

the interest of tEe person to whom he
spqk^. "

(Pros. Sxh. 3563, 2943~P5,

D.B. 97-A, p. 171). (underlining sup
plied).
The defense introduced a report by AmbassaC-or

Coulondre to the French Foreign Minister, Bonnet, on 17
August 1939, concerning a conversation with Ambassador
Henderson,

They discussed the desirability pf further

pautlonlng Poland not to provide any possible provocation

for German action.
T-Dj p. 80),

(Weiz, Fxh. Ill, Doc. 211, Weiz, D.B,

W^IZSAFCKFR construes this also to be a

result of his alleged lorevious warnings.

However,

Araoassadors Henderson and Coulondre did continually stress

to Vi/SIZSAFCKSR without success that Sngland and France
would naturally caution Poland in this tense situation.

Ambassador lipski, as aforementioned, stated thr?,t the
Polish Government was doing everything possible to avoid

providing Germany with any flimsy pretext,

(Pros, Sxh,

C-334, NG_5870, D. B. 204, p, 69, et.seq.).

Moreover,

Ambassador Coulondre in this conversation stated:

"I thought it ray duty to add that it
was important in any case, to refrain
from exerting any pressure on Warsaw

and to avoid scrupulously any interference
with the machinery which had led to the
de structlon of Czechoslovakia,

,

I remarked to Sir Neville Henderson

that, even assuming that certain factors
of a seoondrary nature had exerted their
influence, he knew as well as I that as
a result of Goebbel's and Forster's

speeches, the militarization of the city,
the obstacles of every sort put by Poland
.
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is the way of the exercise of Jits rif^ht.

hatlonal socialist agitation in i)anzig
had,

'iJl£ ^

since April, been devej..&pi>ng aocord-

^ plan, the objecl: of whic"h was

to exhaust

at a

and overcome Polish Iresistanoe

time when .German propaganda aimed at

disturbing opininns in France and Sngiand.
in order to divide the Allies." (^eiz.

Sxh. Ill, Doc, 211, Welz. D, B.
(underlining supplied).

I-D, p.80).

On 18 August, WSI2SABCKFR infornteA. Ribbentrop and

other officials of the Foreign Office that he had just
seen Ambassador Henderson.

Henderson reiterated that

Poland would not allow itself to be led int-^ provocation
and that Sngland would Insure such behavior,

I'TFIZSAECKBR

opposed this statement and replied:

"... I once more couldn't help finding
a complete misjudgment of the Polish
behavior against the Germans on the
part of Sir Neville Henderson, and I
explained to him the true facts."

(Pros. 5bch. 3562, HG-5377, D. B. 97-Aj
p.

169).

^en Henderson again emphasized that England would lend
armed assistance to Poland, WEIZSAECKER stated:
"I answered Henderson that we

could not

attach any belief to these protestations

It was in this respect as well, that we
found a complete difference between our

respective opinions."

(Ibid,, p. 169).

Reaffirmance in a memot^andum to Ribbentrop of the

belief that England would not support Poland in nowise
tended to convince Ribbentrop that the ^nglieh were not
bluffing and could not be split from their Allies.

About 22 August Ribbentrop flew to Moscow to con

clude the Russian Pact, and WEIZSAECKER, as his deputy,_
remained In charge of the Foreign Office in his absence,

(T. 9061).

On 22 ^ugust Chambe^^lain sent a letter to

Hitler through Ambassador Henderson which stated that
England would abide by her obligation to Poland; however,
England offered her services in negotiations between

Poland and Germany to obtain a settlement.

180, N&-2006, D. B, 4-B, p. ©O).
-

loa -

(Pros, li-xh.

WEIZSAECKER claimed

that this letter was in accordance with his personal
sentiments and further, that Hitler, prior to receiving

Henderson, had inquired whether he should receive the

Ambassador.

Upon W3IZSA3CIC3R's recommendation he did

so, in the presence of W3IZSAECKSR.

\^H]IZSAHJCK-£R, in

his testimony, indirectly alleges that Chamberlain's

• H
1 .1 -

offer to the Fuehrer was a product of his warnings to
the British Government; but no other proof is adduced.
«!

W2IZSABCKFR further testified that in this meeting with

'
*

Hitler he had a long desired opportunity to spcah to
the Fuehrer alone concerning the critical situation.
When Hitler mentioned that the Poles might give way,

WSIZSA5CKBR advised him to seize any such opportunity,

WSIZSASCKBR also states that he told Hitler thatif

war did result he desired to rejoin the Germany Kavy.
WSIZSAFCKBR contends that Hitler was not at all offended^

hut convinced by W3IZSAFCKBR's statements, at least for -

'

the moment. (T. 7755).

WFIZSA3GKSH may have stated his

*

views diplomatically, but it is difficult to believe
that he voiced outspoken opposition and to Hitler

alone.

Further, although he testified that Hitler

had been influenced, on the preceding day, 22 August,

^

Hitler had told his generals that war with Poland will
be made at once,

p. 201),

(Trial of Major War Criminals, Vol. I,

^nd on the same day, 23 August, the Russian

Pact was announced, removing the last obstacle from
Hitler's path.

In construing this uncorroborated testimony of
WSIZSAFOKFR, arguendo, it must be observed that he
himself claims that he was able to influence the Fuehrer,

and as one of the top-level officials in the Foreign
Office, his advice was frequently sought and resoected
^
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by both Rlbbentrop and Hitler.

Hitler's reply on 23

Augus,-S tg Chamberlain! s'letter is in starh contrast
to WEI23aEeKER's testimony that he had conyinced him.

Thp fuehrer stated that Germany had pertain definite
interests which it cannot abandon, nsraely Danzig and the

Polish Corridor.

Although Germany was prepared to settle

these quest-ions by methods of negotiation, the English
guarantee to Poland had dispelled the letter's inclina
tion to negotiate.
"... 4)

'-L'he Fuehrer further stated:

The unconditional assurance

given by England to Poland that she
would render assis tance to that country

in all circumstances regardless of the

causes from which a conflict might

>

spring, could only be interpreted in
that country as an encouragement thence
forward to unloosen, under cover of such
a charter, a wave of appalling terrorism

against the one and a half million German
inhabitants living in Poland," (Pros.
Exh. 180, NG-2006, D.B. 4-B, p. 84).

Hitler further declared that the questions of Danzig

and the Corridor must be solved.

(Ibid.).

It is to be

noted that these statements of the Fuehrer's concerning
♦

k

A . .

England's blank check guarantee, the policy o.l encircle
ment, the ignoring of German rights in Danzig and the
Polish Corridor, and the alleged persecution of German
minorities in Poland, are the very defenses that

WEIZSAECKER employed in Justification of his alleged
peace efforts*

TOISSAEGKER also testified that during his conver

sations, about the 20th of August 1939, with Ambassador
Henderson once, in his garden, he suggested thct the
British send a general to Hitler who "was to make it
emphatically clear to Hitler that any armed measures

against Poland would simultaneously mean a war with
Britain". (T. 7860). This proposal is quite surprising,
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•since it is contrary to \7EIZSAEDKER's reiteration that
British determination to oppose

Hitler should he trans

mitted discreetly through diplomatic channels,

^ut here

he testifies that he recommended that the British revert
to his recommendation during'the September 1938 crisis.

Assuming WEIZSAECKER's previous statements, arguendo,
the sending of a British general, to lay the law down
to the fuehrer, x^ouli

be a method of direct intimida

tion that would infuriate the Fuehrer and cause him to
adopt the most drastic course of action,
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The prosecution Brief against the defendrjit

Veeeennayer, concerning his activities In Danzig in

August 1939 is hereby incorporated in this brief by
reference,

\7EIZSAEG;KER admitted that he saw the defendant

Veesenmayer shortly prior to his departure in mid-August
1939 for Danzig. (T. 7857).

On 19 August 1939 Veesen-

-mayer informed the ^'oreign Office that G-auleiter Forster
had requested the Foreign Minister's approval for in

creasing pressure against Poland to the limit.

In the

customs officials dispute, G-aulelter Forster will demand
that Poland withdraw fifty customs officials and, should
the Poles yield, the demands will be further Increased
in order to mate agreement Impossible,

WEI23AECKER for

warded Veesenmayer's report to Rlbbentrop and recommended
that the follov/ing reply be given;

"I agree v;ith your idea about how
to conduct

discussions about

the customs

officials dispute.
Still, discussions
will have to be conducted and pressure

^•

exerted against Poland in such a way
that responsibility for failure to come

i,

to an agreement and the consequences rests
wltlTPoland.(ProsTTxh. 173, NO-2172,
D.B, 4-B, p, 48). (underlining supplied)

In testifying about this exhibit, WEIZSaSCKER stated
that his recoraraendatiOn was made to delay the contem
* <K .

plated action.

(T. 8758).

But his recommendation con

tained no course of action that would result in post

ponement or delay, if the proposed plan incorporated

his suggestion. Further, his suggestion is in accordance
with the diplomatic campaign then being conducted by

G-ermany and he merely csutioned the Dsnzig representa
tlves to adhere to this policy.

Further, WEIZSAECKFR

stated that it was not the Foreign Office or Veesenmayer

but Hitler who was making the decision as to the course
-

•J- '•
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of "action In g^aig; (T., 7859) and, as the evidence
has shown. Hitler very carefully attempted, throughout

the. era of aggressiOHi to place the bla.nie upon the other
party.

V/EIZSAEGKER alsp testified that the center of

gravity had long passed from Danzig to the minority
question and that the activities in

tant.

(T. 7752).

Danzig were unimpor

However,'he did concede "of course,

it might occur to Hitler at any time to give more

prominence to the Danzig question".

(T, 7855).

On 22

August Veesenmayer informed VVEIZSA3CKER, who was then

in charge of the Foreign Office in the absence of the •
Foreign Minister (T, 9061), that the follovrlng action
is planned

;

"Action is planned as follows:

"1, Long-drawn negotiations in the
question of custom officials will end in
a complete dead lock. Doles to be blamed
for i t .

A

"2, Complete removal of all Polish
custom officials and abolishing of the
customs-frontier to East Prussia will
follow^

"3. 7he Poles will react, one way
or

the

other.

"4. We shall retaliate with the
arrest of numerous Poles in the Danzig
area and seize numerous Polish hidden

ir.i

stocks of arms,

"^^he finding of these

hidden arms is- secured*

"5. If the Poles do not sufficiently
react to this, then finally the Westernplatte shall "be attacked.
(Pros, ^xh,

175, N&-3615, D.B. 4-B, p* 69) (under

I'^tV

lining supplied).

It is to be noted that the proposed course of action
incorporated WEI2SAECKER'8 recommendation.

WEIZBAECKER stated that this exhibit could not be

taken seriously since the decisions were made at Hitler's
•
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headquarters, and not in Danzig- (T. 7859)- However,
on 23 august, G-auleiter Forster who was in contact with
the Fuehrer vjas appointed head of the Danzig Sta.te by

decree of the Dapz^-g Sepate.

(Pros. Exh, 182, TC-72,

D.B. 4-B, p, 90). Also on 23 August WEIZSAECICER was
informed that Danzig will demand that fifty Polish custom

inspectors be withdrawn at once; it Is anticipated that
Poland v;lll reject this demand; negotiations will then be
terminated and the blame placed upon Poland-

(Pros. Exh.

181, Ng-1992, D.B. 4-B, p. 88). On the following day
Veesenmayer informed WEIZSAECKER that the Fuehrer had
approved of the proposed plan, with the exception of
Point 4.

(Pros. Exh. 176, N&-1993, UB. 4-B, p. 70).

On 23 August 1939 the Non-Aggression Pact between

G-ermany and the U.S.S.R. was signed at lioscow by Ribben-

trop. (Pros. Exh. 179, TC^25,DB. 4-B, p. 77). The secret
- protocol was not promulgated. However, in this protocol
Poland was divided into German and Russian spheres of

influence, in the event of a territorial and political
rearrangement.. Germany declared its political dis
interestedness in the area of Roumanian Bessarabia.

(Welz. Exh, 116, Doc. 223, Welz. D.B. I-D, p. 97). Von
Kessel's testimony revealed that WSIZSAEGKER had Imowledge
of this secret protocol,

(T. 9478/80),

WEIZSAECKSR testified that he considered the Russian
Pact "disastrous to peace" (T, 9027); and he further
said that he deemed that Pact highly dangerous because

"Hitler believed that with this instrument in his hands

he was novi in a position to launch his attach on Pola
without any danger"

(T.8044).

However, the defendant had knowledge that the

prosecution was in possession of documents establishing
his participation in the securing of the Russian act.
-
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This Is evidenced by his statement that he was aware
of the U.S, State Department publication, "Nazi-Soviet
Relations, 1939-1941" (T. 9032) and that he also him

self introduced documents from this publication.

He

therefore puallfied his condemnatierj gf the Pact and

admitted that from early spring 1939 onward, "this
state of normalizing relationships between G-ermemy and
Soviet Russia was one which appeared to me to be a
reasonable course to take,"

(T. 9031),

Although WEIZSAECKER testified that he favored

the normalization of relationships, he constantly evaded
answering the question whether Hitler would not be
vl

given a freer hand in the Polish conflict if Russia was
neutralized and an alliance between the Russians and

the Western Pov/ers prevented (l, 9029/31).

'-^'he follow-

ing presentation of evidence establishes that the defen-.

dant WEIZSAECKER actively participated in the prevention
of the proposed -^nglo-French Alliance with Russia and. ,

that he participated actively in the diplomatic and
political preparations that ledd to the conclusion of
this Pact,

Theo Kordt testified that as early as 17 April 1938

WEIZSAECKER Informed him that the European balance of
power was disturbed by having Russia In the opposing
camp.

Therefore, it was imperative that Germany

reorganize this unequal balance in order to achieve

equilibrium (T, 12,009).

Thus, shortly after the

Anschluss, WEIZSAECKER believed that one of the aims of

the German foreign policy must be to neutralize Russia
if Germany were to achieve her aim^s.

In March 1939 Stalin dropped a hint that an under

standing with Germany might become possible (T. 7742).
-

110

;; -

Vi

^ uf
,1'

Germany immediately^grasped this opportunity. V/EIZSAECICSR
testified that is was only in the course of the summer

of 1939 that the polltipal element was Intrpduged into

negotiations between Russia and Germany (T. 9027).

How

ever, WEIZSAECKER subsequently under oross-examina.tion

admitted that since early spring 1939 he discussed v/ith

the Soviet Charge d*Affaifes the political question of

coinciding their countries relationships (T. 9032).
It is Interesting to note that WEI2SAEGICER, on
50 May 1959 made the first

official pSlitical contact

with the Russians on the question of political rapproche

ment.

during this period

England and France were

negotiating with Russia on the question of the conclusion
of a military alliance.

Thus, the discussion of

rapprochement with Russia was a ticklish one, for a

rebuff by the U.S.S.R. would mean an immeasurable loss

of prestige.

WEIZSASCKER in his conversation with the

Soviet Change d'Affalres on 30 May handled the novel
discussion with the necessary tact, caution, and effective

ness; WEIZSAECKER said;
"Actually, Herr Molotov had stated that
politics and economy could not be entirely
separated in our relations; a certain
connection between the two did actually
exist.

"... After we had exchanged a few more

words to clarify the incJdent of last
January, I told the Charge that I agreed
with him that economicd and politics

could not be entirely separated from
each other.
I t was for this very reason

that I was having the conversation with
him, because the British efforts to
Rnssio- into her sphere - efforts of

which we were informed -

indicated a

political orientation in Moscow of which
we would he.ve to take account, even in

considering less important problems, such

as the Soviet
Prague.

k-

Russian trade mission in

-

m/
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Ill

-

.

After the discussion had reached

this point I reminded the Charge of
certain conversations which he himself

had conducted in the Office and above

all of the statements of his Ambassador,
now absent from Berlin, v/ho told me in

the middle of April of the possibility
of

a

normalization and even further

improvement of Crerman-Russian political
relations.
From this point the conver
sation proceeded spontaneously and I

changed over to a'purely conversational
tone and put aside paper and pencil.'"•i

I

did not know whether there still

was any room at all for a possible g^radual
normalization

of

relations

between Soviet

Russia end u-erraany, now that Moscow had

perhaps"~'^ready listened
ments of London.
At any
since the Charge and his
talked so frankly in the

.

to the entice
Fate, however,
Ambassador had
Foreign Ministry,

I would like to spare myself the reproach
that we on our part had held back and had

concealed our position."
(Lammers Exh. 67,
Doc. 115, Lamrners D.B. 6, p. 23, 24, 88)

(underlining supplied)
WEI2SAECKSR's affiant, Schnurre, the German Foreign

Office official handling the economic phase of the Soviet
German negotiations, stated that in May 1939 he realized

that a politically satisfactory atmosphere had to be

created before any economic negotiations could be
successful (T, 19,169,. 19,174).

He further testified

that from May until the conclusion of the Pact he con
i, 'f

tinually reported, orally and in writing, to both
i¥EI23AEClC.ER and Ribbentrop (T, 19169/170).

during May 1939, England, France and Russia were
discussing the possibility of a military alliance.

In

a memorandum of £5 May 1959 to Ribbentrop, V/EI2SASCKER
proposed;

"It should be our aim to prevent the
Russo-Anglo-French relations from

assuming a more binding character and
from further intensification." (Pros.
Exh. 3550, NG-5365, D.B. 97-A, p. 149),
WEIZSAECKER also recommended that in discussions between

Ambassador Hllger and the
-

Russian diplomats on economic
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questions he ce.utlously cspress the opinion that although
he ¥/ould not discuss politics during his economic phase
of the negotiationsj he believed that between G-ermany

and Russia, "all possibilities were open"

(Ibid, p.

150) (underlining in original).
In a personal letter on 31 May 1939 to Ambassador
Moltke at Y/arsaw and Ambassador Maokensen at Rome.

WEIZSASCKER stated:

*

"J-'he problem, whether and how one could
try to put a spoke in the wheel of the

<

English-Russian conversations, has
turned to and fro within the last days,"
(Pros, Exh, 3551, NO-5366, D.B, 97-4..

f

p.

♦

151),

WEIZSAECKER testified that when the situa.tion

becrme more critical, he dispatched Erich Kordt to

England (T. 7745)^

Erich Kordt testified that in June
I

1939 he conferred secretly v/ith Lord Vansittart and

informed hira thct Hitler was contemplating an alliance
with Russia,

Ke stated th;..t although the G-erman opposi

tion opposed the English system of guarantees, they felt

, it would be desirable that

England rather' tha.n Hitler

conclude this treaty and thus avoid a v;ar (T, 7395/96,

7589/90),

^hls testimony contradicts WEIZSAECKER's

other endeavors for peace during this period.

If England

ooncludod publicly a military alliance with Hussia,
seemingly this would further antagonize the Fuehrer.

Secondly, srloh Kordt claimed that he spoke in the name
of the opposition in his conversations with Vansittart,
However, YffilZSAECKER himself testified that there

no resistance activities preceding the Polish campaign

(T. 7864).

in addition, the only news .conveyed to

Vansitta.^'t was fully knovfn to the British G-overnment
und • - merely Infoi-med them that this alleged opposition
-
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group favored England, rather than the Fuehrer, conclud
ing an alliance.with Russia.

The situation was so tense

that obviously England did not require Kordt's counsel

to realize the fatal consequences of Hitler's concluding
such an allianoec

Reference' is also made without further

comment to^ the two affidavits of Lord Vansittart character
izing the nature of his contacts with the Kordt brothers

(Pros. Exh. C~65, N(3-5786, D.B. 204, P. 1 end Pros. Exh.
C~65A, N0~5786A, D.B. 204, P. 5).

In contrast to the alleged advice given to the
British, ^VEIZSAECKER on 13 June 1939 discussed with

Ambassador Henderson the British negotiations v/ith Moscow.
WEI3SAEGKER then stated;

"Sir ^^eville made a statement to the

following effect:

As long as London

was carrying on negotiations T;ith
MOSCOW; convorsftions between London

%

and Berlin were naturally impossible*
if the pact with Russia were concluded,

however, it mi^ht be easier to talk
with Berlin.

1-

!y this statement

Fonderson evidently believed about

Sv-;,

the same thing the Times had said,
nanicly that strength v;as perfectly
coiApstible \7ith readiness to negotiate;
without strength Britain was perhaps
not even a suitaole partner for
negotiations.

"With reference to the British pact
with Russia I

made a. fev; remarks to

^"enderson regarding its effect of Pro
moting war, especially in Pol.snd.

•;>hbF:

p

Xxh,

97-A,

154) (Underli'iing supplied) (Docu

ment appeared in G-erman White Book).
On 17 June 1939 WSI23LECKER conversed with Ambassador

Coulondre who was of the opinion that once the Francoi-;-.

Russian Agreement was concluded- diplomatic discussions
I

between the Axis and Western Pov^ers could be more easily
arranged.

WEIZ3AE0KER replied..

"I Expressed doubt regarding this, and
said that it was futile to threaten us
-
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Vtfith the Russians and that we were an

uhsuitahle target for threats. The
method of intimidation produced in us
• the opposite of what was intended,"

. (Pros, Sxh. 3554. NC—5609Fj D.B. 97-A»
p. 156).

WEIZSAECKER again received Ambasgador Coulondre on 30
June 1939.

WEIZSaECKSR referred to the despera.te British

policy of encirclement of G-ermany and then stated;

•^'To me the British illusion that they
could conjure away the alleged danger of
W8J? in Eut'ope by negotiating with Moscow,
was a source of profound astonishmentc"

(Pros, Exh. 3555, NCt-5609G-, D.B. 97-A,
p. 157).
The aforesaid evidence is incompatible'with ':/EIZSAECKER' s
contention that he secretly warned Vansittart in June
that the British Alliance v/ith the U.S.S.R.

should be

concluded speedily.

The question remeans unanswered why WEIZSAECKEB.,
instead of criticizing bitterly Henderson's statements

that England was negotiating for an allience, did not
drop a hint to Ambassador Henderson that G-ermany V7as

also-seeking an allisiice with the U.S.S-R.

Instead,

he kept Henderson in the dark as to his persona.1 desires
on this question,

Germany's efforts to reach agreement with Russia

were accelerated during July 1939 a.a tension in the

Polish crisis mounted.

Cn the evening of 27 July 1939

Arabaasadcr 3chnu?"re conferred -"jrlth the Soviet Chonge

1:

d-Affaires and the Ghief of the Soviet Trade Mission,

.••vf

'^I explained that such collaboration
appeared attalneible to me now, if the

In his memorsnd.um, dated 27 July, he stated:

'Vi

Soviet Government considered it de-

*

,

sirable. I could visualize three stages:

"Stage One; The re-establishment of
collaboration in economic affairs though
the credit and commercial troary which
is to be ooncludod.
-
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"Stage Two:
improvGmont

The normalisation and

of political relations.

. . Stage Three would be the reestablishment of good political relations,
either
' ' C,,. •! - • .

a

return to v/hat

had been in

existance be_fore_(Berlin Treaty) or a hew

'

arrangement vdiich Jto_ok_a_cc£unt_o_f _the vi^al

(Pros, Exh. 5558, m-564"2 B,""D.B.97-A,
P.163) (Underlining in original)
and

"&e_rms^_P£l_ic_y; wa£

—

That was the decisive fa.ctorc

As I

had

stated previously, I could imagine a.

far-

reaching ^ompromi^e__o_f mu_tual_j21'^er_es_ts_
with due consideration for the problems

whd"ch_ were_v_ltal_to Russ_ia_^ However; this
possibility was barred the moment the

Soviet Union, hj signing a treaty, sided'
with England sg'ainst G-ermany. The Soviet
Union would then have made

its

choice,

and then would only be__ehl_e o_share__tho_
Serman_o£p_osj.t_ion wlUT_England^ Only for
this reason would I have s-ny ^bj_e_ctj.on
to his

view that

the

undyrs^and_lng be_tw_een ^erraan_y end
slow. The time was

opportune ilow..__but would _nojt be_a_ft_er___the
conclusion of a pact with London. This
would have

to be considered in Moscow.

V/hat could Englend offer Russia? At best,
participation in a European war and the
hostility of G-ermany but not a. single
dosir.able

end for Russia.

'iVha-t

could we

offer, on the other hand? NcutrBdit_y„^-IlA_
®.^£-yA^E
2.^ ^_P2®^^ble Suropean__oon- _
_fl_ict_ and, if Eoscow wished, a German- _

*

mu_tual_int_er_esjfcs_
v^hich, just as in former Times, would work

out to the advantage of both countriOs^"
(ibid, P.164) ( underlining in origina.1)

On. 29 July 'StEISSAECKER forwarded Schnurre's
mcmorand.um to the German Ambassador Schulenburg at
Moscow and made the following suggestions:

"it v/ould be important for us to know
whether the statements made to Astaldiov
and Babarin have found any response in

Moscow, If you see the opportunity of
arranging a. new talk with Molotov, I re
quest that you ^ound him _ou^ _in this
sense and tho.t, should the occtiaion e.rise,

y_ou us_e th_e A^I1*^-_^A Ab^'^E^A
memo—
rarTdumT Tf~"it' should""develop that-Molojtov

abandons_the__re6er_ve thus far maintained by

him, you £an

your
. ''V

presentation and state somewhat more pre

cisely what was expressed generally in
,
the memorandum. This concerns particularly
•

.:V"-

:t -.a;

y.0'

' H;

v^. 'V'
•;-i "-y
.

vjAS^tai^*

Poli^h_que_stionc In anj develoi^raent of the

Polish question, either in a peaceful manner
as we desire it or in any other way that is
forced upon us, we would be prepared to S8,fe

£uard all _Sovi_et interests and ^o_r_ea_ch_an
un^ersTand_in£ wi^__t^e_I^s_cow government.
If the talk pr_oc_eeds_p_os_ltively in the~Balt_lc_
question too,

the idea couTd be advanced "that"

we will adjust our stand with regard to the

Baltic in such a manner as__t_o respjec^t the vitaJ-

•Sovi^t_int_eresjbs_in jth_e Baltlc_^"Tibid, P,1S2T
TUnderlining in originalT
The aforementioned exhibit laid down the exact

formula for effecting rapprochement vath the U.S.S.R.
Since* the quos'cion v/as a delica.te one, the Russians
were to be informed of the G-erman proposals with the
necessary tact. As inducoment to have Russia withdraw

her support from Poland and the ^vestern Powers, G-ermany
promised to respect the vital interests of the Soviet.

Ihe exhibit also clearly reveals that the prospect
of concluding the Pact speedily was to clear the

way for necessary action eg-ainst Poland.
•?'BTz,SA'iCfCER

on 3 August 1959 informed Ambassador

Schulenburg that?
"In accordance with the political situation

and in the j:^tere£t__^o^
anxious,
without? prejudice to your conversation with
Molofcov scheduled for today, to continue in
Bei'lin the clarification of terms for the

adjustment of G-erman-Soviet interests." (Pros

BrJri. 3539, NG-5643, O.B. 97-A, P.166)

(Underlining supplied)
WEIZSASCKEB. in conclusion stated;

"W'e would then be prepared to speaJc quite
concretely concerning problems of possible
interest

to the Sov^ r-t Union." (Ibid)

WEIZSaECIvER testified that when plans for the

G-erraan-Russlan political pact became clear, he on 15

August Issued a'warning to Ambassador Henderson that
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in case of a conflict Russia v;ould stand by G-erraany,

(T# 7757) ♦ Hov/ever, Henderson in describing that stormy ,
conference stated;

"He seemed very confident and preferred to
believe that Russian assistence to the Poles

would not only be entirely negliable, but
tha,t the U.ScS-R- would even in the end join

in sharing the Polish spoils nor did my insistance on the inevitability of British
intervention seem to move him." (\7eiz.Exh.

110, Doc.326, V/eiz.B.B.l-D, P.79)„
HoiTever, like no.ny other statements of IVEIZSASCICER,
this is taken out of context. Reference is made to the

aforementioned discussion of the meeting of 15 August
1939 between WEIZSAECKER and Henderson. As Henderson

himself expresses it, 1/EIZSAECKER was issuing more
of a threat than a hint to the British Ambassador and

the entire interview reveals that IfVEIZSAECKER was

attempting to dissuade England from supporting Germany.
Further; It is to be noted, that it was only in
i

the eleventh-hour, on 15 August; that V/EIZSaEGKSR
allegedly gave this hint. At this time the British
Mere well aware that the German diplomats in Moscow
and in Berlin were in constant consultation with the

Russian officials in an attempt to prevent the com
pletion of an alliance between Russia, England, Frsnce

and thus strengthen the German hand in the Polish
question. In support of this, it is to be noted that
on 14 August 1939 *.7EIZSAECKER instructed Ambassador

Schulenburg and the German Military Attache at Moscow

"to oppose energetically to the Soviet authorities
and personalities there, the ideas of English military

men which you reported." (Pros.Exh. 3561, NG-5367,
D.B. 97-A, P. 168) He further stated;
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"Hov; shall Engl^jid effectively interfere in '
favor of Russia after Poland will have "been .

overrun? If Russia chooses the English side,

then she will indeed stejid isolated aga.inst
C-ermany, like in 1914, lf„t:he_S_ov_le;t Unj^on
_ch_oo£e_s ^_urider_st_^ding_w_ith us, then 'sh'e

v/ill achieve tHe security desired by her; for
that 176 £.re prepared to give all guarantees.

For information there, it is still remarked that
this trend of ideas has been handled several

times at length in conversations with ASEaEHOV
here." (Ibid)

This message was baded on instructions from. Ribbentrop;
but in his concluding sentence WEIZ3A:.C1CER discloses the
same attitude had been expressed in Berlin in conversa,-

tions vrith the Soviet Charge d'Affaires Astaldiov.
On 22 Augus-t, Kibbentrop flew to iioscow to con

clude the Russian Pact and -EIZSAhChER, as his deputy,

reraained in charge of th^ Foreign Office (T. 9061).
On 22 August '/EIZSnEClER received the Japanese Ambassador
Oshima and described to him the natural course of events
which led to the conclusion of the Russian Non-

Aggression Pact. Oshima expressed the shock that was
felt at 'Japan in this turn of events. TEIZSAbCKSR
replied that the Japanese should not be surprised

since they had been informed ^ome^i'nonjfch^s pn_ev^ous^y__^
that G-ermany was e,ttempting a normalization of their
relations with Russia. He further said;

"it was clear as dsty that for Japan, England
ha.d become Enemy No-l,

•::A

• •'I-

just as P-erraany also

was threatened rauch less by Russia than by_
English policy. The agreement v/hich was being
res-ched with hoscow was serving the interests
of both of us," (Pros.Exh. 3566, KG-o641,
P.B. 97-A, p.-177/178)
.'ElZSA.bCI.EP. also declared:

"6) Our economic, and clso certe.in political,
discussions v^ith i oscow had lasted for some

time. The negotiations for a nonaggression
jpa.ct were,' hpwever, of very roeent origin.
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It was only In the Is.st two or three days that
the posssibllity of this had aprieared. Polish

arrbgance might force us into vfar even in the
course of this weeh. 'iVith only such a limited
amount of time g.vailahle, we had been absolute

ly corapolled to act«^' (Ibid)
On 2S August IVEIZSASCPCEPu informed ell (Terms.n missions

abrpad of the background of the normalization of rela
tions betwet^.n O-ermany and Russia. He revealed that the
process of improving relations hs„d been prepared over
a ]period of months and that para.llel with the economic

negotiations, political negotiations were conducted.

(Pros.Exh. G-332, NCr-5675, P.B. 204, P.30) This is in
contrast to his

testimony that the political negotia

tions occurred quite late. (T. 7745) WEIZSAECKER further

traced the course of the recent policy toward Russia
and stated;

"The increasingly tense situation, caused
by the Polish arrogance and the continuous
and increasing Polish provocations occasioned

_taking__a_dcfj.bj.t_e stan_d at BritainJ_s_s_id_e._
It was necessary to free tHe Soviet govern
ment from a feeling of threat in case of a
German -Polish conflict, This 'Could suitably

bo achieved by putting the talks on the sub
ject of a non-aggression pact into increasing
ly concrete shape ut to the present stage. This at

the same time ^orved__o_ur__ini_ti_al__p_ur2o^G of
interfering vrith the British-French encircle
ment negotiations at Moscow." (Pros.Exh. 0-532,
NG-5675, D.Br 204> P.40) (underlining supplied)

.' •,x>;

••'EIZSAECKER ooncludeds

"The effects on ¥rorld policy of this treaty
will bec'omo visible shortly. At any rate it
can be seen already that it cejne as a hea.vy
blow to Poland." (Ibid, P.42). -

On 26 August 1939 vVEIZSAECKSR informed the German
Embassy at Moscow that tension betvireen Germany and

Poland was constantly increasing. He desired the Am
bassador to ascertain whether Russia had withdrawn her
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ti-'oops from the Polish border and;

"whether, if this is the oase, this step
cannot be retracted, as every new threat to

Poland even from the Russians would naturally
help to ease the situa.tion in the west, and
could in the end diminish willingness to aid
Poland." (Pros.Sxh. 188, Nrr-2371, D.B.4-B,P.105)
V/3IZSAECICER interpreted this telegrajn as indicating that
it was a move to bring about negotiations with the

Polos, (T. 7862) This allogat ion requires no reply,
On 26 August 1959 ^'VSIZSAiiChEH saw thu' Americsn

Chengo d'Affaires concerning two ap2:^oals from President
Roosevelt to the Fuehrer. In discussing this question,
ZSaECICSR st at ed;

"I told him that, wheraas all hope of peo.cG
was not completely lost,
situation v/as

in my view the

strained to the utmost.

I

sa.id

that in sny case he vrould be better advised

to take his warnings regarding the possible
consequences of c. war else'here, for instance,

to V/arsaw, " (Pros. Exh. 5567, NG—2570, D.B,
97-A, p. 179)
S^xh a

remark is not

in accordance with 'TEIZSAECKER' s

testimony tha.t ho desired peace at any cost.
t\ r.

§.
It:

•v;

On 27 Au^iUst 1959 h'EIZSAECrER handed Ambassador
Coulondre the Fuehrer's reply to Paladier's appeal for

peace. In this letter Hitler attempted to appease the
French Primo Jilinister and assured him that CVermany had

no intentions directed against Franco. However, he

••

-.'•h-M

dcmcndod that Danzig and the Corrlvlor must be returned

to Germany (Pros. Exh. C-528, 2945-PS, D.3,204, p.51/53)
On 29 August, 'TEIZSAEGKER informed Ribbentrop that
in a conversation vrith the Papal Nuncio concerning the
Pope's appeal to the Fuehrer for the prcserva.tion of

peace, WEIZSAEOICER had pointed out "the unceasing
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excesses against the ethnic aermans in Poland" (Pros.

Exh. 3569, MG-4606,

97-A/ 0.182). On the same

,dr,y, WEIZSAECKER informed the German Embassy at ivioscox?
that the Foreign Minister ha,d assured the Russian
Cho,rgG d'Affaires that Germany had consulted with
i-tussia on a,ll points concerning the eastern question.

••/EIZSASGKSF. concluded by stating that the German array

had started to march and that the Russian Foreign
Iviinister should be so Informed. (Pros'-Exh. 193, KG2406, D.BM 4-B, p.116)
On 51,August 1939 VffilZSASCKEH sav; the Slovel;

Minister, T/hon queried whether all prbspects of peace

had vanished, ^VEIESAECKER replied, "that this did not
depend on us". Kc fur'chor stated:

"I took notice in a friendly manner of the
Slovak Minister's request to pay due regojpd
also to Slovak territorial claims in the event

of e. peaceful solution, and in the event of
a v;s^rliko solution to return to Slovakia such

Slovak territory as was lost to Poland 20
years ago." (Pros.Exh. 3570, NG-4439, D.B. •
97-a, p.184)

It is to be noted thsit on 21 November 1939 a Gurman-'
rv^v

Slovak border a.greomont ceded Polish territory to
Slovakia and. on 22 Dccombor' 1939, Slovakia annexed,

those territories. (Pros. Exh. 497, 646-PS, D.B.97-A,
p.185)

On 51 August, Ribbontrop r.t top speed road to

Ambassador Henderson the rllogod German plan for
Gei'^man—Polish rosottlumont. However, Rlbbentrop
refused to furnish Henderson v/ith the text since the

time p.llottcd to Polrnd for sending a pleni-potontiary
had expired.- Through English
and French pressure,
'o'
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Ambassador Lipski obtained approval from his govern

ment to give an immediate and affirmative reply to the
G-orman proposals for conversation. Ambassador Lipski
saw "^.TEIZSAECKEB. at about 3;00 p.m.

tuid V/EIZSaECKER.

merely inquired v;huther he cejue as a. pleni~potentiary
or as an Ambassador.(Pros. Exh. C-328, 2943-PS, D.B.
204, p. 54) V/EIZSAECKER knew tha.t B.ibbcntrop had taken

the position that he would only receive Lipski if he
caxie a.s a plenipotentiary and not e.s an Ambassador.
\7EI2SaEC1SK could have avsaled himself of this last
I

opportunity to find a formula around this impasse.

Both he and Lipski were experienced diplomats and

might have made a. last-rainute effort to bridge the
difficulty; but Vv^IZSAECkEH mcade no such attempt.
L-.ter that evening V/SI23aECKER informed Ribbontrop
that between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. on 31 August, he,

in accordance I'dth instructions, hejid^^d the suggestions

of the Oerman bovernraent concerning the sol&tion of

the Danzig and Corridor question to the various
dir>loma/cic reproscnta/Clves of Franco and England a/aong
others.
%

On 1 September 1959, Crcrraan armies invaded Poland,

V/SIZSAECKER sent the following circular telegram to
all G-erman missions abroad: G-erman diploma.ts were in

structed to sta.te that in repulsing Polish attacks
the G-erman army wat into action. Per the time being,
this a.ct is not to be construed a.a a. state of war

"but merely as combat actions v/h.ich were caused by
Polish attacks". (Pros. Exh. 197, NG--2274, D.B. 4-B,
p.121)
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On 1 Seyjtember 1959 Hibbentrop informed the G-ermpji

mission e,t Budapest that GermeJiy did not require military
assistance from Hungary. However, in-order to prepare
for any eventuality, the Hungarian government v;as asked
not to declare its neutrality; and if they were un
decided, diplomatic pressure was to be exerted to

influence their axititud©. A marginal nota.tion reveals
that ITElZSALCIffiR was consulted. (Pros. Exh. 196, NG—
2868, D.B. 4-B, p.120).
On 3 September 1939 V/EIZSAECKER sent a circular

tolegrejn to all German missions, providing the diplomatic
justification which wa.s to be stated in a.ll diplomatic
conversations. b*EIZSAECKER reviewed the reasons for

the outbreak of hostilities including the English
\

policy of encirclement and its blank check guarantee
to Poland. He concluded;

"This is the harvest reaped by those men in
Britadn who for years he,ve preached Germany' s
annihila.tion. This course of events clearly

shows Britain's full responsibility for the
outbreak-of war." (Pros.Exh. 3572, NG-5609,
D.B. 97-A, P.190)

VJEIZSAECKEP., testified that during the last few

days he made repeated efforts to avert the outbreak

of V7ar (T. 7759). ^-TElZSAECKER expressed his belief

that if Germany embarked upbn such war, she would be
plunged into disaster (ibid). Arguando, WEIZSAEQKER
may have desired a peaceful solution of the Polish
question and well felt that through negotiations the
Polos would cede Danzig and the Corridor to Germany
rather than risk a major conflict. However, throiAghout

the jpreparations and planning for the aggression
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a.gr-inst Polpnd, V/EIZSASCKER was av/are that the Fuehrer
would not deviate from his demands for the return of

those territories, and that if thwarted in peaceful
endeavors, it was quite obvious that he would resort

to wa.r. It is noteworthy that ^e^ther his testimony
nor the evidence ever indicated tha-t he desired

Hitler to mitigate his demajids to Eejizig and the
Corridor not that he attempted to persuade the Fuehrer

to reach ancord through pehific and legitimate means,
and abandon his tantics of pressure and force. Until

the very end, he, like Hitler, tried to obtain these

aims of the G-orman foreign policy through diplomatic
i

pressure and the successes of Austria and Czechoslovakia
be reiDeated, and if that failed, G-ermany could resort
to arms.

The question remains unanswered why at this most
\

^
«

critical time, as in March 1939, when Hitler's
aggressive intentions were clear, there was no interna.1
resistance. WEIZSAHCKSR did not furnish any credible

explanation on this vital question. (T. 7864).
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PRE War REbATIONSHIPS TO ATTQLICQ

telZSAECKER testified that during preparations for tho

aggression against Polan(|, he had closely cooperated with
the now, deceased Ambassador Attolico in efforts to maintain

peace.

During his testimpny he in vague language contended

that Mussolini attempted .jl>o hinder the outbreak of war in
the summer of 1939 as a result of his efforts transmitted

through Ambassador Attolico (T, 7851).

Therefore, it behobves

us at this point to analyze.this contention.
VVEIZSAEGKSR contended that the Italians acted as a

brake but at the same time, he admitted "the relationship
i:

.

.

between Hitler and Mussolini had at that time already
r

.

passed the culminating point.

(T. 7749).

WEIZSAECKER fur

ther alleged that when Attolico and he felt in the. summer of
1939 that the situation was growingcCritical, a meeting was.
to be arranged between the Duce and the Fuehrer, in order
to have the former warn the latter of the consequences of

war.

Unfortunately, this meeting did not come off due to

iViUssolini *s state of apathy; but Ciano was sent instead to

fc
^

^

Salzburg on 12 August 1939.

(T. 7749)..
' /

However, an examination of the defense exhibit 103,

excerpts from an "Italian Embassy in Berlin, 1939^1943"
by Simoni, is in contrast to this testimony.

The author

was one of Ambassador .^^ttolico's closest confidants and

after examining the manuscript. Ambassador Attolico initialled i t as correct.

In the summarization of the events

leading up to the war of Poland, there is no mention whatso-

.ever of Vi/EIZSAECKER's active .participation.

The author

states the Steel Pact was concluded at the end of May 1939;
and Mussolini notified Hitler on 5 June 1939 that he would

be unable to complete his war preparations for the follow
ing three years.

Hitler expressed his agreement with this

point of view and the Fuehrer proposed a meeting with the
-
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Duce during the suirmier to review the situation.

(Weiz.

£icho 103, Doc. 215, Weiz. D. B. 1-D, P. 42),

Further, when rtome did not at first reply to this
\

proposal, the G-ermans pressed for a decision,

xtibbentrop-

on 4 July proposed to Ambassadqr Attolico that 4 August be,
fixed as the -date

of the meeting, and it was so arranged

upon the pressing solicitations of the Germans (Ibid., P.

43/44).

>

It is to be noted that WEIZSAEiCKER claimed author

ship of this proposal.

(T.

7749).

In subsequent meetings with Ribbentrop, the author
continues, Attolico in July learned from Ribbentrop that

Germany was prepared to wage v/ar.

Therefore, Attolico

proposed that such a meeting would only be desirable if

Italy, intended to take part in the war.

(Ibid., P. 45).

On 7 August 1939 W!£I2SA£C1vER forwarded to the German
. Ambassador at Rome, Mackensen, with t^he approval of itibbentrop,. a note received previously from the Italian Charge
d* Affaires.

This note from Mussolini to the Fuehrer re

iterates Mussolini's statement of 5 June that Italy will
not be prepared for-v/ar,

Mussolini proposed an interna

tional conference to solve the outstanding problems| the

advantage would be that if the Western Powers then refused
to agree to German demands, they would bear responsibility
for the future course of events,

(Pros. Exh. 166, 1828-PS,

D. B. 4-B, P, 20/26).
WEIZSAECKER

also sent to Mac kens en a memorandum of

his conversation on 7 August with Ambassador Attolico.

Attolico conveyed the message from Mussolini that the pro
spective meeting between the two dictators should be post
poned until the results of the Anglo-'Russian negotiations
are known.

However, Mussolini desired that the two Foreign

Ministers confer.

(Ibid., P. 27).

On 12 August, Ciano conferred at Salzburg, Austria,
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with nibbentrop and the u'uehrer and fell in with Hitler's

plans although inaking it quite clear that Italy would not

participate.

(Pros. Eixh. 260^ ld71-PS, 1). S, 7—A, P. 4).

VvhlZSAEChER stated that he, as usual, was not inforraed of-'

ficially of what occurred at the conference.

(T. 7751).

'iflihy did not Attolico inform him?
However, three days later on 15 August, VjihlZSAECxlSR
informed Ribbentrop that during his conversation with am

bassador Henderson, the latter inquired about the Salzburg

meeting.

v*iEIZSAEiCivER stated that he did not discuss the

situation with him

(Pros. Exh. 170, NG—2008, D. B. 4-B,

P. 36) and by implication, VvEIZSaECiGBPi must have been in
formed officially what occurred at the Ciano-Ribbentrop
conference or otherwise he would not have so referred to it
in his memorandum to the

P'oreign Mnister.

Therefore, there is no evidence to

establisn that

ViIEIZSaEC.vER played any role in the bringing together of the
leading officials of the axis Powers.

The evidence rather

discloses that it was Hitler, Ribbentrop and the f>uce who
maintained the initiative.

It is true that to some extent

hussolini's action was prompted by attolico's statements

that Germany was preparing for war.

But except for 'ivEIZ-

SACivER's ex post facto construction, he w/as not connected
in a major way with these activities.
vvEIZSAECiCER also testified that Hitler and Ribbentrop

till the last days believed that Mussolini would partici

pate in the aggression against Poland and that they v^fere

quite shocked by nussolini's letter of 25 August making
impossible demands as a

pre-requisite for participation.

The aforementioned evidence clearly establishes that i.iitler

long knew (from 5 June)

and never anticipated that Italy

would taxe part in the campaign.

Moreover, Hitler in his

reply on 26 August, which ^EIZSaECisER received a copy of,
-
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stated that Hitler fully understood Mussolini's position, of
military unpreparedness and .that Germany could not deliver
in time the materials required.

All Hitler required was

that Mussolini by means of propaganda and appropriate
i

military demonstrations tie down hnglish-Prenoh forces,

as .he previously promised.
4-B, P. i06) 6

B.

iVtussolini's gesture of bravado in the

eleventh hour in
and there is no

(Pros. Iiixh. 189, HG-3614,

nowise hindered the German military action,
corroborated evidence whatsoever that

VkEIZSAEGKER through Attolico induced Mussolini to write this
letter.

On 28 August 1939 Ambassador Attolico informed

WEIZSAECKER that Mussolini still harbored a plan to solve
the present crisis but hesitated to present it.

WEIZ-

SAECKM transmitted this proposal to Ribbentrop.
Exh. 3568, NG-2369, D. B. 97-A, P.- 180).

(Pros.

On 29 August

Ribbentrop in a direct conversation with Ambassador At
tolico informed him, that developments were advanced too

far to consider such a proposition.

(Pros. Exh. 192,.

]SiG-2409, D. B. 4-B, P.112).

.

'

WEIZSAECRER in his testimony had eluded to this last

minute Italian appeal and without clearly stating it, had
implied that he was r'esponsi,ble for this Italian action..

However, during the course of cross examination, the fol
lowing transpired with reference to this appeal:
"Q.

This plan came from the Duce on his

own initiative, in this particular in

stance, didn't it?

"a.

Evidently."

(T. 9065/66).

It is also to be noted that the Duce's proposal was for an

international conference, after Danzig was ceded to Ger
many, in order to settle the remaining questions between

Germany and Poland,

(Pros. Exh. 3568, NG-2369, D. B. 97-A,

P. 180).
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On 2 September 1959 Ambassador Attolico handed VilEIZSaECICER a letter from Mussolini to the Fuehrer proposing
that an armistice be called and that a

conference be held

between Germany, England, France and Poland.

19d, ,1831-PS, Do B. 4-B, P. 127).

(Pros. Exh.-

VffilZSAECKER and several

of his witnesses had alleged that this proposal too could
be traced back to the defendant's efforts.

Little doubt

exists that vl/FjIZSAECiCEH would have favored such a peaceful

solution which would cede Danzig to Germany without ,embark

ing up bn-any further uncertainties of the vira'r.

Hov^ever,

the defendant Woermann in describing this proposal stated;

"This idea which originated from the Duce
had its foremost exponent in France."
(Ibid.).
Hitler replied stating, that he could only accept such
mediation if there were guarantees that the conference

would be successful, from the German point of view.

More

over, he believed that this was the best time to attack
Poland rather than permit her further opportunity to arm.

(Ibid., P. 129).

Mussolini in his reply on 4 September

stated that ho had never considered any form of arbitration

that as a pre-requisite would, have required the withdrawal
of the German troops from Poland.

Further, he stated;

"He refused such ideas with actual indig
nation, also he would not consider the
'symbolic withdrawal' suggested by
Paris♦

In view of the strong, appeal by

France to make one last attempt, he
had forwarded the suggestion under the
self-evidence supposition, that the

remaining of the army corps, where it

were, should be a pre-requisite.(Ibidi,
P. 131) (Underlining supplied).
Thus, in this instance, too, the evidence establishes that

VIIEIZSAEGKEK played no role in this proposal, but rather
that the Italian and French governments initiated this.
This lengthy analysis of the alleged cooperation
between Attolico and TOIZSAEGKER was considered necessary
du3 to the emphasis that the defense had placed upon it as
-
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mitigation of VffilZSAECKER's actual activities.

A survey

of the entire scope of the relatiohship between Attolico and
7vEI2SAECi\ER since 1938 provides further insight into the

question of the extent of cooperation that ;/SIZSA£CICER af
forded Ambassador iittolico.

^

The evidence has revealed and

VvEIZSAJiiCivER has testified that the personal relations
between them were most cordial.
•ther

Hovi^ever, the evidence f\^-

establishes that VvEIZSAhCKEH rarely disclosed any con

fidential information that was to be withheld from the

Italians,

•

If the teamwork was so^close between the two in

r

a mutual endeavor to maintain peace, then, we submit,
VCEIZSAEGiCEh would have* disclosed such information to At-

tolico during his ve*ntures as a private individual to keep
the peace.

During the Anschluss with Austria in March 1938, the

evidence established that only at the last moment were the
Italians informed of the contemplated German action.

(Pros.

Exh.,5514, NG-4580, D. B. 97-A, P. 75, and Pros, i^och. 3527,

NG-5362, D. 3. 97-A, f, 101).

^

^

Thus no cooperation existed

at the time of the -unschluss.

.

During the Sudeten crisis, viiEIZSAECiCER allegedly
transmitted the draft by the i'uehrer on 28 September 1938

)»

to Attolico for transmission to Mussolini,

^

however,

this

question has been thoroughly discussed in the section of the
brief dealing with pr^-Munich defenses; and no other co
operation during that period v/as alleged.

During the final days prior to 15 March 1939, WEIZSAECKER closely adhered to tho official German policy of
not disclosing their intentions to the Italians.

On

11 March 1939 he informed the German Embassy at Rome that
"informations for the Axis friend are supposed to be given

at this stage in a similar manner as a year ago".
Exh, 3527, hG-5362, D. ii". 97-A, P. 101).
-
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See also2

(fros.

Prosecution liiXhibit 3550 (iSiG-353c3, G. B. 97-A, P. 104)
wh-icb. discloses ttiat tbo vaerman oi'iicia.1 wh.o gave limited
information to Ambassador Attolico was tbe Foreign minister
himself.

;KE;IZSABCI'ZE.ri did contend that on 12 iiarch 1939

he saw Attolico at the Berlin Opera House.

During the

course of a short.conversation, he disclosed by facial

gestures that the invasion was impending.

On cross exam

ination, VvMZS^FGivBR stated the' follov/ing^
"Q,.

Is that the only thing you did to

your friend Attolico to inform him,
was making a face? Is that correct?
"A.

I

believe so.

but I don't remem

ber it very well.'

(T• 8835).

This, we submit, is how fragile and refined resistance
actions could become.

Vi/EIZSAECJiEH was further queried

whether during this timp in the Opera House he could not

have stepped aside for a moirient with Attolico and told him
t

.

the details without revealing it to Hibbentrop subsequently
7irEIZSAECivE.H adr.iitted that he did not adopt this course of
action.

f
'>

It is to be noted that shortly thereafter vtfEIZ-

SaECjciER submitted a memorandum on this meeting with At

tolico to hibbentrop.

97-A, P, 102).

(Pros. Exh. 3528, NG-5390, D. B.

Even assuming, arguendo, that v/EIZSAECKER,

by his facial gestures, conveyed to Ambassador Attolico
the vague hint that sofiiething was brewing, this hint at

noon, 12 harch, was given far too late to permit Attolico
to halt the German aggressiOiTi.

He could> not even contact

the Duce then, because he had no specific information of
German intentions that he could transmit.

Thus, the Opera

House episode cannot be characterized as a serious en
deavor to maintain the peace.

•/^IZSAECilEH also testified that he could not disclose
any information to Attolico, becauso the Italian code was
in the possession of the German, government.

am' nation the.following colloquy occurred^
-
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On cross ex

"a,...i And I also remind you of the fact,

something that I have already testified
to on direct examination,

that we pos-

sessed the Italian code.

I

- .

had to be

very careful in my statements which would
not then have

been passed on as coming

from me by Attolico which the Italian
Erahassy would generally have transmitted
to home.

"Q.

Baron. vVeizssiecker, you had known At

tolico by this time, 12 i^iarch, for quite
an extensive period of time., had you notV,
"a.

On the 12th of karch?

"Q.
I said, by the 12th of iuarcri you
" had known Ambassador httolico for an

.

extensive period of time.

f

"A.

Oh, yes.

"Q.

And not only had you seen him of-•

ficially but you had him over to your
house for dinner and personal contact,
isn^t that correct?
"A.

Vve saw a

lot of each other.

"Q.
One thing strikes me as curious, and
perhaps you could clarify it for me.
In
the course of the many times you saw At

tolico, personally and without any officials
around, where you were quite safe, no one
could-hear you,' such as your own gardener
-- why didnit you tell Attolico that the
Germans had the Italian

code?

" A . I can't tell you why I didn't do that,

y
¥

But I know that other people told the
Italians that v/e had the code, namely
Canaris.

*

^

"Q,.

The code was not changed —

"A.

But I want.to add that the Italians

didn't believe it,

^

'

"Q,. But you never told your friend Attolico about it yourself, to reasssure
him that you had the code after they did
not believe i t ?

"A. I didn't tell him anything about that,
no."
(T. 8837).

Any nation that was informed that another country

was in possession of its most secret code could and would

have changed the code at once.

I'urther, it strains credi

bility to assume that the relationship between Attolico
and VVEIZSAECKER was so close and yet he did not disclose
-
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the one vital fact that was perhaps most disastrous to

Attolico's peace efforts, not only in the ~Gzechoslovakian
but through the Polish crisis.

Referring to the book "Mussolini and Europe" by
{•

iiiario honosti (Luciolli) which was introduced as a defense
exhibitj the following prosecution rebuttal excerpt was
introduced cioncerning attolico's activities during the
• Czechoslovakian crisis

in iwarch 1939;

"On ^the lOth (March) he attended with
the entire diplomtic corps the 'Heroes *

f

I'estival'

and noticed 'that

the

'fuehrer's

face was foretelling great occasions.

It

wore the same expression as in the Septem-

. ber days.'
He approached 'y/EIZSAECiUi;R,
but could not obtain'any useful informa
tion from him. ~T^I noticed that his
lips were'^sealed. ' """"TPros . Exh. C-329,
NG-586c>, D. B. 204, P. 24)
(Underlining
supplied)..
The remainder of this extract discloses that any informa

tion provided to Ambassador Attolico during this period
came from Ribbentrop.
On 31 iViarch 1939 VV'EIZSAECAER saw Httolico after his

return from Italy.

During the course of this conversa

tion, Attolico stated that he did not wish to have his state

ments disclosed before he saw xtibbentrop.

However, VffilZ-

SAECKER in a memorandum he prepared the same day, a copy

of which was sent to Pol. IV, reviewed the conversation.

i

During i t , Attolico in part stated;

"it should be clearly uricfeX'stood that
Mussolini had been informed at the

ANSCHLUSS of Austria by the prince of
Lessen only in ttie last hour.

"... At last, during the events in
March, Italy was instructed only in
the last hour of an action which was
in direct contradiction to the known

letter of Mussolini to Runciman."
(Pros. Exh. 3544, 1326-PS, D. B.
97-A, P. 133).
and s

-
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.r*''

.

A • •.

"In summarizing, one can perhaps say
that Attolico showed his government in
the light of the betrayed and disgraced
concealer, who in the interest of
future comradeship should now by all
means also be allowed to participate in
(Ibid., P. 134)
the profit himself

(Underlining supplied)
In concluding this examination of the cooperation alleged

ly given by VifEIZSiLhCiUiiE to Attolico, it is noteworthy to
mention -that in a prosecution rebuttal excerpt from the

book "Mussolini and Europe" by Luciolli (excerpts from

this volume were initially introduced by the defense) the
r^.

author states that during August 1959 Italy obtained most
of its information from the British government rather
than

the

Germans:

"Apparently Chamberlain and Halifax made
it a point of honor, as it were, to keep

Mussolini informed more quickly and com
pletely than Hitler did^ They evidently
were not aware

.

that Hitler was

neither

eager nor scrupulous in the discharge
of this obligation to keep his £lly in

formed, and therefore they were "in a
hurry, which under the circumstances
was unnecessary.
Several times every
•

day, the British -t!>mbassy in Home conveyed

'•

»*

i

to the Palazzo Chigi telegrams exchanged

>

between Henderson and the British foreign

Office."

(Pros. J^^'h. 0-333, HG-5a67,

D. B. 204, P.

50).

And;

"It was not until many hours later

that

the telegrams from attolico arrived with
the. information received from the Germans.
This information was scanty.
fratrmentary. and s o me times br azenly

false.

\

•

'"v

(Ibid.) (Underlining supplied)

No mention is made of the defendant UEIZSAHiCi^jH*
*

1

-
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g. MGRgSSION MAINST T|S
SCMpINAVIAN MD LOW COUNTRIES .
A.

Introduction

After the outbreak of war Oerrnan foreign policy

#•-

was closely coordinated with the dictates of military

•S'

opportunism^

Germany embarked upon a succession of

further aggressions whenever military or ebonomic advan
tages warranted it.
'*

diplomats to canouflage in the political sphere military

.V

I"

Here it was the function of German

preparations so that the impending attack could 'be
1..

achieved under most favorable conditions,

{

The Foreign

Office was also responsible for preparing the alleged

)

Justification for these four agg.ressions^

Once the

inva^slon was under way^ pressure was exerted to compel

the invaded country to capitulate with a minimum of
^ i

a.rmed resistance^
Vv.

0,'he aggresdjons against the Scandinavian countries.!

Norway and Denmark; ar^d the Low Countries.- Holland;

Belgium and I.uxem'bourg, are treated

4

as one chronicle

in this Brief; the defendant WBIZSAHGKSH during his

")

4

teatim.cny dl3»cussed the two aggressions together since
tn point of time th^'preparations for each overlapped.
The prosaoution will adopt a similar approach in order
to present a full picture of the defendant WFI2SASGK3R's
- -lu

activities In the dipioms.tic prepa'^'ations for these

m

two aggresslonG..

•'I
B.

Sim'I/\RX OF ZVIDSNCi:

Before the outhfreak of war contlnut:us assurances
were given to the Low Countries of Germany's intentions

to observe the neutrality of Belgium, Holland and
Luxembourg.,

(Pros. Fxh^ B35/B4.0)<,

were extended to Denmark and Norway,
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Similar assurances
On 31 Ma.y 1939

s. Won ag;-,i'ession Pact was siyisd. bstiwoen Go^many and
Denmark; the defendant ^IZSAi:GKi]H participated In
the negotiations prior to the conclusion of this

treaty,

(Pros. 3xh. 201, WG2556, Doc, Bk 5, o, 77).

On 28 August 1939 'VEIZSABCKBR informed the Danish
envoy that Germany would continue to adhere to this

pact,,

(Pros. 3xh, 205, NG_2398, D, B. 5, p, 19).
On 14 September 1939 Ambassador Sonnleithner

informed \TBI2SA^CKBR that Ribbentrop had conveyed

instructions to the OKW requesting that the Foreign
.Office be furnished prior information on a.11 OICW

reports of a political nature,
2829, D.B.

(Pros. 23xh. 205, NG-

5, p. 42).

On 7 October General Brauchitsoh directed Anny
v"

Group B to prepare ••tor

the immediate invasion of

Dutch and Delglon territory, if the political situation

i

so demands...''.Trial of P,!ajor War Griminals, Vol. I,
p. 209) ,

T-vSIZoAFCKBR testified that he had knovdedge

^f these military preparations for the imminent invasion
of

::he Low Countries since 12 October 1939 and that

through his own private channels he was kept regularly
info.vrred (T, 3024/25) ,

^

The date for the military attack on the Low
Countries was originally fixed for 10 November 1939,

A

buc was postponed from time to time until May 1940, due

^

to weather conditions and transport problems^
of Major V/ar C.viminals, Vol, I, p.

(I'rial

209).-

.

As German troops in early November massed on the
Belgian and Dutch borders, the King of Belgium end the
Queen of the Netherlands on 7 November 1939 sent an

offer to Hingland, France and Germany to mediate the
0,;

;/

present conflict.
19).

(Pros« Sxh,, 244, NG--1727, Do B, 6, p,

Ou 8 November, Ambassador Buelow-Schwante, the
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German ambassador to Belgium, informed the Foreign
Office that he had learned from- a

Put oh source tha.t

the King of Belgium had gone to the Hague due to
fTthreatening news received concerning German prepara
tions for an attach near the Belgian and Putch "borders".
Motivated "by the- anxiety that their countries would

be precipitated into the war,

resulted,
On 8

the Belgian-Dutch offer

(Pros, Fxh. 253, NG-1726, P.3, 6, p, 17).
Novem'ber "yFIlSAFOKHlP. received Ambassador

Attolico and in discussing the Low Countries' offer
of mediation mentlonBd that the English government had
repudiated at the outset the attempt at negotiation,
Puring the course of this conversation WEIZSSECKER

also corapiained about repeated violations of Belgiun's
sovereignty by the air forces of England and Prance,

and stated in concluding his memorandum to Hi"b"bentrop:
"Belgium and Holland would have to
.consider preserving their neutrality
not only with words "but with deeds,

I

a.nd oppose English pressure, unless
I'oth countries want to gain tie reputa
tion of exclusively favoring our

opponents. " (Pros. Exh.
P,3., 6, p. 21),

244, NG-1727j

On 11 H^vember the Fuehrer through diplomatic channels
rejected .the mediation offer, on the basis, of the
prior attitude of England and France.
Arii'bassador Buelow.-Schwante, as a ^i"itness for

WEIZSAECICiR; testified that he was indirectly responsible

for this mediation proposal, by a prior conversation
with the Belgian King about the subjeoto

However, he

admitted on cross-exariiination that this was a conclusion
of his and he in nowise Knew how the mediation proposal

actually came into being,

(T. 9993).

WSIZSAECKER

contended during his direct examination that this
action was div-ectly traceable to him and he stated:
-138-

.f.

--f -•

;i-

'^This is an illustration and example

of the manner in which officials of
our own service, who endeavored to

promo ce and achieve pea.ce, used devia

tions and detours via, alien monarchs
and leaders of state,, in order to

promote their ovm objectives, and
they were forced to resort to such
means. (T. 8018).

He did admit that this mediation offer did not have
much "chance of actual success or achievemente"

(T.

8018/19).

This defense can be summarily dealt with,
admitted that the heavy military concen

tration of German troops on the I^utch .anci Belyian
borders in November 1939 could be conside-'ed one of

the circumstances contributing to this mediation offer.

(T. 9158/59).

He further stated on cross-exsuriination;

'Cy. In order to clarify your testimony,
do you maintain that this media.tion

offer of Holland and Belgium at this
time was done at your instigation?

"A, Kg, I^didnt assert this to bo the
case in these words and in this
manner and I don't assert i t to be

the case nowt

'"fac-t I (cm saying is

that the German ambass.ador in

Brussels was animated by me to
order a report according to which
Belgium on its part was willing
to remain neutral. . .

Jxist one more question; I think w^e
Can clarify thisAmb-asspdor BuelowSchwante was responsiblle fo.r the
mediation offer of Holland and
Belgiv'.m; is this what you want to
say?

''A,. He was not responsible for it, but
the Belgium and Dutch governments.,"
(T, 9151}
In October and November 1939 Admiral Raeder in

conjunction with Rosenberg's Foreign Affairs Bureau of
the NSDAP worked on plans for the possible occupation
of Norway; and in December Quisling, the Norwegian
traitor, contacted them,
Vol, I, p«

(Trial of Major War Gr-imlnals,

205).
-13q-

I

I ireil,'ii- 'ii r - friil'i'-iii •if>iififritf"rf-ivf

r.

WEISSAH1CK3R testified that when Qjiislln,'^ visited
Berlin, he tried to sea WSIZSAECKilR; hut the latter
refused to receive him, "because -'it was not possible
to discuss politics with him on a serious basis."

He also recommendod that "che Foreign Minister not
receive ciuisllng,

(T. 7830).

Rib'bentrop adopted this Buggestion^

By WSIZSASCKER's own testimony, even at

this late date, he was able to influence the policies

of the Foreign Minister, but allegedly only for good.

It is to be noted that if such contact between Quisling
and the G-erman Foreign Office was discovered by the
Norwegian government, it would have resulted in
serious embarrassment.

I

Tf .

s-y.

; ;:»•
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A report proparea by Aeichslelter "{osenberp; in 194b

v.'hlch revie-^ed the preparations

for the ZCorwef^ian a^^-^ression "

stated that the Porci-\n

inister v-as kept Iniomod as to the

progress of the uctloAc

..loreover,, .tosenberg's personal
f

reprcseiitati.ve.

i.n horway^ Scheldt; v;ho rrialntained secret

liaison '.vith t-uisling^ v/as officially assi. ned to the C-err.ian
naval attache at the Gern^an Legation 3.n OslOo

OVj fS^'OOTp iOo bo Of

(froso ^h®

r» bl}o

On cib Deceriiber I9b9 %XZ3AbCKER informed the Ger .an

f.lnister to Koro-ay,

3rauerj that itoscnbcrg's representativej

Scneidt, v/as In iVorvvay to ^'laintal n contact and observe the

activities of >^uisling; and thae the i'oreipr. i-inistor re
quested brauer to Kce'p in discreet

touch .vith Scheldt and

report to Jerlin at the end of the year for insuructions,-.
"You v.i 11 report on this latler to tne Reich i'orci.n ...inisterp
myself, and to
Lo'bft OV-a,

irunaherr

t i 191)n

oniy-A'

(froso ~:shn 5573,

,.G'-bc<i5,

upon cxauiinution oy a member cI tne

'i'riou.nal, ^'^EIZSAECKER ac..iitted Lnat after the bGrman
ambassador reported

bo

re..iaincd in contact

icri5-n ne, pursuant to instructions,
ocheidt v;ho in turn continued nis con

tacts "with M,bisli.n",o

Luring a'an uary 1940 the vecholn incident occux"-redOn 10 J...nuary 1940, a

a1rnl«r»e carrying secret

operational orders for t

invasion of the Lov/ Gountrios

accidentally crashed on 3cl:;ian soil anu tne docunents .vcre

captured by the rjelgi^^-n art" or it ics before tncy could be
totally ooatruyeds

(frosa .-..Kh^ bhl,

L'Cn bb, -h 52,

fhis InforjjiatIon conflrracd tno long-founded suspicions .;f
the Scl;;lan Tovernjient and ci-oated quite a stirt

^^r., ..-aus,

'Aho testified tnat during the e'inter -f iJ40 ho rcgul.irly

attended tho morning conf ..rcAices , sav-/ .vEIZSiia:.CA:i^U ^i*equ< ntly,
and oitca discussed the ,,eaox*d. situation as It cxistc^c ^,t that

tioo, (ih 49bb/b6) stated tnat in the ..ccucln inolccnt
-
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"the aerman Foreign'Offloe tried to conceal the real situa

tion and to explain away this occurrance/'(Pros. Exh,254,
NG—3945, D.B. ,6, P.66)# '.'.rEIZSAECKER, during his direct ex
amination, asserted that he neither discussed nor denied

the possibility of such an invasion. (!F.6027).
On 15 January 1940, WEIZSASCKER informed Rlbbentrop

that he had received the Belgian ambassador, Count Bavignon^
and mentioned that he had received a series of reports

Indicating that Belgium was highly excited and in a state
of military activity which v;as "one-sidedly directed

against Germany," Davlgnon admitted this and explained
the reasons that Belgium feared a German invasion. WEIZ3AECKER replied;

1

"I answered this point by saying that Brussels
would after all not be influenced by the gossip

in the street," (Pros,Exh,247, NG-2893, D.B.6, p.26)
Davlgnon denied VffilZSAEGKER's statement that allied planes

*

were continuously crossing Belgian territory and stated
that England and France had been most cautious recently. He

mentioned that among the diplomatic circles in Berlin the

invasion was anticipated, and that German flights over
Belgian territory during the past few days and the con
centration of German troops next to the frontiers of Belgium
was cause for alarm, V/EIZSAECKER then replied;

"I told Davlgnon ho should inquire how things
looked at the French-Belgium frontier, whether

there are not great numbers of French and English
units massed. The danger point would be right
there, but Brussels would not seem to react
against it.

"Davlgnon asserted now that a spontaneous French
Invasion of Belgium was absolutely out of the
question." (ibid, P,28)
When Davlgnon also mentioned that the Mecheln incident had
caused considerable alarm, WEIZSAECKER stated;

"There was presumably some material in this plane
which could give rise to some alarm. I conceded
quite Incidente.lly tha,t I had
-142-

ii

learned of the fact of such an emergency landing
from the press to a- point where I could repeat
that the Belgian government was intimidated by
unfounded informations and was pushed into a

very

ono-sldod activity, I ^ons_ld£rj2d_thi_s
^lonab].e^ 1 £Ould nojt re£0gnize any ^particular _

ce'£S£ _for th£ BeTg^axt
Tihlng supplied).

P."29T TUndor-

It is difficult to give credence to the statement that

five days after this incident occurred the Foreign Office
still had not been Informed except through reading it In the
newspa,pers. Further, V/EI2SAECKER contended that he was

justified in trying to avoid all unnecessary excitement and
insure that an acute crisis be avoided; and he also stated
that as..?, result of this affair the invasion had been post

poned indefinitely. (T.8030), However, as aforementioned,
the postponements in fact were due to weather conditions,

and WEIZSAECKER had so testified. (T.7886), In a general
character affidavit for the defendant WEIZSAECKER, Count

Davignon stated:
"Did the State Secretary attempt to prevent this
invasion? It is difficult for the undersigned to
make any statement on this subject.

"Did he even know of the plot which was being
woven? He was furthermore a civil servant accus
tomed to discipline. Finally, his reserve toward

the diplomats of repute in Berlin could also be
explalni^d by G-estapo supervision which assumed a,
multitude of different forms." (Welzsaecher Exh.

142, Doc* 204, D•B. 1—E, P.51).
We submit that in the aforementioned Interview with

Davlgnon WEIZSAECKER attempted to dispel his justified
suspicion of the impending invasion, when he by his own
admission had full knowledge of the G-erman military
preparations.

On 17 January 1940, Amba.ssador Buelow-Schwante Informed

the Foreign Office that Foreign Minister Spaaok of Belgium,
since v;EIZ3AECKER had questioned the purpose of the Belgian
military measures taken at the end of the previous week,

desired to Inform the Foreign Office that these measures
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resulted from information that G-erman troops v;ere' concentrated

on the Belgian border, and also as a consequence of the

documents captured in the Mecheln incident. (Pros,Exh.847,
NG-2a95,

P,30),

On 17 January 1940, IVEIZSAEGKER informed Ribbentrop and

other Foreign Office officials that Count Davignon desired to

reitera.te that his government's action was a consequence of
the documents recently oapturede. WEIZSAECKER stated:

"I looked surprised and repeated my remark of the day
before yesterday that I knew of this story only through
the press, but Davignon himself v/ould obviously have
no proof either.

"I told Davignon once end for all it appeared to me
that he was informed on these documents from the

airplane by a short telegram only, while I myself
V70uld not know anything of them at all. Both of us
v/ould lack, therefore, the sufficient foundation
for a

I

discussion of the case but I

would consider

Belgium's suspicious, conceded measures confirraod

in a way v/hich I could not acknowledge." (Ibid,
pp.32/33).
On 19 January the Tokio news representative in Berlin

cabled the Domel news agency that in spite of strong protests
from the Foreign Office, he believed an attack on Holland v/as
imminent, I'ffilZSAECKER 'then informed the Japanese ambassador;

"We cannot tolerate such a disloyalty on the part of

the Domei representative in Berlin." (Pros.Exh#
3578, NG-2614,, D.B,97-A, P.205).
On 22 January WEIZ3AECKER saw the Italian ambassador and in

formed Ribbentrop that Attolico mentioned the Mecheln inci

dent and the recent alarm in Belgium, which information he

1

had only obtained from the newspapers;

"Attolico held this article against me and remsj?ked
it seemed that this here was an importp.nt event of

which I had never spoken on the occasion of his
visit

last week.

"As I did not want to enter into the subject, I told

Attolico that this story was making the round through
the foreign press for quite a while already. How
ever, I would like to ask him whether ho oould not
tell me on his part why it was that the Belgipjis

were so D.larmed a week ago." (Pros.Exh.247, NG—
2893, D.B.6, P,26.).,
This exhibit furnished further proof of the official nature
of the relations between Attolico and IVEIZSAECKER.

It also

strains credibility to imagin'e that after several inquiries on
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the affair, WEIZSAECKER had not attempted to gain further
information on the Mecheln incident than he acquired from

press accounts, particularly since he continually discussed
this incident in his dispatches to the Foreign Minister.
During January and February of 1940, military planning
for the invasion of Norway and Denmark was under considera

tion; and at the end of February 1q40, General Jodl proposed

that Ctase Yellow (the code name for the operation against

the Low Countries) and Weser Exercise (the code name for
the operation against Norway and Denmark) be prepared in

such a way that ''they will be independent of one another

as regards both time and forces employed."
^

(Ifial of Major

War Criminals, Vol. I, p. 206).
WEIZSAECKER testified that at a very early date he was

informed by his naval connections, particularly Admiral

Canaris, of the military preparations for the expedition to
Scandinavia, and WEIZSAECKER warned Ribbentrop repeatedly

of such a possibility.

(T. 7883),

Moreover, Erich Kordt

testified that Admiral Canaris informed him in February
1q40 of these preparations, <*ind he in turn informed
%

WEIZSAECKER.

('T. 7570/71).

However, it is est-ibllshed

that the preparations for the Scandinavian aggression were
far more widely known in German diplomatic circles than
to WEIZSAECKER's Intimates.

Doertenbnch, a defense affiant

for WEIZSAECKER, stated that at the beginning of I94O he

he discussed with WEIZSAECKER the rumors

%

that were r.-tmpant

concerning Germ,-iny'a intentions to invade Denmark and Norway,
and ^VEIZSAECKER .confirmed that such rumors were true.

.(WEIZSAECKER Exh. 137, Doc. 151, Weiz. D.B. 3-E, p. 38).
In the fall of l93q, the Venlo Incident occurred,
Reference is made to Count I of the Prosecution Brief against

-the defendant Schellenberg, wherein participation in the kid

napping of two British officials, Stevens and Best, from
Dutch soil is recounted,
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On 15 March 1p4G, a member of the American Embassy

inquired about the fate of the kidnapped British subjects

and stated that the United States, as the protecting power
for British Interests, had as yet received no reply from

Germany to their inquiries of 25 November lp3q and 4 March
lp40 on this question.

dum.

WEIZSAECKER Initialed this memornn-

Three days later the Dutch minister inquired whether

any information could be given about the Venlo affair;

WEI^SAECKER informed Rlbbentrop:

"I gave him the stereotyped negative renly."
(Pros. Exh, 248, NG-2ei5, Doc. 6, p. 36/38).
ii

In the German' ultimatums to Belgium and the Netherl-ands on

^

9 May 1p40, informatiorr allegedly derived from the victims
of the Venlo Incident served as one of the pretexts to

Justify the aggression. (Pros.Exh. 249, TC-57, D.B. 6,p,3p).
In the first days of April lo40, the military prepara
tions for the first aggression against Denmark and Norway
had been completed; and close coordin.ation with the Foreign

Office was required during the final preparations.

In a

letter written on 3 April 1p40 by General Keltel to Rlbben
trop he mentioned that "the time which you on the other

hand have for the politiorO. preparation of this action is
Buoh shorter," and he emphasized that no other Reich agencies

except the Foreign Office and OKW would participate in the
preparations.

(Pros. Exh. 212, D-62o, D.B. 5, p. 65).

On 6 April, lp4C, a conference between General Keltel
A

and WEIZSAECKEH in the presence of Gaus and other OKW

(

officers occurred.

This conference unveiled to the Foreign

Office for the first time the detailed role the German

diplomats were to play in the coming invasion three days
hence.

Prosecution affiant Dr. Gaus recounted in detail

the events transpiring at this conference.

It is to be •

noted that during his extensive cross-examination he was

not examined on the subject matter of this conference.

Further, /i subsequent military report on 12 August lq40
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substuntl.-Lted the accuracy of Dr. C3-aus' affidavit (Pros.
Exh. 3575, 3597-PS, D,B, 97-A, p. IpS).

Nor did the defen

dant WEIZSAECKER, in his testimony, challenge Dr. G-.aus'

description of the conference.

Therefore, we submit that the

latter's statement is an accurate representation of the
events that occurred.

Dr. G-aus stated:

"On 6 April lo40, the German Foreign Minister,
Ribbentrop, summoned the State Secretary,
Weizsaecker, ^md myself to his private office
at 76 Wilhelmstrasse,
After a few oreliminary
remarks, Ribbentrop, with due solemnity,
announced that he had called us in to inform

us of Hitler's momentous decision that Norway
and Denmark were to be invaded in the immediate
future....

"He then told Weizsaecker to expect quite soon
a visit from General Keitel, Chief of OKW, who
wo\}ld furnish him with all necessary documents
and other information required by the German

Foreign Office to enable it to prepare speedily

its portion of the preparations'required before
the attack could be launched.
stated that I, too,

with Keitel,"

Ribbentrop further

should attend this conference

(Pros. Exh, 215, NG-3q44, D.B. 5,

pp. 74/75).
It is to oe noted that although '.VEIZSAECKER was supposedly

on b,ad terms with Ribbentrop he was entrusted by the Foreign
Minister with the responsibility for representing the Foreign
Office at this important conference; further, that it was
General Keitel who o.-one to WEI2SASCKER rtnd not the converse.
Dr,

Gaus

continues:

"Very shortly thereafter, and the same day

(6 April lp40) Wpizsaecker telephoned and
asked me to step into his office. Upon enter
ing I discovered that Welzsaedker, Keitel,
several other OKW officers and members of the

German Foreign Office staff were present.

I

noticed that Keitel held in his hand a large

sheaf of p.M.pers, bound together, which were
subsequently handed over to Weizaaeoker.

These

papers, as the discussion revealed, pertained

to the military planning and preparation for the
invasion of Norway and Denmark and the diplomatic

measures

required to

operation.

I

Insure the

success of the

noticed that the date of the first

page of the papers in Keltelfe possession was
2 April lq40, and this date stuck in my memory
oecause I subsequently referred to it when dis-

cussing the matter later '.vlth Ribbentrop^
k ^

Mm .

^
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^

^

"Keitel then generally reviewed the details of
the operation and some time later departed, I
"believe, and the detailed contents of the papers
were reviewed "by Weizsaecher, myself,and the
OKW officers present,

"The military steps to "be taken were examined in
detail and Keitel stressed the importance of the

closest coordination of the military and diplo-'"
matic measure's^

This coordination had oeen worked

out in detail "by OKW and was contained in these
papers. Weizsaecker held the papers in his hand,
and we

examined in detail what had to be accom

plished by the G-erman Foreign Office, and its
representatives in "Henmcirk and norway", to insure
perfect coordination with the military.,.

"During this conference, it appeared from oral

i

utterances, or from the v/ritten documents being
examined, that the invasion was to occur on 9
April 1940, The plan stipulated that the military
authorities would secretly contact the G-erman
envoys to Denmark. Renthe-Fink, and to i^orway,
Brauer, before the invasion to achieve the
closest coordination.

"The timetable for the military invasion and
requred diplomatic steps were reviewed; sub
stantially the same military demands were to be

presented to iMorway and Deniarli,

THere wore

two categories of military demands which the
G-erman diplomats were to present to the Foreign

Ministers and the Kings of Dpi'way and Denmark at
the outset of the invasion^. Firstly, 13 demands
to be presented at the beginning of tho invasion

by the German Foreign Office officials when they
presented the ultimatums to the invaded countries.

Then, other military demands w^uld be presented
later after the occupation was accomplished,

Y/eizeaeoker psrefully examined every detail of

the plan with the'OKW representatives,
"It was evident that i t was. the task of the

Foreign Office envoys in those oountries to main
tain close contact v^ith the military ana to a^ply
cont.jnuous pressure on the governments of npry/ay

and Denmark to induce them to cooperat:e with the
Cxerman military forces and consent to these

demands v.dthout fighting. It was emphasized by

OKW that this mission of the Gorman Foreign Office
officials was most important to the military sue-

cess of the campaigns,

"During this conforonoe,I noticed during the exami
nation of these documents that the envoys of the

German Foreign Office would be the highest policical representatives for this operation r,nc for the
occupation of these two countries,.,

"After completely reviewing all details,the OKW
officers departed. This conference had been a very

long one in' order to Insure that Weizsaecker had
full knowledge of the details of the steps to be

taken by the German Foreign Office" (Ibid.75/76).
(Underlining supplied).
A Copy of the first thirteen military demands that tho

German diplomats were to present to the GovornmentB of Korway
and Denmark after the invasion was started was found in
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•Wsi'iiSAESKi^R's files, These dem-nnds^vere handed 'by

Keitel to

during the conference and then dram up as a

diplomatic note, as Dr* Gaus* accompanying affidavit to this
exhibit establishes,

(Pros. Exh. 214^ NG-2627, P. B. 5, TP.

70/72).
WEIZ8AE0KER stated that

as a

result of this conference?

"I reported sick; I ms generally un'=^ell a.n<?.,as of
Tth of April I failed to go to my office and
remained without any contact with Rib'bentropj
Ribbentrop sent word to me that I should stay at,

home quietly and get over my illness* " (To 788'5/86)

However, WEIZSAEOKER prepared a telegram to the Germoji Sbbassy
in Sweden on 7 April, the first day. of his alleged absence

(Pros* Exh. 213; N&-36ie, D. B, 5, P. 69); and he further admitted
his participation in this, telegram; which contains his hand
written remarks^ (T, 7928),
Subsequently, in his testimony, V/EIZ8SE0K'ER

statea that

if

the final preparations were taken under Ribbentrop's direction

and "I was excluded from attending these sessions*'^ (T, 80l4).
Since t/SIZ8AEfkER had volunta.rily incapacitated himself from

further participation in the activities of the Foreign Office
by his illness, it is a distortion to state at the s.r?jne moment,

y

we su'l:mait, that Ribbentrop delibera.tely excluded him from the
events between 7. and 9 April.
Furtherr hr^ Gaus^testifled that on the evening of 6 April
he called on WElZSAS^SKER in his office and found him in the

!*»

midst of a discussion with another

Foreign Office official on

i.Vi:

V>

the question whether the dip3.omatlo Qourlor to Denmark was to
.{

take along in his luggage the uniform of the high ranking
military officer who was to serve as liaison man between the

German Embassy and the German military forces invading Denmark,
Gaus subsequently learned that one of the cpu3:*iers was so

instructed, (T. 4920/21),

.(See alsos Pros* Exh, 3575,

3597-PS, D,B, 97-A, P. 195)*

On 3 April 1940 a telegreni was sent to the Ge.rman

Legation in Finlr^nd stating that rumors concerning the con'centra
tlon of German shipping in the Baltic sea ports were completely
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mislea<3.ing and undoubtedly due to British propaganda activity.
On this pat-ticular copy the signature read "Signed Welzsaecker"

(pros* Sxh* 213, NG-3818, D, B* ,5, P^ 66)»

He contended that

• IV'

in this instance Rlbbentrop' s Bureau must have prepared the
draft^

inserted his name^

•

and sent it out« Kov/over, wSlZSA2013E._ •

did state that this could not be considered a misuse of his

name, if a normal relationship existed between 'him and the

Foreign Minister,

I

'

(T, 7926/27).

Assuming arguendo the. truth of his statement,

still,

on

.7 April he sent a telegram to the German Embassy in Sweden

for their information containing the same contents; and his'
I

handwritten remprhs were on this copy, (Pros. Exh^ 213, NG-

It'.

3818, D. B, 5, p, 69),

Upon questioning; moreover, by a member

of the Tribunal, he admitted familiarity with this telegram
of 5 April ard then revised his statement to the effect that

he was informed about the first telegram after it was dis

patched, (T, 7928),

In this connection it'may be recalled

that Rlboentrop had on 6 April entrusted him with the
responsibility of conducting the Keitel conference.

Between 7 s.nd 9 April during

" self-imposed

absence the technica]. preparations for the dispatch of t.he
diplomatic couriers to the Ge.man Embassies in Norway and

Denmark indth the necessary instructions discussed in the 6 April

Gcnference were arranged by Rlbbentrop,

The diplomatic

memoranda providing the German Justification were•written;

but

but the evidence is not clear whether the Foreign Minister or
the Fuehrer wrote it.
'

*

The invasion of Denmark aid Norway was launched on 9 April

1940, and through diplomatic pressure Denmark
almost at once with only token resistance.

capitulated

Prosecution Exhibit

218 (D, 828, D,B. 5, P, 89) and Prosecution Exhibit 3575

(3597-PS, D. B, 97-A, P. 19 5 et seq,.) disclose that the diplomatic
steps taken in Denmark by the German envoy. Minister Renthe-

Fink, were in accordance with the plan unfolded in_the 6 April

conference.

Prosecution Exhibit 211 (^10^-3817, D. B. 5, P. 56)
*
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discloses that the German Minister to Oslo

to carry out similar measures*

instructed

However, Norway, due to Its

geographical position and the arrival of reinforcement from
England, decided to resist*
In the official military resume by the Chief Custodian

of the German Army Archives for the Danish operation, h5-s repor.
concluded as follows:

"The fact that they required such slight losses
redounds to the glory of. German leadership.from

the political as well as from the military

standpoint*"

(Pros* Ejh. 5575, 5597-PS, D. B* 97-A,

P, 195)

On 25 April 1940 ^EI2;SAECKER sent instructions to the
German Minister at Stockholm to obtain permission from the
Swedish Government for the tra.nsit of o-erman sealed supply

trains through Sweden to Norway,

These trains wer-e to aid

in the waging of the military campaign in Norway,

a.nd the

German Minister was directed to attempt to secuf^e this
consent vdthout creating the impression that the

German

milit.ary situation required such a course of action. (Pros.
Exh. 223, NG-2569; D, B.

5,^ P. 97),

Prior to 10 May 1940, Rifbentrop and a small group of
officials prepared the offloia.l diplomatic raemor'.anda for the
invasion of the Low Coum:ries*

1 a^m. on 10 May,

V9EI2SAEOKSR testified that at

several hours prior to the a.ttach on the

low countrie s, . he was. Informed through official cha,nnels of
the attach.

(T, 7887).

After the attach had commenced, WEIZSAECKER, on 10
May, informed Ribbentrop and other officials of the Geman

Foreign Office that he saw the Belgian Ambassador, Count

Davignon, early that morning immediately after the latter had.
visited Ribbentrop and been Informed of the active aggression,

Davignon came to WEIZSAECKER in order to attempt to telephone

his Ministry in Brussels, While they waited, Davignon stated
that the world would not believe the reasons Germany gave for
this aggressive act.

WEIZSAECKER described wheat transpired:
-
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I myself alivays tried to bring Davignoji
'back to the Ip^st t^^o oara^'paphs of thoGorman

memorandum, whel^e~trie'Belgian Government is
urged to give the required orders to cease
any resistancea

My attempts in this direction

were rejected oy Davignon ^i^dth the remark that
Belgium would act dishonr-rahly if she rolinoulshed
her right to resist. ... My emnhatic.description

of the annihilating oonsecuoTTces for h^ co_a^t.ry
were answeVed
DavTgno'n with't'ho remark" 'chat
the battle had undouhtedly sta'cted already^ •'

(Pros. Bxh. 3579, NG-5141^ D, B. 97-A, P?» S06/207).
(Underlining supplied)
WBIZSAHICKSR alleged that

Count Davignon's general character

affidavit explained Davignon's impression of that morning.
However,an inspection of this defense exhibit reveals the
following:

Did the State Secretary a.ttempt to prevent
this invasion?

It is difficult for the under

signed to make any statement on this subject.
"... In conclusion, the undersigned feels

compelled to state that on 10 B5ay 1940; ne saw
Herr von WSIZSASCKBR lust after he had boon

brutally informed by fie.rr von Ribbentrqp^of
the act of a.ggression committed against Belgium
on false pretexts.

The. State Secretary

..

appeared grieved by what was happening." (Welz.

e£ 142j Dog. 204; Weiz> D.B. 1-E, p. 51).

At such a moment WRIZSAECKSR would naturally have been

sympathetic to a man with whom he had close personal relation

and whosd country had become the most recent victim of
German aggression. The fact that this affidavit in nowise

contradicts

hif> attempt subtly to persuade Davignon that

his country should ca,pltulate isdthout further .resista,ncc as
Denmark did, is illustrated by the following expjninatlon
of the defendant by the T.ritunaU
"BY JUDGE MAGUIHE:

"Q. Well, witness; , hadn'

the Germane compelled

or . Induced the surrender of Denmcark by throats
df cannihilation, bofnbing, etc.?

"A. I don't remember the documents, the details
of the document, to be able to give jou such a
specific answer.

"Q, Weren't threats — you are awaro of the fact
that threats were made of annihilation to Denmark
if they didn't surrender, aren't you/
"A.

I wasn't involved in this particular event;

I wasn't'ln it at all. Your Honors; I didn't draw
up the document nor did I turn It over^ nor was I.
even in the Foreign Office at this time.

.

was Hitler's policy; carried on by Hitler himself.
-
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But there'is no doubt that there were menoxes,
threats, which would go into effect" in co.se
Benmarls; was not going to capitulate,

I

am

sure that these threats were of a very serious
kind.

"Q*

the__s.ame kind of thrxati

in. your statement's '^o Pavignon?

"AI i^xuld very much like to he furnished the
documents, and then I would be able to draw a
comparison.
There are certain parallels in

existence, it is true, but I can only give you
a specific answer if I see the actual documents.

"Q. Well, you say you gave an emphatic description
of the annihilating consequence in this country.

"A. Yes, it was surely a very serious threat;
that there ^ms surely a very serious threat pf

Hitler contained in the document which Hibbentrop
had turned over to the Count on tha.t morning^ A

throat which, of course, I didn^'t approve of I
Well, did you repeat it to D<avlgnon?

impression gained by the Count in the

idon
is estabi.ished
in
an affidavit contained in my document
book.
-Perhaps,Your Honor, in that affidavit you will
see

of all v;hat effect my conversation with

aim had.

"Qp That wasn't the auestion, witness. In your
report, which is 3579 for identification, that is
the last document, I find the language as follows:
dy emphatic description of the annihilating
consequences for his country were answered by
Davignon with the remark that the battle had
Started already,I What rere those
anninllating consequences that you gave to him?
fnJ> a fact any more
I mtoday»
unablebut.
to iftell
for
vm you" that
"

me^tS
today, but, if you will rermit
? following, I will give you the"
thi
Pnnn? Davignon who wasmy.not
Conversation
the Count
Invited by\wLth
me to
come and see me, Your Honor,

"^*4Interested
Witness, about
I am not
about Now,*thnt
th^^t I
am
whatinterested
you told'him,
that you would have some conference.
recollection I ofwould
it^

assume

remember that I told him tha.t his country
hazardous and .restrictive

~^-^Sl-Cilces_g_ne wasn't able to induce" Fi's

g^vernmo^ to DO
marching trough his
wi^o^f
fe^^.ny^^
-"Tm
onvinced tE!at I ir?.d an Ifiscm ction to ta.lk
along these lines,, but I am also of the opinion,
least^ I think I remember it very clearly, that

..

^.-.v

'

L ^0^1^ have been vury pleased myself
If Gount'^avlp;non would have been able
to comply with my statements to him."

"TT. 9162/63) ("underlining supiDllod),

WEIZSaECKSR's attempt on re-dlrect examination (T.9437/38)
to justify his action by his custoraaxy defense that
these notes were Intended for Rlbbentrop,

does not cor

respond to his above-quoted admission.

When Dcnmaxk ca.pltulatcd• on 9 April 1940; C3-ermeiny,
in accordance with Its ultimatum, agreed to respect

the territorial integrity and political independence
of the Kingdom of Dcnmaxk.

(Pros. Exh. 217, TC-55,

D.B. 5, p. 80; and Pros, Exh. 229, WG—3166, P.B. 5, p.

114),

The purpose of such model tre tmont, permitting

Denmark de jure to maintain her Independence, was to

proclaim to the world the integrity of Germex intentions

and demonstrate her generosity to the vanquished.

The

leading German official In Denmark was the German Klnlster, Rcnthe-Flnk,

On 6 September 1940, V/EIZSAECIiER

informed Rlbbentrop that he had discussed the Danish
situation with vsxious German offioia.ls whom he told
t

that the process of assimilation of Denmark to Germany

was being fostered by the SS.
"...

I

He then stated:

did not believe that the time for

the removal of the Cabinet Staunlng was

adroady ripe.

For the preeunt time, It

would be better to burden the present

cabinet with the responsibility for the
unavoidable, unpopular measures, vrhioh
were Imminent."
(Pros. Exh. 3577, NG2689, D.B. 97-A, p. 203).

And betv/cen Jrnufry and February 1941 the Danish Govern
ment v/as compelled, through diplomatic pressure, to sur
render twelve Danish torpedo boats to the Gcrm,:ui Navy.

(Pros. Exh, 228, NG-2760, D.B, 5, p. 119).

v^rEIZSAEOKER,

who had complete knowledge of this Incident, testified
that this transfer, under coercion, was hexdled in a
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very fair manner (T. 8016), quite disregarding the fact
that Germany had pledged itself to respect Dajiish inde
pendence.

C.

DEFENSEa

I^IZSAECKER stated that during this period a.lso he
endea,vored to bring about peace and prevent the extension

of the war.

However, the evidence, as discussed above,

reveals thr,t although he possessed knowledge long before
the aggressions v;ere launched, he did not communicate
this information to one of his closest resistance

collaborators, Theo Kordt.

(T. 12300/301).

He

testified that the German Amba.ssador in Brussels,

Buelow-Schwante, was v/orking in closest coopero.tion
with him to maintain the neutrality of the hovi Coun

tries (T. 9151); however, Buelow-Schwante, himself,
testified that he was not aware of Hitler's milite.ry

plans for the invasion of the IjOW Countries, nor
that the invasion date had been scheduled and post

poned on several occasions. (T.9990/91). Nor did he
inform Ambassador Attolioo of these military prepara

tions, thus frustrating any peace endeavor from that
f.i4, (

ilr

sector. (T. 9076). Nor, when he conferred with the

Norwegian Bishop Berggrav,- in January and Llai^ch 1940,
concerning the German acceptance of an unofficio.l
pea.ce proposal of leo.ding church dignitaries of
Norway and Great Britain, did ho disclose in any
manner v/hatsoever tha.t the invasion of the Bishop's

country was impending. (T. 8514/43).
During the final stages of the diplomatic prepa

rations for both aggressions the evidence has re
vealed that Ribbentrop secreted himself and made the
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final preparations prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
^:vEI2SAECiCE)R testified that this exemplified his rela.-

tions with the Foreign Minister and also demonstrated
tha.t he played no vital role in the diplomatic prepara

tions for these two aggressions. (T,8014/15, and 7887).
This defense can be summarily dealt with. It v/as
Hibbentrop who selected VffilZSASCKSR to a,ttend the im
portant conference with Keitel on 6 April 1940 as
a.foromcntioned. This conference lasted several hours,

and V/EIZSAECKER then transmitted the plans for the

aggression against the Scandinavian Countries to the

A.

Foreign Minister. (Pros.Exh. 215, NG-3944, D.B.5,p.74),
'', I

Further, although V/EIZSAECICSFl makes no allusion to it,
^ li Vifi.'

^

it can bo reasonably inferred that ho must have explained

to Hibbentrop the contents of vrhat transpired at this

lengthy conference and outlined the role that the Foreign

Office had to play. It connot be si^riously contended that

the Foreign Minister would merely receive these

voluminous plans without any report as to the contents

or what arrangements had been reached at this conference,
particularly in view of the short time-limits that
remained for the diplomatic part to be prepared prior

to the dispatch of the couriers on the following day

7 April, (Pros, Exh. 3575, 3596-PS, D.3. 97-A, P.198).
Further, T/EIZSAECKER reported ill between 7 and 9
April (T. 8015), and, therefore, j.t_was_quit

po_salble_for him to participate in any actlvl'cies of
the Foreign Office. Therefore, his oraphe:,sis on his ex

clusion from the diplomatic preparations in the case of
Norway and Denmark Is not in conformity with the evidence
presented.
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^/EIZSAECKER wa-s not Included in the small group
that prepa.red the final memorandum auid selected the
couriers prior to the Invasion of the Lovj Countries,

vJElIZSAECKER places grea.ter emphasis upon this fact.
Dr. G-a.us, who wa.s one of the officials present
with Ribbentrop on this occasion, stated that

SASOhEg. did _se£ Rihb^ntrop_on ^everal _occasions during

jtliis_verj^ ^eriod_^' (Pros. Exh. 254, NG-3945, B.B. 6,

. \

P.66); the veracity of this statement was challenged

a

neither during Dr. G-aus' cross-examination, nor during
1/EIZSA*JCKSR* s ov/n lengthy testimony. It can thus

reapnnably be assumed that during these audiences,

•"SIZSAECKER v/as informed at least of the progress of
the propexations. Moreover, while Ribbentrop for
purposes of secrecy worked aoart from the Forel5:n

. .
V -5'

Office at this time, it was "'/EIZ3AECKER who was
i. 4
i

entrusted with the resi?onsibility of running the

''

Foreign Office in his absence. During this short
period, TffilZSAECMER handled the normal course of busi

ness, o.nd received the foreign diplomats (for example Pros.Sxh.

264, Nrr-3237, D.B.

7-A,

P.14-A: WSIZSABOhE?.

on 8 May 1940 Informed Ribbentrop that in an interview

with the C-reek Ambassador he had vigorously attacked
England's action in expanding the theater of war at

the expense of her allies and friunds).
i.oreover, it is clear that the drafting of the

final diplomatic memora.ndum was only the end product

of the long prepara.tions for aggression. Ribbentrop
himself would naturally v/rite it, since it was designed

in this aggression for £3?op_agandi£t^o__value_^ rather

:%

•'i-V
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than diplomatic effectiveness. The alleged justifications
had already been long assembled; the diplomats of
Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, of course, would not
be persuaded by a. memorandum at the outbreak of

hostilities that the pretexts for Aggression were va,lid.
The _onl.y_purpose this memorandum had in the instance
of the invasion of the Low Countries was propagandistic;

to envelope the newest G-erman aggression with a
semblance of justification. Thus, in this instance

Ribbentrop did not require. WBIZSAECKSB.'s experience
and ability, since no diplomatic skills were involved.

Ribbentrop was just as capable of manufacturing the

Nazi propaganda slogans required to broadcast to the

world this secOiid aggression v;ithln a month.
Moreover, WEIZSAECICER v/as informed at the latest

several hours prior to the invasion.

(T.8028). And

Ribbentrop left Berlin on the day of the invasion; and

he entrusted vVEIZSAECKEH with handling the many diplo
matic tasks and questions vjhich necessarily v;ould
arise during the follov;ing fev/ days in the wake of

the aggression. Moreover, in the Davignon conversation,
as previously mentioned, in the morning of 10 May,

'./EIZSAEOKER strongly urged the rocommondation con
tained in this memorandum, namely, that Belgium
capitulate without resistance, be adopted.
WEIZSAECKER referred in his testiraony to his brief
oral discussion and memorandum on 12 October 1939 to

Ribbentrop, wherein ho discussed the political ad

visability of G-ermany remaining on the defense, rather

s-f''
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then stai'ting an offensive in the West. (Weiz.Exh.lS?^
Doc.370, Weiz.D.B. 1-E, P.2). VffilZSAECKSR stated that

this demonstrates his pee.ceful endeavors. Kowever,
tahen in the context of the times, this political
suggestion as a questioa of strategy was a sound one,
from the G-erman viewpoint. G-ernany had just victoriously
concluded the Polish camiDelgn; and thus Germany would
be in a position to dictate its peace terms. On the

other he^nd, if Germany continued to wage the war, the
possibility of ultimate defeat always existed. •;irSIZ-

I

SASOKEPl even testified that Hibbentrop, at first, was

inclined to that point of view. (T. 7869). It is to be

noted that WEIZSAECKSP.'s proposra naturally _lnclud£d__
hoGp_ln£ the Fu£hror as the head of State; and, in
practical reality, for a peace conference to be success

ful, Gorman demands for Danzig and the Polish Corridor
and other concessions would have to be met.

Only six days prior to ^TEIZSiJi^GhEP.'s proposal,

Hitler, on 6 October 1959 had made almost an_ldoritJ.cal_
pr_op£sal_ln a pfiblic speech before the Reichstag:
"In my speech before the Rcichste^ on 6 October,
I publicly proclaimed the aims of German policy,
and declared anew that Germany had never or \70uld

never mcJie demands neither of England or Prrjico,
v/hich could encroach upon the interests of those

countries, that Germany, a.part from her demand
for appropriate colonial possessions which
could be settled peacefully, saw no more reason

for the present situation to be revised, and

consequently there was no sound reason which
could justify the iramaasurable sacrifices of

a belligerent feud. At the srmo time I have made
concrete proposals as to how in my opinion

effective guarantees for the restoration of
permanent security in Europe could be oroatod.
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"England rejected this peace offer at once in
such a wa.y which represented an intentional

challenge and offence to the German nation and

the German government." (Pros.Exh. 244, NG-1727,
D.B. 6, P.20).
17SIZSAECKER himself mentioned Hitler^s speech and termed
the rejections on 10 and 12 Uejy by Prance and Englnnd as

"a very vigorous and obstinate attitude". (T.7868). He
further stated that ho thought there was only the
barest minimum of ,preparedness on the side of England

and France to negotiate, and he only made his proposals

I

because "in such situations you have to utilize the

very smallest and insignificant gaps that might be
there". (T. 7869), Seen in this perspective, YffilZSAECKER's political recommendations coincided with
those of the Fuehrer a few days previous who also
realized the advantages to Germany of securing peace
under such favora.ble terms.

£•

It also must be recognized that some of the highranking military loaders who had just concluded the

campaign a.gainst Poland v/ere in favor of •a halt and
consolidation of their gains. (T. 7865).

Even assuming, a.rguendo, that Y/EIZSAECICSH ha.d

internal misgivings about the launching of an offensive
In the V/est, his attitude radically a,ltered when German

victories were achieved. By 23 May German armies, in a

whirlwind campaign, hp.d ovcroomo resistance in the
Scandinaviaji and the Low Countries, and the breaarthroi^h in

the West had been achieved. On that date, I/EIZSAEChEpL,
in a private letter to his friend, Ambassador Ott, in
Japan,

started;
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"... For every forward step that the Army_i_s
mahlng_ln Xho ]7e_st signifies far more from a
foreign policy point of view than anything
that we could ever accomplish with our pen

and paper work.
facts',

'V/hat wonderful things are

said Disraeli. These European facts

are of course surely shining out and pene
trating clearly to the a.rea of your main work,
and I am a.ssuming that thereby, you too arc
having your work lightened. Cordial greetings
and Hoil Hitler J" (Pros, Exh- 3608, HO—5405,

D. B, 97-C, P.18) (unduriining supplied).
And on 17 June 1940, after French resistance had

"it

been crushed and France sued for peace, t/EIZSAECKER
immodiatoly forwarded to Ribbontrop his recommendations
for the policy to bo adopted in the event of an
armistice with France.

*

The terms listed in 15 points

were unusually hoj?sh. (pros. Exh. 3580, NG-4909, D.B.
97-A, P.208/209), But, of course, O-ermany was then a,t
the peak of her milita.ry successes. •'/EIZSAECICER stated

tha.t during this j.ieriod Ribbontrop favored peace, but

Engls.nd elected to carry on the conflict. (T. 7891).
And on 3 July 1940 V^IZSAECKER informed Ribbontrop
that ho saw the Papal Nuncio who inquired about the

G-erman a.nswer with respect to the peace proposals of

the Pope. V/EIZSAECKER then, stated that the English attitude
seemed to be intransigent and:

T... Whether oh not the Englj-sh Government_was

well_advi.se_d_wj.th re_sp_eo^
would remain to bo seen.

""^/hen the Nuncio then inquired carefully about
the German ans'^ver to the Papal mission, I dis

regarded that part of the topic and ror:arkcd
that v/e are only concerned ^^^it_h_tho_fullo_st

possible preparations for tEe v/ar against ^nglana. .

(Pros.Exh. C~339, NG-5610, D.B. 204, P.102).
(underlining supplied).

Such a course of conduct demonstrates how fa.cilcly
\7EIZSAECKER could shed his fears of German defeat and

abandon his guest for a just peace when G-ermany was at
the peak of her military successes.
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AGGKESSIOH AGAINST GREECE AM) YUGOSUVB.
A. INTRODUCTION

Unlike the preceding invasions, the

Balkan campaign required

the closest coordination of the activities of German militarists and

diplomats.

Of necessity, Germany had to enlist the cooperation of

Greece's Balkan neighbors in order to permit the Vlfehrmacht to mobilize

and launch the

aggression.

pressure and promises of

of

Hungary, Roumania,

measures.

The

Foreign Office, through diplomatic

territorial enrichment, obtained the consent

Bulgaria and Slovakia for the necessary

Hundreds of thousands of Cbrman troops were permitted to cross

ttftrough these countries, concentrate their supplies and mobilize there,
months before the attack was launched.

Diplomatic activity was conducted solely to fulfill military
purposes and meet military deadlines-

A series of non-aggression

pacts were deliberately arranged in the Balkans, in order to neutralize
potential enemies and accomplish the isolation of

Greece,

The

evidence wiH establish that these pacts were concluded as expedients

to facilitate the

aggression.

Such pacts were concluded, among others,

between Turkey and Bulgaria, and Hungary and Yugoslavia,

The Foreign

Office camouflaged, to the extent desired, the military preparations
and also layed the groundwork for fabricating the alleged justification
of this

aggression.

In late

October 1939 Italy attacked Greece without provocation.

The Italians speedily suffered military reverses; and the Fuehrer
as a result ordered the necessary military preparations to extend the
war to Greece and thus extricate his Axis partner.

The orders for

Operation Marlta (the code name for the attack against Greece) were
concluded long before a few British air units landed on Crete in
January 19-41 to provide limited military assistance to Greece,

German

diplomacy grasped this opportunity to depict the planned aggression
as a defensive action, British troops did not land on Greece, however,

until 3 March 19A©, and then in lirulted numberso At that time, ever a

million German troops were poised in Eoumania and Bulgaria for the
impending invasion,
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Yugcslsvia, vjhich the Fuehrer had long considered an uncertain

neutral, finally consented to join the Tripartite Fact on 25 March 1%0.
Germany had sought this noutralization cf Yugcslavia in .-.rder to protect
her flank when the attack cn Greece was instituted. E: waver, when^ on

26 March, the Yugoslav Ministers who had adhered to the Tripartite Fact
vjere removed from office, the Fuehrer, on the following day, ^rder^o that
Yugoslavia Ise included in the ccntemplatod aggression against Groeco, •
This was considered desirable net only duo to the atte.ck on Groeco, but
also in view of the aggression that was to be launched against the USSR
subsequent to the

Balkan carapaigHo

The evidence discloses that VvEIZSAECKER played a particularly

significant rcl© in the-diplomatic preparations for this aggression.
I

Despite his extensive testimony as to the alleged hostility between

Ribbentrcp and himself during this period, the evidence reveals that he
was entrusted by Ribbentrop with full responsibility for the formulation

and execution cf the necessary policies. He was fully informed by and
worked in the closest ccoperaticn with the Foreign Minister and the
defendant Ritter.

Curiously enough, VffilZSAEGKER cffer^^d no defenses

except the standard Hasi justification for this aggrussion, which
was rejected in toto by the IMT. During this period too, tnere was no

opposition or internal resistance spearheaded by »JSIZSAiGI^SR to stav^
off invasion. In fact, Theo Kordt, me of the key fig'ires in

VffilZSiiEGKER*s private peace negotiations, was not oven informed .f the
contemplated aggression. (T. 1230l/02). During the course .-f the
diplomatic ccnversatims and negctiaticns during the winter -f 1%0,
ViEIZSAECKER conducted himself in a surprisingly arX'-'gent manner, iis

evidence will disclose, his treatment ^f the Greek i^mbassad-r during

these trying days was mmt severe. IftEIZSAE-GKER participated fully in
the diplomatic preparations for this aggression; and in this
no mitigating circumstances are even allegoda
B. SyMITOY,.0OYlPENCE

Long before the German aggression was cmtemplated, VwI2Sk...GKYR
considered the orientation 'f Greece in the direct! n f the
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powers as cause for misgivings,

(t« 8O3I).

England, in the spring of

1939, extended a guarantee to Greece sinii.lar in nature to the one offered
to Poland,

Qn 8 May 1940 tVEIZSAECKER informed Ribbentrop that he had

received the Greek envoy.

The envoy expressed his fears of a possible

German repetition of the Scandinavian affair, and that Germany, to fcrest-all
the supposed intentions of the Western powers, might invade Greece,

?/EIZ-

SAECK5R replied:
"I did not remove the anxiety of the envoy.

However,

I put the blame entirely on England and France,
Exh, 264, NG«3237, D. B. 7-A, P. 14-A)-

(pros,

The Greek diplomat then pointed out why Biglaud would certainly not attempt
at this stage to draw Greece into the war,

WSIZSAEGIZER replied, in part,

that Greek prudence "should not be based solely on pious assurances on the

part of British diplomacy, but rather on tangible evidence from the Western
powers^ conduct of the ivar",

(Ibid,, p, 14-B)»

During August 1940 relations between Greece and Italy worsened.
V*

In a

telegram on 15 August 1940, Woermann informed the German missions in Rome
and Athens of the interview on 14 August between the Greek envoy and V/EIZ—
SAECKER.

The Greek Ai-ibassador had denied his countryis implication in the

murder of certain Albanian patriots and e^q^ressed the theory that Italy
desired war with Greece,

VJEIZSAECKER replied:

we rely upon reports coming from our Italian
allies. He was therefore to entertain no hope that
we would publish in our press the Greek version of
events vfhich had taken place, v{e did not believe

that Italy sought to quarrel with Greece,

It woul.d

be more prudent of the Ariibassador to avoid rash use
of the vrord iwart. If he spoke of a conflagration

A

follov/ing in the wake of a Greco-ltalian conf3-ict in

:

the Balicans, the only such event '.hich "we could possi

bly imagine
®f Greece,
been placed
Britain had

rras one which would be to the disadvantage
Tlie popular reliance \rhich had so far
by the G^^ccks and by Turkey in help from
generally proved to be a'snarc and a

delusion,"

(pros, Exh, 366, NG-2339; D. B. 7'-A> P*

• tAi

.!
As

16/17).

In early September 1940, a German military mission was sent to Roui

mania,

IVEIZSAECKER testified Uiat this military mission vras sent at the

request of Marshal Antonescu of Roumania, to afford protection against a

possible Russian invasion of the BDumanian oil fields.

(T* 8035)•

On

14 September I94O t'ffilZSAECra sent to OKW a draft of the service instruc

tions concerning this military mission. Those instructions defined the
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tasks of the German military- mission in Roumania to fulfill the German
guarantee and also afford;

•>

"an effective military protection of the vital in

terests 6f the German Reich in Roumaniao" (pros®
Ihdi® 276, m-3^2U, D. B. 7-A, P.

Ihis military mission vras expanded during the subsenuent course of events
to form the nucleus for German preparations in Roumiania for the attack on

Greece® The members of the mission attached to the German Legation in

Roumania were subject to its political directives® (ibid®, p® U5)^
On 8 October 1940 VJEIZSASGKPR informed Ribbentrop that the Japanese
Ambassador had iiiquirod about the German military mission to Roumania®

ITOIZSAECKER stated that he gave "a harmless and natural reply", (pros.
•Exh® 282, MG-3155. D. B. 7-A, p. 53).

During October 1940 Italian military preparations for the attack upon
Greece wore completed.

On 25 October the German Ambassador to Rome informed

the Foreign Office in a telegram initialed by l®:iZSiVECKSRj that he had
heard from confidential sources that the Italian invasion would start this-

weekend, (pros® Rxh. 268, MG-3034, D. B. 7-A, P. 21)® The folloiving day
I'JEIZSAECKER instructed the German Legation at Athens;
"Request to use the greatest restraint in conversa

tions and particularly when giving advice in matters"

concerning the Greek—Italian relations,"

(ibid, p, 22).

On 27 October 1940 the German ©ubassy at Rome inforr.icd the Foreign Office
in a telegram initialed by lii/EIZSAEClCER, that Italy that evening wUl present an ultimatum to Greece, The enclosed Italian diplomatic note charged
Greece "[vdth aiding England in an unneutral manner and declared that Italian

troops were coming to guarantee the neutrality of •Greece,

The Greek Govern

ment Vfas requested not to offer resistance, (pros, Udi, 269, NG—3085,

Do B. 7-A, p. 23)0 It is to be noted that Italy, in furnishing alleged
justification for its aggressive step, took a loaf out of the German book.

On 28 October 1940 the Italian invasion was launched, (Trial of Hajor
War Criminals, vol. I, P. 211).
In discussing the Italian aggression, V^SIZSAECICER told two conflicting

stories. He stated that a week before the aggression unofficial notice of
Italian intentions came to his attention.

He then immediately forwarded

a protest to Ribbentrop to the effect that Germany coiild not tolerate Italy
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launching this attack.

Ribbentrop indorsed this policyj but the Fuehrer

refused to pass thia admonishment on to Rome, on the basis that he had not

informed Mussolini before the Scandinavian campaign, and thus ho did not
propose to prevent the Ducefs undertaking,

(t« 7S94> 3032, 8034).

On the

other hand, ^l/EIZSAECKER testified that the attack on Greece surprised

Hitler,

(t, 8031/32),

Thus, the significance^of this self-styled poaco c •

Gadcavor^ which in reality was a question of political strategy, at the
y

eleventh hour requires no further comment.

y

Even assuming, arguendo, his

first narrative, this v/as the only peaceful endeavor that he undertook dur-:*
ing the Ballcan preparations.
The Italian military operations met with no success.

In November

Hitler informed Mussolini that the Gorman invasion of Greece could not be
4

J

✓

undertaken before the following March, and, therefore,
"Yugoslavia'must, if at ali possible, be won over by

other means, and in other v/ays,"
Criminals, Vol, 1, p, 211),

(Trial of Major ^/ar

On 7 December 1940 ViEIZSAECKER was informed that despite diplomatic pressure
exerted by the German Minister, the Yugoslav Government refused, cn the
basis that it would constitute a violation of its neutrality, to permit the

transit of 1,000 trucks to Albania through Yugoslavia,

(pros, Exh, 272,

NG-3404, D, B. 7"A, p. 33)n
WEIZSAECKER testified that Germany considered Yugoslavia a irbonevolent
y

neutral" (t, 8034), and he thus implied that it v/a.s quite unnecessary for
the Foreign Office to iinpose pressure upon Yugoslavia to complj'" with Gorman
demands.

However, in fact, Yugoslavia had long boon considered an uncery

'

*

*

tain neutral by Germany, (Trial of Major Wr Criminals, Vol, I, p, 210/211)^
And as the evidence will subsequently reveal, during the vdnter of 1941
continuous diplomatic pressure was exerted on Yugoslavia,

!Vhen the pro-Axis Hungarian Government, on 11 December 1940, ^ve
advance notice of its intention to sign a treaty of friendship with Yugo

slavia, IVEIZSAECKER, on the copy of the telegram vrfiich T;r,s read by Ribbeny

trop, added the handwritten remark:

"Mo particular importance would attach"to this treaty,"
(pros, Eidi. 275, Ml-2658, D. B, 7-4, P. 42).
I'ffilZSAECKER, in his teartimonpv did-not: coiamGnt on this remark.
On 13 December 1940 the Fuehrer issued the directive concerning the
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Operation Marita (the code name for the invasion of Greece),

This plan

provided for the formation of an increasingly largo task forco in southern
Roumania during January; and after favorable v/eather sot in, probably'* in
March, the invasion of Greece was to be launched by way of Bulgaria,

(Trial of Major

Criminals, Vol. I, p. 211).

Within ten days the Foreign Office was informed, and TJEIZSAECKER, on
23 December 1940 initialed a memorandum by Ritter v/hich stated;
"Inclosed please find complete time'schedulc'for

the'first stage of Operation Marita."

(pros. E>ch»

2S2, NG—3155j D# B- 7-A, P» 58)•(underlining supplied).
The inclosed timetable established that the German mission in Roumania vfou^d

be reinforced by shipments of troops through Hungary from 13 to 25 Decembero
Another task force vfas ti^ be assembled in southern Roumania under the command

of Field Marshal List.

Under certain contingencies this force will advance

through Bulgaria to Greece.
flank against Turkey.

The Bulgarian Army v/ill protect the German

The Roumanian Government will be informed by the

German Minister in Roumania, before I5 January, v.hat military units will
arrive,

preparations will be made for the crossing of the Danube.

The

German military timetable ivill be imposed on Hungarian-Roumanian railroads,

and the Foreign Office by corresponding stops vo.ll fully support the chief
of Wehrmacht transportation.

This plan further provided the diplomatic

pretext for the massi ^g of German troops:

"... Inquiries by soviet Russia, which must with cer
tainty be expected can bo ansviered mth the argument
that Germany cannot tolerate a British foothold on
the Balkans and that she is moreover bound in view of
Touraan£^a's adherence to the Tripartite pact to give

the latter country adequate protection."
p. 63). (underlining in original).

(ibid.,

Antonescu had already expressed his agreement to the German Minister in

Bucharest ; and the Bulgarians were to be contacted,

(ibid., p. 5^).

Thus,

before any British forces were in Greece, VffilZSAE'^K^R ivas fully aware that
the Fuehrer had ordered preparations for the attack on Greece. TVEIZSAECKER,

however, in his testimony, adopted the same defense that v/as presented be✓

fore the BIT and rejected.
to 213).

(Trial of Major War Criminals, Vol. I, P. 210

^VEIZSAECKER testified;

"Apart from the fact that there was an alliance bo-

tvroen Germany and Italy, you have to say that the
German invasion in Greece was actually Only carried

out in April 1941, after the Britishers, before that
time, that'is on 3 March 1941j had landed on Greek

soil." (t, 8037).

^2.67-

\'JSIZSjiECKjLR c.lso stated that HitXeris ml-stakG v;as not botiToen December

1940 up to the attack in April 1941? but rather by permitting the Italians
in October to invade areeco; "overjdihing else^ of necessity^ came as a
result".

(Ibido)

(see also:

T.- 7S94)o

Thus, VJEIZS/iEClCH? at least by implication, attempts to justify the
German invasion of Greece as a defensive measure after British troops had
landed on the Greek mainland in March 1941c

This is the very argument pro—

• posed in Operation Marita as above-mentioned, v/hich v/as resolved even before
the British Government sent a fev/ airforce units to the Isle of Crete in

January 1941o

Since no ne^v evidence has been adduced and the BIT? after

careful revievf of all the 'evidence, concluded that the German campaign in

the Ballcans constituted an aggressive war, no further coranient is deemed
necessary^

On the follovdng day, 24 December 1940, I'ffilZSASCKSR instructed the
Gorman Minister, Killingor, at Bratislava, to obtain from the German Arny

Mission there aH necessary information on anticipated troop moveracntse
The Slovak Foreign Miriistor ^vr.s then to bo informed of these planned troop
movements and told that the German milit'^ry authorities vd.ll discuss thC'

details T'.dth the Slovak military authorities t

However, the Slovak Minister

was to be told, "only the absolute necessary minimum"<,

On 25 December the

Gorman Minister at Bratislava informed Vi/EIZSAECKEH that his directive had

been carried out.

(pros, Kxh, 283? NG-3191? D. Be 7-A? P. 65),

On 27 December 1940 '"i/EIZSASCKER was informed by the German Minister to
Hungary that the Hungarians had acquiesced in carrjdng out the increased
German demands for military transportation over Hungarian railways,

(pros.

Exho 273? NG-2541? Do Bf 7-A, P-> 37)" It is to bo noted as pointed out
above, that such action was in accordance vd.th the first stage of Operation

Marita, The Hungarians found it necessary to cancel all passenger trains
for several days in order to meet this demand,

.Vid the reasons given were

"lack of coal and^.^unfavorable weather conditions",

(ibid,, Po 38)c

On 31 December 1940 a telegram sent by the Military Attache and German

I,iinister at Athens, Erbach, to the Foreign Office, and distributed to IVEIZSASCKER, stated:
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t «. There are no signs of a landing or anticipated
landing of Snglish groundforcos at prcvocca or any—
v/horo gIso on the Greek mainlnndo Groiind staff only
has recently been transferred frora •.:hat lia.s been'until

recently the Erilish sain air base at Elcusitras_, to
the Greek West coasto

"The ncT-vs regarding the arrival of largo nuabors of
English motorists is also untrucc
The General staff also emphatically denies in

formation concerning the arrival of English reinforce
ments on the Greek mainland,"

(pros, Exh. 2S4,-.

NG-3190; Dt B, 7-A, P? 68/69)(underlining in original).
On 3 January 1941 the German liinister in Athens^ inquired by tologram
to the Foreign Office v;hother German air corps units in Italy v.'cre to be em

ployed in operations against Greece,

V/EIZSAEGKER^ in a handvYrittcn note to "

Hitter, stated:

"I have no objections to infonning the Legation, but
without granting them permission to make use of this
information to the outside," (proso Bxhr, 2C5j NG-3234^
D, B. 7-A, P, 71).

And in a second remark, VffilZSAECKSH statodj
"German pilots arc of no concern to Greece, as long as

they do not fl^^ over Greek tcrritoryc"

(ibidc)

It is to be noted that VffilZS.'JSCKiiR and A'libassador Rittcr closely cooperated
throughout the diplomatic preparations and kept o:"'ch other fully informed.
In a top-SGcrot telegram on 7 January 1941 to various Gorman missions,
Ribbentrop stated that strong German formations have been trajisportod to

Roumania via Hungary since the beginning of januarjG the pretend; being that
the necessity is seriously being considered of throwing the English completely

out of Groocoa

Reliable information is available on steadily increasing

English troop roLnforcements in Greece,

A marginal note indicates that the

telegram was submitted to YEIZSAECKER for Information,
NG-3l90j

B. 7~A, F= 77)=.

(pros. Exh, 284,

On 9 January the German pini.stor in Athens in

formed the Foreign Office that general reports on the arrival of Gorman troops
n.

in Roumania have caused groat uneasiness,

m-

He stated:

"I herovdth explicitly point out that it is of little
use to argue ia the presence of Greeks or other diplomats
that we havo reliable reports regarding stoa.dxly In-

croasing roxhforcomcnts of English troops of all kinds
in Grcoco, as according to the statements of the GreoK
authorities coticernod and'the observations of all, oven
foreign milit<?.ry attaches, 'Lhe opposite is the caso,ti

(^Ibid,, p, 69) (undcHlning s'uppliodyi
On 8 January 1941 VEIZS/J3CKSR instructed the Gorman !;inister at Bslgrado
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to state that as far as Yugoslavia is concerned^ the ificving of German

troops into Rouniania is "maintly not a military affair, but a political
one'U

If the occasion arises, the previously given assurances that the

Gern'an measures were not directed aga.inst Yugoslavia "raa-y be energetically

confirmed".

»

(Proso Ssh. 28?, NG-3376, D. B. 7-A, P, 75).

At this tine diplomatic pressure was being exerted on Yugoslavia in
order to enlist her cooperation in the aggression ij.gainst Greece or at least
effectively insure her neutrality.

On 9 janua-ry IpA-l •'fEIZSAECKER informed

'Toerraann and Ritter that when the Italian Ambassador inquired about the
talks with Yugoslavia ^IIEIZSAECKER repliedj
"That up to date, taJJcs with Yugoslavia arc just dragg
ing alonga The Yugoslav Government may cone to life if
the general trend in the Balkans can bo observed more
clearly in the future," (pros.Emh. 289- IIG-3373j P- Be
A.

7-A, P. 81) (underlining supplied).
I'JEIZS.IECXSR, on 10 January, informed Ribbontrop that the Gorman-Yugo
slav conference is about to conclude and that a controversy had arisen be

tween the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Office:

"I am of the opinion that a special consideration for
Yugoslavia also in the economic field is unnecessary at
present, and as long as I do not receive other instruc
tions, I shall make decisions in accordance hmth'this

principleT^^

(prbs'.. Exii. 291, NG-3374, D. B. 7-A, P. 85)

(underlining supplied)
WEIZS.YECKER testified that his remark was predicated upon the fact that

political negotiations v/ith Yugoslavia wore proceeding so favorably (t. 8037)|
this testimony does not correspond to the proviouslj^-mentioned exhibit,

dated 9 January (prosc Exh^ 289, supra)«
Throughout, the cooperation betvfeen Ribbontrop and '7EIZSAECKER was
particularly close.

On 15 January 1941 Ribbentrop referred to his tele

phone conversation v;ith "JEIZSAECKER and fcrvvardcd to him the inclosed copy
of a note received from General Antonescu of Roumanis,

Ribbentrop requested

that V'/EIZSAECKBR discuss the contents vrith the compotont officials, in
cluding the defendants Ritter and "!'JoormL\nn.„

Antionoscu stated in this note

that since "in the development of the diplomatic and military events, in

the spring Roumania can become a center of military operations) Roumania
is prepared to collaborate closely with QormanyB"

For this reason, Rou-

manicu joinre the Tripartite pact and is prepared to initiate military opera-170-

tions r,s an ally of Germany if It should boccme hocGssaryc Economically^
Roumania must ImoviT tho strength of German troops and the length of their

stay in order to organize its v.nr economy. It is to bo noted that among
the officials •'.vith viiom VEIZSjIECKER v^as to discuss this note were ''fiehl and
^

✓

Clodius^ of the Foreign Office 13 Econor.'iic Division^ (proso Exh, 294^ NG~3764,
D,

7-A, Po 92),
On 2 January 1941 the defendant Ritter issued c. memDrandun on the ex

pected visit of the prime Minister of Bulgaria®

His hauidwritten marginal

note stated that this memorandum was shown to Vi/EIZSASCEIiE®

Ritter stated

that although there is no intention to confer with the prime 21inister in

detail on military questions;
"It is however necessary to prepare tho ground for tho
necessary military negotiations on tho occasion of the
expected conversation vd.th the Bulgaria.n prime Minister.."

(pros, .Exh, 299^ NG-3144^ D.

7-B; P« 9)v(underlining

supplied)*

Ritter also stated that tho military negotiations with Bulgaria v^ere necessary

at the earliest possible moment to provide for the transit of German troops
through Bulgaria and tho use of the B^ftg-rian Arn^ to protect Germany is
left flenk against Turkey^.

Re also suggests that a representative of the

Foreign Office be a.ttached to List is comrvando

On 15 January 1941 the Foreign Office representative, Rcnzler, was

attached to tho staff of Field Marshal List, Commanding General of the task
force gatherirxg in Southern Roumanis, to insure;
I'that all matters of foreign policy which are connected
with Operationi.rarita remain firjtily in tho hands of'the

Foreign Office(pros® Exh» 295;. NG-3174j

7-A^ P- 111).» .

On 11 January 1941 QIC'/ forwarded to tho Foreign Office, attention

Ritter, additional military orders connected vd.th Operation Merita and dis

closed that Killer approved of General Kcitel -'s suggestion to enbor ixito

negotiations with Bulgaria so that necessary preparations could be ma.de be
fore German troops crossed the Rcanubo into Bulgaria® A handivrxtten marginal
note by Ritter stated tha.t this letter too, was shovai to V®IZSiiECKER and

Ribbontrop®

(pros^ Sxh., 299j NG-3144-

B 7-B:, P->

This further

demonstrates that contrary to his testimonj", I'ffilZSAECKfR v/as kepb fully in

formed,

It may be noted that in almost all exhibits in prosecution Document

Books 7-A and 7-B (Aggression against Greece and Yugoslavia), VJEIZSAIiCKtR is
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either acti-roly participating or kept currently Inforaiod.
It Vv'as VEIZS/tECK!HH v/ho^ on 13 J.'^nuary 1941^ conferred vdth the Bul

garian Prime Minister Braganoff in order to secure the cooperation of
Bulgaria \7hich v/as imperative for the Gorman military plans of invasion^

(pros,

299;, NG-3144;

B= 7 B., P= 19)o

?/EIZSAECKER, on direct examination^ stated that in the absence of

Ribbentrop ho handled this discussion^

He stated that there were tiTO prob- .

lems—the politica.1 problem^ vriiich \7ns his responsibility^ was Bulgaria is
accession to the Tripartite pactj the military problem i7as the ma.rch through
Bulgaria against Greece^

Bulgaria desired to coordinate the political and

military phases in point of timo^ and OKIV too did not desire the conclusion
of the pact prior to the inception of hostilitiesfor that would put Bul
garia in the limelight*

VEIZSAECKER states that v:as the reason v/h^^" he was

informed of the military preparations concerning Bulgaria-o

(To SC38/39)6

Therefore, VEIZSAECKER himself admits the importance of coordinating the

diplomatic activities vdth military planning in order to insure that no ob
stacle was placed in the path of the military operation*

Further, V'JEIZ-

S/iKCKIiR admitted that the problem cf securing Bulgaria is accession to the

Tripartite pact was his a

(To 8038)c

VJEIZSAECK5E, cn 15 January 1941^-. in a telegram to the German Embassy

at Sofia_ reviews the details of his conference on 13 January with the Bul
garian Prime Minister^

During this conversation Bragpnoff mentioned the

pro-English sentiment growing in Yugoslavia and stated that Yugoslavia
should not be pranlarjd Balenikao

The prime Minister further stated that he

vrould join the Tripartite pact if Germany guaranteed that military assis-

ta.nce would arrive, if necessary, vnthin 24 hoursj and he mentioned Bulgaria's
desire for certain Greek territories?

VEiZSAT'GKIiR replied;

"a/.e To these remarks of p.raganoff, I replied verbally
that coneernlng Bulgaria ts territorial aims I was
position 00 infoom. himTtwt oho Geima i Government was in

agrcTomcnt in prxncIple" th}julgarla sTiould rocuTve
access to the Aegean

approximately between the

mouths of the Marica and the Strimia Riverso

Concern-

ing the Three power pact I told Bra.ganof.L that' Bul

garia (crossed out: 'should obcpress -) had to u^r3s_s
rFs unreserved willingness to sign the p'xt at BeF.Lin
at such tiiae as vfo shou.ld see f'LOo

Germany wo'dd

choose the date for the signature at such a ti!;no as •
would enable us'to cope with any possible dovolopinentsg"

fpros^

299j NG-3144, D. B. 7-B7~Fr 2^)y*'(^'der-

lining supplied),
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The prime Minister iridicated his Vfillingness to press for Bulgariats
entering the Tripai-tite pact on this basis.

A ma.rgxnal note on the tele

gram statedj

"It is requested not to discuss under an^ circum
stances the proposa.ls concerning BuJ.garian territor

ial demands mentioned beloWo"

(ibid®, p. 19),

This exhibit establishes conclusively the inter-relation of diplomatic and
military preparations for this invasion*.

Bulgarian acouiescence v/as necess

ary before German troops could-cross her territories to launch the invasion

against Greece^

Bulgarr.an cooperation vias also required for the necessary

mobilization measures that v/ould precede the attack^

rffilZSAECKER secured

this necessary consent by promising, in the name of his Government, that
Bulgaria would receive territorial componsa.tion for this assistance to Ger

many.

4

Further, pi-^garia was induced to join the T*ip"i'tito pact which, as

a political gesture, strengthened GermanyJs hand in Jluropeo
Ritterts account on 15 January in a tclegrajn to the German Embassy at

Sofia of iraZS/iECKER's conference on 13 January with Braganoff, is addi-

tional proof that '®IZS/iECKER, iri his telegrams, reproduced the true facts
rather than color them or deliberately employ Nazi terminology T^iich ex

aggerated the actual situation,

(Pros.

299j IJG-31^+4- Do B» 7-B, 'P-> H)*

On 21 January Bitter submitted to 7GIZ3AECKER infomation received

• from 0?ZJ concerning the strength of German troops in Houmanis.,

Tho Fuehrer

stated that if GGne?\al Antoncscu requests such infomation ho is to be in
formed that over a half million German troops will arrive in Roumania vrnthin

the next few weeks,;

(pros- Exh-, 29S, NG-3765^ D. B® 7-B, Ps ll)i

On 2k January tVEIZSAECK^iR stated that he had just been informed by tolo—
phone bhat the General .staff conferences vrii/h tho Bulgarians had been con—

cludodo

The Bulgarians were cooperative, but expressed concern with regard

to their security, and the.y desire that Bulgaria not be required to join tho
Tripartite pact pricr to the commencement of military operations®

Ritter, on 27 January, in discussing German troop concentrations in
Bulgaria, mentioned the Foreign Office tasks in tho coming weeks:
"During tho next tv/o or three weeks, a number of operations in tho field of foreign policy are to coincide and
harmonize tiwh the miiLitary situation and oporaticnsc

The operations in tho field of foreign policy are as
follov/sj
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Renewal of the Bulgarian-Turkish Non-Aggression
pact.

"2, Signing and publication of BulgariaJs Joining
the Tripartite pact.
"3. A possibly, more concise and formal declaration
of Germany Ts attitude to Turkey.
"4,

German diplomatic attitude to Greece*

"5«

lugoslavia Joining"the Tripartite pact,"

Exh, 300, NG-3097, D. B. 7-B, P. 22),

(pros.

On 4 February Hitter forwarded to Ribbentrop Hitlerrs decision of 31

•

January I'diich superseded the Fuehrerfs decision of 28 January concerning
Bulgaria,

*.

The question still remains unsettled whether German troops are

to enter Bulgaria on 15 or l6 February,

randum on the same day, 4 February,

^

VffilZSAECICSR initialed this memo

The inclosed decision of the Fuohror

cor.-^rning further preparations for Operation Marita in part stated*
'T^oint I;

Intended attack against Greece to take

place at the beginning of April,
"point Us

Entree into Bulgaria to take place at a

date'as late as possible, con^Datible with the above
date.
•

• •

"point Vl!' In order to restrict the theater of

oporationSj non-aggression pacts between BulgariaTurkey and Goriiieny and Bulgaria-Yugoslavia arc to '

bo concludod."

(pros, Exh, 300, NG-3097, D, B. 7-B,

p, 26) (underlining supplied).
p

WEIZSAECKER^ on 12 February 1941j saw the Tuidcish Ambassador

quickly turned the conversation to the concentration of Gorman troops in
Rouraania which was being ^vatched with anxiety by Turkey,

^TEIZSAECKER re

plied*
"I told the Ambassador that the decisions the Reich

Government had taken concerning the safety of the,
Balkans against any threats made by England wore ir
refutable.

"•••

I could hardly imagine that any Turkish general

or statesman could envisage any clash between Gornum

and Turkish"troops and thus bring about'bad liich for

his country." (pros, gxh, 304^ NG-31S6, D. B, 7--B^

*.•

P. 49),
WEIZSAECKER also informed the Turkish Ambassador:

"That we are ivilling, unconditionally, to^respect the

Turkish border in Thrace, both on the basis that

Turkey on her part would not give Germany an occa

sion to intervene by giving armed support," (to Eng
land).

(Ibid., p, 50),

Thus, it is clear that VffilZSjTOKHl was endeavoring to secure the neutraliza-174-

tion of Turkey by placing the blame upon England^ in accordance vd.th the
✓

diplomatic phase of Operation Marita, as mentioned in the previous exhibit*

VJhen \VEIZSj\ECKER gave exanples how during the last year and a half England
often had foresaken her friends and that Germany "was merely safeguarding

the Balkans^ the Turkish .Ambassador replied thot "no British troops were
present in Gneece, so that the whole threatening eventua,lity of a German

advance v/as not given at the moment*" IfVEIZSAECKHR stated that he had con
trary information concerning British troops in Gneocc*

(ibid*).

It is in—

toresting to note that ViEIZSjVECKMj on direct examination, however, testified
that British troops did not land in Greece until March 1941.

(T. 7894).

On 14 February, iVEXZSAECKER informed Ribbentrop that he had issued the
following directive. He had informed the German EJ^bassy in Turkey that

although German infantry had not yet crossed the Danube, supply transports
v7Gro operating, and engineering units had already crossed to prepare the
building of bridges,

VEIZS/iECKER concludes that ydth regard to explana

tions to the Turkish Government, "please let me have further directives if

the occasion requires",

(pros, Exh. 305, NG-3821, D, B. 7-B, P. 51).
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On 14 February 1941 OKW sent

concerning Bulgaria to the

the timetable of Operaticn Marita

Foreign Office# A marginal nrte states

that the document was to be shewn to WEIZSAECKER, and he initialed it#

On 21 February construction of bridges ever the Danube is to begin, and

three days later the crossing will occur# The Bulgarian King is to be

informed that 680,000 troops vdll enter Bulgaria and that there are
innumerable reserves to cope with all political and military developments

in the Balkans#

(Pros# Exh# 303j,NG-3171> D,B# 7-B, P# 46)#

On 15 February the German Ambassador to Bulgaria, Richthofen,

informed the Foreign Office that the Bulgarians requested that the

military acticn not be commenced before 28 February# He referred to the
*

King of Bulgarians proclamation being prepared by the Bulgarian

Government to explain the situation to the people, Rlchthcfon requested

^

instructions whether there were special wishes concerning the qont'^nts
of the proclamation that the Foreign Office desired to have

inccrpcratod, mzS/iEGKERns handwritten marginal n'te opposite this
query stated}

n*l)#

Security measures;

"2),

Against

®3)

$

Britain;

Volunteers#"

(Pros. F:xh# 3581, NG-3874, D.B. 97-A,
P# 211), Underlining supplied).

It is noted in this connection that V7eizsaecker desired to insure tha
the Bulgarian explanation corresponded to the German view#

On 24 February 1941, VffilZSAECKER initialed a mamcranaum by Ritter

'

in which the Bulgarian Minister had informed Ritter that the B g
diplomatic representative in Yugoslavia had been reproached b^ fug
Deputy Foreign Minister because Bulgaria concluded a non-aggres

pact n21 February without including ther countries such as Yugosl
in it# (Bros, Exh# 305, NG-3821, D,B. 7-B, P. 52)#

On 1 March, ijElZSAEGKER informed Ribbentrcp that he h^d
the Russian Ambassadrr that it was British activities in Greec

induced Germany to take the necessary precautions. I/jEIZSAEOKSR
assured the Russian Ambassadfr that German troops would with
- 176 -

tho Balkans once- the British danger vjas averted.

(Pr s. Exh. 3581,

NG-387ii, D.B. 97--&, P. 212). VJEIZSAEGKER^s conduct during this oonversa-

ticn Tiiias part

the Foreign Office policy ^ neutralize all neighboring

countries sc that the military attack on Greece vjould be unhampered,

As ^ill be shown in the succeeding section of this Brief,

bEIZSAECKER, at this tine, knew since the end of December 19A0 that
Operation Barbarossa against Russia was in preparation.
On 9 March 19-^1 tho German Minister tc Bulgaria
Office

informed tho Foreign

in a sealed matter telegram that the Bulgarian Minister to

Germany had incurred tho disapproval of tho
demanding oxcossivo territorial ccncessions

Bulgarian G vernmont by
from Germany.

The

Bulgarian Government dees net wish tc disturb Germany by prrducing tcc farreaching territorial aims and desires tc kn w whether Germrny wants
to recall tho Bulgarian Minister,
informed

Government

On tho fcllcwing day liiEIZSAECKEH

Ribbentrop that he could n:t c-nfirm the Bulgarian

statements concerning their Minister, sincej
"I have never heard him name any territrrial aims

but these approved by us now."
(pros, Bxh, 307,
NG-382'^, D,B. 7-B, F. 55) (Underlining supplied ),
On 18 March VsE'ZS^-iECIOT informed

Ribbentrop that he had seen the

Greek Ambassador who had expressed anxiety about German-Greek relations
and tho fate cf Greecos

"Hov^ever, I could not permit him to continue, net even
in the fcrm 'f a private conversation, such as he
desired, when ho attempted to present matters in such
a light as to imply that tho present unfcrtunate
position of his country had been caused bv tho Italian
cccupaticn cf Albania,

"As I have said, I had tc discontinue this conversation,
as I was of an entirely different rpini-n thrcugh:-ut,

I replied that Greece had mn.do its decisive err^r in
accepting the British guarantee."
(Pr.s, Sxh, 3582, NG-

3169, D. B, 97-A, p. 215).

(Underlining supplied)

In a memorandum on 20 March, ViEIZSi^OKER disci-sod that during this
18 March conferonce with the Greek iirabassad r, the latter attempted to

deliver, in the name f his Gr^vornraent, a n te to VffilZSAECKER f r the
German Gcvernment. UEIZSAECKER refused t. accept this nrte, and the Greek
Ambassador had handed it to Admiral Cnnaris fcr transmission to th
Fuehrer in a suitable manner. General Koitel had refused to p rm'

prcceduro, and turned the n^te ver tc. the Foreign Office, (I •>
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Thus, ViEIZSi*ECKER, in preparing

his remarks cn 20 March concerning

this episcde, was in possession :f the nctc which he had refused.
The n to stated that Greece vvishes t: secure the friendship
of Germany and is fearful .f Gorman preparati-ns in the Balkans.
The first vJcrds

f

the n

te

are as follrwss

"After the Italian attack

(Ibid.,

n our country..."

P. 217)

VvEIZSAEGKER, in recounting the ncte^ statedi
"After reading nc further than the fourth word I

stated that I could n:t accept this n te.

After

the A.mbassadcr had changed it s-mewhat,

I rend

the entire note, but inf rmed the Ambassador that
I ^-bjocted to various points and that

I was not in

a p^sitirn te accept the d-cument," (Pres. Exh.. 3582,
NG-3169, C. B. 97-A, P. 215). (Underlining supplied).
VJhen VaElZSjiECKER, under cr''Ss-oxaminatien, was questicncd ccncorning
this d'cument, ho stated that he, in his

capacity rf Sta.to Secretary

of the Foreign Office, naturally could n-t accept such a n te,
regardless

f

his personal feelings.

The frllcwing ccllcquj^ than

occurred:

"Q.

ibid even after the changes were ma.de, y.u still

refused the whole note. V.bro n t the changes
satisfact ry?

"A.

I d:n*t romomber what means I finally used in -^rder

to accept this d.'cumont, after all, I will have found
sorao diplimatic moans very prrbably t^^ dc so." (T, 9161).

In March 1941 l;'iElZSid::Cl\ER was inf-rned that Yugoslavia finally

would c. nsont to J' in the Tripartite Pact if a gur.rantoo was oxtonaed
that she would not participate in any way :n the war mc that bar
*

demands f-r the Greek tcrrit"ry f Salonika bo given fav roble c-nsidora-

ticn. (Pros. Exh. 312, NG-354.2, D.B. 7-B, P. 69). Germany accepted
those c-.nditiLns (Ibid^ and thus Yug slavia, induced at least m

part by thusQ promises f torrit rial enrichment at the oxpenso •. f
Grooco, n 25 torch y inod the Tripartite pact. On 26 March the
Yugoslavian

Ministers wh" signed this Pact were rom. ved b^^ a cvup

dtotat, and at a c.:nferoncc 'n 27 March at which Ribbontrcp was present,
Hitler announced his declsi n to attack Yug slavia, since she was an

uncertain fact r n t -nly in regard t' the c ntomplatod attack n Greece,

but oven mrre si with regard t the attack up n Russia, which was
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t- bG crnductod later ..n< (Trial f Maj-r bar Criminals, V l. I, i- 212),
IrffllZSiiEGEER testified n direct oxaminati. n that Ribbcntrap had
net infcrmed him f the events f this ornference.., but that he had

learned about it a few hcurs later through devi: us channels. Ho further-

said that n:. diplomatic preparations "nere taken, (T. 80^1, and T. 7895) •
Hcwever, 'h noaorandtim on the follcvjing day, 28 March, by von Rintolen,
stated that upon VJEIZSiiSGlSR's instruct!, ns he had transmitted t: VOhll
the Fuehrer order that ethnic Germans are tc be urged t. flee Yugoslavia

t

to Germany, if necessary via Hungary, in •. rder to evade military

conscription in Yugoslavia. (Pros, xh. 3583, NG-5008, D. B. 97^, P. 219) •
On 30 March 1941 the German Minister to Yugoslavia, Heeron, inf'rmod^
the Foreign Office in a sealed matter telegram initialed by .SIza^CKER
\

that the new Yugoslav Government had as its first .bjoctivo

recognition of the ratification f the Tripartite Fret and desired that
the policy :,f friendship with Germany would bo continued, (Pr s. Exh,

3584, NG-^27, D. B. 97-1., P. 221), VrEIZ3u^0:-im had testified that aue
tc the coup dfetat, Yugoslavia changed ver to the enemy de facto.
(T. 7895).

' i. file n-to by Sonnleithnor tc y-iSIZaiEGI'DR, initialed by him

on 31 March, stated that Ribbontrop roquostod that tho attached

*

telephcne ccnvorsaticn with Count Cian be brought t. the attention
of tho *^intorostod dopartments ^f the F roign Office." Durin._, this
inclcsod tolophcne ct.nvarsation •n 30 March between Ribbontrop and

Diane, a telophono ccnversatien between bEIZSABOKER and ;.mbassad.r
Heoren on 29 March was mentioned,actsRibbontrop
used tho usual catch-w rds
of

that Germany had received news .f^vi lenco against Germans and that the ^
•

situation was being watched m'st carefully, VSIZS^SGI^ER, 'n 31

after the director*s conference, inf rmed a small circle f Preign Off*
officials f this ccrrversatlcn. (Pros, Exh. 3584, WG-4227, D.B. 97-1,
P, 22i).

in a oircula.r telegram n 31 March ..EIZ8.E0I® inf rmed Germa.n

missions that oxcessos against Roich and .thnic Germans in Yug"slavid

continue to take place, (Pr s.

3585, NG-2973, D. B. 97-A, P. 226 ).

It is to bo n-tod that this was the usua.l dipl-rv-tic
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rmula which sor

as "bho prelude tc aggro ssi-H.

On 29 March ^i-armann subndttod a mom^randum to -,,73IZSjiaCi<jSK and
Bibbontrcp stating that tha Yugoslav ^anistor triad to arrange an
appointment mth Ribbontrcp, VffilZaVilOISR, r himself. vrormann

prcsumos ho is nt to bo roooivod, (Pros. Sdi. 316," NG-3319, D.E. 7-B,

• a|

F. 83).

That porti-n f the Prosaoution Brief against tho defendant
VoGsenmayor concerning his activities in Or atia curing this p r'

inc:rp:.ratod by rofcronco and .ado a part horoof,

had kn ^lodgo

of theso activities in Cl.atia, (Pres. Sxh. 3l8, NG-3247, D.B. 7-B,

P. 87? and Pr s. Exh, 325, NG-3126, D. B. 7-3, P. 100),

On AiipriX, \.EI2Si'^CICEE inf itagc: Eibbentr pthat he hex. seon tho
Hungarian ^bassadcr v.h- desired t- inform him f the audience batueen
\r

tho Hungarian Minister and Hitler. Admiral Hrthj desired
olimimte the ral .bligati'.ns contained :.n the recently concluded
Hungsrian-Iug' slav Pact cand thus uanted a. clear-cut Cc.uso

against Yugcslavic such as the doclaratiin f Or ati^.'s indepon'
(Pros. Exh. 322, NG-2693, h. B. 7-B, P. 92). On 5April 1941
Ribbontrcp vjas inf rmed that a mu.bor f the Xug sl^-V Logati
requested an audience. VtEIZSiiEGICER's marginr.l n te states.^
«I request that the gentloraon, ^vh'. are

after, to feign absonco. " (Prrs. Exh. 31'==, I^G-33 ,
D.B. 7-B, P. S3.)

On 6 April 1941 German armies invaded Grooco anu

7;ithcut v^arning. (Trial f Majtr War Orimlna.ls, V. 1. I, B- ^12).
And n 6 April bEIZSiDCKER initialed an OIGV mom rancum vjhich
established that the Fuehrer vr uld pay ff his dipl^m^'^i®
Yugrslavia vJas t' bo partitioned, ancL p:;rtlins

-hrt -ll-.catod t"^ Italy,

Bulgaria, and Hungary, (Pr "s, Exh. 328, HG-30S3, B. B. 7B,

In o.-nolusi^n, it is tc be ntod that 'jEIZSAECjiER oid n, t cnso t
that there uaB any intorna.l resistance by any socrv^t pp
tc thwart tho invasion.
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G. AGGfL:lS.:iON AGAIIIST THJ U3SR
A.

IN-TRCDUCTION

In disregard of tho Non-Aggression Pact with the soviet Union on 23
August 1939^ Hitler^ in the late sumriicr of 194' j ordered the commencement
of the preparations for the attack on Russi.".

On 18 Decombor 1940 the

Fuehrer issued the directive for completion of all propara-tions connected

with Case Barbarossa (the code name for the attack on Russia).

This

contempla.ted aggression aga,inst the USSR v/as ca project long considered by

the Fuehrer to permit Gormany further to expand eastward, according to her
own desire,

A more immediate purpose was the prospect of feeding the

German army from Soviet territory in the third year of the iTar (Trial of

Major I7ar Criminals, Vol. I, PP. 213/215) •
In considering the military and diplomatic preparations for this
aggression, it must bo borne in mind tha.t during the v/lnt'cr of 1941 these
plans were coordinated \Yith the preparations onta.iled in Opcra.tion H<arita.

Hitler Is directive for the la.ttor campaign preceded the military directive
for Operation Barbarossa by only six days (Ibid, P. 211, 213) 5 and the
mobilization of the German army in the Balkans was so prepared as to

provide a substantia.l reservoir of German troops in that region for the
attack upon Russia subsequent to the c-ggression against Greece.

In the preceding section of this Brief it has bcjn established that
the defendant ViSIZS/iRGKER had knowledge of and participated in the

diplomatic preparation for the .attack upon Russia from the paHcan bastion.

As will bo subsequently shov/n, VGIZSAICICER, during his testimony, treated
the preparations for these coupled aggressions as txto complotoly

independent courses of action, both in point of time and subjcct^ms-tter;
however, the evidence has established that the contrary vfas truo,

'•JKIZSARGKiiE not only participo.ted in the Ballc'n phase of the

propara.tions for the Russian invasion,, but also camouflaged the nature of
the operation during his conversations with foreign diplomats. Gcrman^

foreign policy again adopted the pattern employed in prior aggressions*
VJhen Russia voiced her concern over the csxcessivo concentration of troops

in the Balkans, a.nd later in the Government GoJaoral a.roa,, she was r p
ly
assured that Germany would abide by the provisions of the Non-Aggrassion ,
pact. However, on 22 Juno 1941, without any declaration of wax, Germany
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invndGd Soviet territory in cccordenco v/ith tho plcn so long ra£ido (Trio.1 of
✓

Jicjor "fr.r Crininnls, Vol.

•

B.

P. 214).

SUiii/vPi OF nVIDI3-:C3

Cm 21 goptcmber l?40j Adnira,! Bucricner of OICI submr tod to VHIIZSAIICKSR
a mGnorandum of 20 Scptonibcr signed ,by Gonoral Kcitol vrhich contained the
Fuehrerts decision in tho question of a military mission to Roumania-

In

this memorandum the real purpose for sending the German mission rras disclosed:
«

"The real tasks, vrhich noitilor Roumr.nia nor our o\ni troops

*

must bo allowed to pcrcoivo, cro (a) to protect the oil-fiold?
against attack by a thii^i p'owor and destruction^

(b)
./

to rondor the Rourm^.nirn rrn^d forces crprble of carrying

out certain tasks in accordance rith a rigid plan developed
in favor of German interests;

(c)

to prepare for the emplo^'ment of GQrr.ia.n and Roumanian

troops from Roumajiir in the event of a v;af vritli Soviet Russia

being forced Upon us."

^ros, Itdi. 333^

D.B. 82-^ p. 9) •

(Undorliniiig supplied) •Thus, "ntZSAfCIClR vfas made officially awr.re at this early date that tho
Fuehrer vras considorin

21 SeptembEjr,

the possibility of v/ar with Russia,

cm tho same day,

'.T3I2Si'iIC:CRj in his capacity "as deputy", referred to

Keitel's letter and requested an early opinion on the draft of the list of

service instructions (pros. ~pdi, 276, NG-3S2Z|., D.B. 7-Aj P» ^f4.) that he
forv'/axded to Keitel on 14 September. (iCbid., P. H)#
As mentioned in tho preceding section, the Fuehrer, on 12 November
f

1940, signed a prepavratory directive for Operation Narita against Greece.
«

In this directive it was announced that political discussions with the

USSR had been, initiated to claj:*ify tho Russian attitude; however, irrespective

of the results, .".11 prepr.ra.tions which have been-verbally ordGred for the

ca,mpaign in the Bast will bo continued. (Pros. Bxh. 339^ PS'-'444^ D.B» 8-A^
/

P« 30), This further demonstrates tho inter-rolation of the preparations
against Greece and Russia.

On 13 Deceaibor 1940 the directive for operation Ilarita ivas issued by

the Fuehrer. (Trial of Uajor 'Jar Critiiinals, Vol. X,- P. 2U).

Five days later Hitlor signed the directive for operation Barbarossa on IS,
December, which provided;" "The GOTinc.n. armed forces must bo prepared to
crush Soviet Russia in a quick cairpaign before the end of the war against
Sngland." it was further provided that it would bo tho task of the torman
forces concentrated in Roumania to pin down Russia v/ith the cooperation
I
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of Rourop.nia.

(pros,

^•dZSAXK:3l

3A1^ 'PS-'kh^, D.B. S-A, P, 35).

tostifiod that only a fcvr days Irtor^ "tovrgrd Christmas"

he was informed, by a militar"* circle contact, of Hitler is intention to

wage v.'ar against the USSR. (T. 7^96).

Ho stated that ho was, ho^./over, not

informed officially until late sp^r'ing 19A1 '"-nd thus had to depend on his

private channels for nev/s of the military operation. (T. COii.6); he later
testified that he also hoard of the grov;ing strength of German troops in
houmania (t. 8049).
Thus, it is clear that during his testimony concerning the prepare—

tions for the Russian aggression he desired the Tribunal to forgot the

active role he was simultaneously taking in the diplomatic preparations for

the attack on Greece.

The preceding section disclosed the close coordination

between the military agencies and the Foreign Office during this period,
.and also established that 'TTIZSXXK^i vrorkod in the- closest cooperation v/ith

Ribbentrop and Ritter.

Further, he was continually and regularly infoimed

through offic al channels of nil military directives; ^nd in paving the way
/

diplomatically for German mobilization measures in the BaHcan <area, he vfas

fully aware that Germr.n troops wore sent there in sufficiently large numbers

to launch the aggression against Groeco and still maintain a reserve f«;r the
subseo^uent attack on the USSR'

This becomes obvious riien we learn by his

o\m admission that at about the time he initialed Operation llarita for the

first time qn 23 December 1940 (pros. Bxh. 282, HG—3155^ D.B. 7—Aj F- 58),
he knew of Hitloris decision to attack Russia.

PfEIZS^'XCKZB testified that ho devoted his private endeavors to the

halting of this invasion, ~Ho stated that w/ion the Japanese Foreign
Minister Matsuoka visited Berlin, ho did noi grasp the danger of a

Russian vrar; V/EIZSAACKZR.^ however,, convoyed to him during 'n official
luncheon one of his trcH-knoim "hints", (t. 7899).

In this connection it must bo noted that during this very p'-riod
:jf:XZSA3CK3R was feverishly engaged in preparations for the operation
r

against Greece; and he does not testify that he convoyod any hint c.bout
aggression. Moreover, "TDlZSADCICSR admitted familiarity i-mth the so^-led
✓

matter telegrams sent to all Gorman missions on 23 February 19U by
Ribbentrop. (T. 8050, and Pros,

343^ PS-1834, D.B. &-A, P.
- i83 -

This telegrpja rGver.lod that the Foreign llinister, in his conversation

T/ith the Japanese /jiibassador, Oshlma, on 23 February stated that Hitler
had concluded the pact Td.th Russia in order to avoid a tv^o-front vfar. He
also said that the situation in the East is being observed closely, and if z

German—Russian conflict ensues, it vfill result in the. destruction of the

Soviet regime, (ibid.)
.

On 24 liarch 1941 ' HiIZS/illCKIiE informed Ribbentrop that with regard to

the notes pertaining to the visit of Hatsuoka:
"I have the follovring comment to make;

"(1)

The most important subject naturally is"the time of

Japan's entering into the v;ar against England.. ••

'1(2) Katsudka is still pursuing a policy of understanding
with Russia, and refers to a Gorman cncouragoncnt as to
this policy. In order to save him'from siu'prises and to

continue to influence, through him, after his Europe trip, the
Japanese policy, it is unavoidable to fiiakc it clc^r to him
how o' r'relations'with Russia, might develop." (pros. Exh. 34S,
NG-3S25, D.B. S-B, ?• 5)«

Underlining da origina.l).

Assuming that '.TKIZSAECICISR conveyed some vague hint, in no wise was any proof

adduced that Japan, long the mortal enemy of Russia, would attenpt to
persuade Gorma.ny to cancel its attack on the USSR.

Horeover, even

further assuming arguondo that Jap-n adopted such a policy, there is no
indication that Germany would hoed such o-dvice.

The Soviet Governraont boc.ame increasingly alarmed as German troop

concentrations in the Balkans grew over larger.

't

On 1 liarch 1941, 'GIZSjiRCKER

informed Ribbentrop that ho had summoned the Russian Amloassador and assured
him that British plans in Greece had induced Germany to take tho necessary
precautions. •TZIZS/JXICER further assured the Russian Ambassador that;

"... bur troops would vfithdraw from the Ballcans once the
British danger vras averted, of which fact tlie Soviet

Govefriraont vras previously informed in January." (pros. Exh.
3581, KG-3874, D.B. 97-A, P. 212).

such assurances were deliberately given in an attempt to disguise, for as
long as possible, Gcrma-n intentions tbVfard the USSR. Roforonce is again

made to the evidence presented in the preceding section which established
ft'

'.rBXZS.'LECKERis participation in the policy of giving tho measures of
mobilization in the Balkans an anti-English character during the winter of
1941 in order to allay Russian suspicions.
✓
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In the Fuehrer conference on 27 Mnrch 1941^ ^-t Trh:-ch Hitler

announced his decision to ettack Yugoslavia

Operation Barbarossa was

postnoned, of necessity^ from its original date of 15 lY-y for an
additional four weeks.

Hitler had also stated then that Yugoslavia was an

uncertain factor in regard to Operation l.iarita, and oven laore so in

regard to the contemiplatcd attack later on against Russia, (pros, IPcc, 302^
PS~1746^ d.b. S-b, p. 6),

shortly after the invasion of Greece a.nd Yugoslavia began the

p.

Fuehrer appointed Roichsloiter Rosenborg on 19 April 1941
as Coinmissioncr for the central control of questions connected v/xth the
✓

^

Soviet territories to be occi:5)ied, (pros. Exh, 366^ PS-S65j D.B. o-B^^P« i3)
Rosenborg, ^ri,th the assistance of various Reich supremo Agencies,
designed the framov/ork of the future political and economic organizations
*

of Russia and filed a detailed report immediately aitor the ^vasxon,

(Trial of Major ^far Criminals, Vol. I, P. 212). This report, dated 28

June 1911, revealed that Senior Legation Councillor Grosskopf vms -ppointed
by Puibbentrop as permanent liaison to Rosenborg, and Consul General
Braoutigam was released by the Foreign Office to servo in Eosenberg*s

^

political departj'.iont of this Commission, The report further mentioned

"f

that negotiations with the Foreign Office vrare under vaay in I'-g^-rd
wish for the assignment of diplomatic roprcsuntativcs to the future Re

Commissioners,

coordination v;ith the Foreign Office reprcs..no.-biv

propaganda questions had boon effected. Further, an ethnologic 1 P
the East, the basis for the eventual fixing of boundaries of the
Reich Commissariats, v/as issued to all offices,

(Pros, .2^^ •

367, p.s-1039^

D.B, t —B, p, 64).

This exliibit established that the Foreign Ofii^o cooperat
v.ith Rosenberg in the necessary preparatory vrork for the Russi

aggression, VEIZ^iECKEE testified that since ho had laio\rl^dge
oj^poscd the contemplated invasion, it was unnocossary for hin to discuss

this oxliibit, (t. 8059).
defense.

This rem"rk typifies

' vi'-n3ts unioue

During his testimony he based his defense on

illegod but

unsuccessful attempts to maintain peacoj consequently^ he deemed it

unnecessary to give in detail any account of v.b.at ho a.c busily
his capacity as state socretax^y.
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on 5 May 1941 Grosskopf, Foreign Office liaison to Rosenberg,

submitted, at V-niZSAlCKSRt 3 rco_uost, to VJlIZSAjXKIiE, a copy of the

directive, the opi^ina,! of vfhich v/as in Ribbentropis hands, concerning
the organization of the Foreign Office is Russia Gommiutce, The directive
stated:

"The Committee for the problerap of thp Sovact Union has been

fully established. If ordered to do so, it ca.n convene at
any time''inside of p few days." (pros, lii, 353? MG—142,
D.B. 8-B, p. IS).

The directive also named the personnel of the Committoe, including Consul

C-eneral Braeutigam.

vniZSAECICER contended that this Committee never met,

since Rosenberg alone V7<as campctent for Eastern ouostions.

Hov/cvcr, the

aforesaid Rosenberg report (Pros. SkIi, 36?, PS—1'39^ D#B, S—B, P- d4)
established that the Foreign Office cooperated closely vd.th his agency.
On 22 May 1941 Grosskopf submitted to Ribbontr^-p, via 'J'MIZSAECKER^ ^

memorandum listing by name the proposed representatives of the Foreign
Office in the Reich Commissariats which jTiay bo created in the East,
VJEIZS/uHCIdlR initialed this memorandum vrliich in part stc'ted:

"It might be profitable to assign prospective heads of
the various agaucios to the cornma.nds of the rrjfiy groups

at the beginning of the putsch toward the.East, as repre

^

sentatives of the Foreign Office." (pros, 'fjch, 35^6, NG—

4755j B-B. 97-A, P. 230),

The previously mentioned Rosenberg -report of 28 June 19/^ had mentioned

these proposed Foreign Office representatives,

Furth3y an inspection of the

places where Foreign Office representatives wore to be located reveals
*

^

that VfEIZSAECKER, through official channels, was fully informed of the

proposed method of partitioning the Soviet Union,
prosecution

(Ibid, pp. 228/230),

vd-tnoss pa, Braeutigam, in his tcstlr-iony, confirmed

ma,ny features of the Rosenberg report (t« 1012/1024); and no crossexamination was conducted by the Dcfcnso,

Braeutigam, one of the poroign

Office specialists on Russia, was transferred to Rosenborg is Commission

on about 20 May 1941 with the approval of the Foreign l.iinister. On 21 May

ho reported, per Instructions, to 'TEIZSA'XKER, who approved of his

assigni-.ient, since he felt that an official of the Foreign Office experienced
in Eastern affairs would be able to influence the activity of Rosenbergis

ngoncy. VffllZSA-SCKEa further stated that he would do cvor^d-hing possible
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to see that sthor experienced officials of the Foreign Office vrore also

assigned to Rogenborg,

In poncludingj TEIZSA3ClCm requested that

Braeutiga.-n keep him informed of v;hat was taking place (T» 1017) •

The witness fupthor stated that Ribbentrop later had a quarrel with
Rosenberg and th)is would pot permit further transfers of personnels
Ribbentrop also ordered that only those Foreign Office conniunications

signed by T/5IZSA3CiGIR were to be sent to RosenbergTs agency, (T. 1018)•
The witness, during the course of his work, handled maps which
indicated the various Reich Commissariats v/hich wore to be created in Russia

after its conquest* Since the state secretary had asked to be kept posted on
affairs, Braeutigam, at the end of Hay, brought these naps to "rsiZS/iliOKMl#
/

The latter exajTiinod the maps vory carefully* (T« 1020),

'T^IZSAECIdl

then directed Braeutlgan to report the same to "Toormcnn, vrhich he did.

(T- 1020/1021), Braoutigamts testimony further "demonstrates VnilIZSABCTCER*s
participation in the preparatorj'' work of the Foreign Office prior to the
invasion.

Between 26 l.Try and 23 June 1941, '.r:iZSA'XK:3l rcocivcd a series of

top secret reports dea.ling with the internal situation in Russia. These

lengthy reports originated from the pra.gue liaison official of the German

Foreign "Offlee Information Office HI, and were submitted directly to
(Pros, Exh, 361, NG-3778,. D. B, S-B, P, 4.2 ot. seq.)

""EIZSABCKER* / These reports, all of v/hich ^TEIZSAICKH^ initialed, contained
complete analyses of the political situation vj-ithin Russia.

However,

YiDIZSAiilCKSR, during his examina.tion, dismissed these reports with the state—
ment that he never road them, because they would havo been a waste of his
valuable time, (t» 8057)*

V/EIZoA3CKAR, on 17 May 1941, informed Ribbontrop of his conversation
• with /jnbassador Qshima, V/hen questioned vdiothor relajcations had occurred in
✓

I?' •

German-Russi-n relations, VEIZSAaOKER-replied that tlioy ''were unchanged."
(pros, Exh, 355, NG-4194, D.B. ^-B, P. 27). ^HIZSAtIJAER testified that since
he had previously hinted to Oshima tha.t Germany intend'-^d to ...ttack

Russia, his remark that "conditions were unchanged"^indicated to Qshiraa
thfit Germany still intended to a.ttack, '7EIZSA.ECK1R, hovfcvor, in this
instance too,confusod his cloudy testimony, for he had previously alleged
that ho had given this hint to ?,Iatsuoka, (T. 7899)»
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*

v'JEIZSAliX5KI3l^ in his mcniorandum on 17

• -rn»"

stated that he informed

jjiibassador Oshinia;
"I r.nsv;orod that the GQnman-Russion relations wore un

changed, ^7e vrcro ivrtching Russia carefully. It v/as well'
known that the Russians wore advancing along our frontior*
It vic.s nn.tural that v;o had ajis\7ered by sending Gernan troops
to the East, V/e wore not pleased with evcr2d>hing the

Russians had boon doing those last months. Hov/ever, I would
not'say that'a state of itensioni existed,"
(~ros« Exh.

355? NG-4194? D.B. 8-B? P, 27).

(underlining supplied).

This was fully in accordance vaLth the long-established German policy of
not rovea.ling their intentions oven to their "llies until the la,st momont.

It was only on 22 August 1939 that 'TEIZSAEGKER informed .'.mbassador Oshima

that the Non-Aggression Pact v;ith Russia was to bo signed by Germany, (pros.

•

Exh. 3566, ng-5641, D.B. 97-A, F. 176).
VJEIZSAECKER also informed Ribbontrop in the same memorandum that

»

the Russian subject is being widely discussed in diplomatic circles ? ani that

in reply to a recent ino^uiry by the Swedish /jnbassador (one of his character

'

affiants) he said:
"••• that it v7ould depend on staLints a.ttitudc'how things

would g6 on between Germrny and Russia," (pros, Exhi 355?

i

NG-4194? D, B, B~B? P. 27).

(Underlining supplied),

On 24 I.iay 1941? VJEIZSAECKSR initialed a sealed matter telegram

sent by gchulenberg, German Iiinister to Hoscow, to the Foreign Office.
He reported that the Russian leaders were doing everything possible to

a.void a conflict with Germany^ all means were being adopted to insure that
Germany is not antagonized^

The conduct of the Soviet press is

✓

*

irreproachable? and the econornic agreements are being punctually fulfilled,
✓

^

(pros* Exh. 358, NO-4195? D,B, B-b? P. 33). This report is clearly in
contrast to UEIZSAECKER's statements to foreign diplomats.
During June 1941 Gorman tarmies massed in the Gevornmont General?
✓

^East Prussia, and the Bali-cans for the impending attack. On 18 Juno
V/EIZSABCKER was informed by von Grote, poL I-H? that OI?f had ordered thcat
P.11 members of the German a,rmed forces who possessed Russian nationality
inconspicuously removed from the front line (pros. EXh. 342, NG-L191?
-

D.B.

^

8-A? p. 47)5 and on 20 June vnnzSA.'iGKIiR v/as informed by KramarZj POL I-^{,

that German air force units met with heavy anti-aircraft fire ifl^ile
conducting air reconnaissance near the Russian border (pros, Exh. 3^4;

NG-4218, D. B, 8~B, p. 59).

Tho eve of the aggression had davffied,
-
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At 9:30 p.m. on 21 Juno 19U VEEZSAI^CKJSR received the Russian
/mbassador, who had attoimjted to see Ribbcntrop and instead had been referr@d to vra~ZSAZCK3i.

The Russian .'jnbassador handed '"CIZSAECKHR a note

complaining.of constant border violations of Soviet territory by over
260 flights of German aircraft.

V/AIZSAIiSKER replied;

"... I did not wish to anticipate the Gorman're-.ly. 'I
should'liko to say only'this much in advance, namely,

that I, on the contrary, had boon informed of vrholesale
border violations by Soviet aircraft over Gorman territory;
i t vfas therefore the German and not the Russian Government that
had cause for complaint.

I'

V

•'«

>k

"yhen Herr'Dclcinosov (the-Soviet Ambassador) tried to prolong

the convorsa.tion somevrhat, I told him tha,t since I ha.d an

entirely different opinion than ho and ha.d to avc.it the
opinion of ny Government, it would be better not to go more
deeply into the matter just now,' The reply would be'forth
coming later." (Pros, Axh. 3587, MG-56AO, D.B. 97-A, P. 231).

(Underlining supplied)
The following question was asked during cr-ss—exa.mination concerning this
exhibit:

"Q. At the tif^io you stated this reply vrould bo forthcoming
later, yoti know that the only reply would bo the invasion
of Russia, didntt you?
Absolutely correct,"
f

A

(T. 9175)
C.

DEFUSE

In this aggression too V/EIZSAECKER

testified that of course he

favored the maintenance of peace with Russia, During his testimony

he continually twisted events and interpreted documents so that regardless
of vfhat wont into the mill the finely ground product that emerged fitted
his specifications.

The follov;ing testimony of '.niZSAECAER is cited to

exemplify his swooping interpretation of facts:

"I rather liked Dckanosov (the soviet Ambassador), but I
could not talk with him as I did with Nevi3Llo Henderson,

for instance.

The unfavorable feature wa.s, amongst others,

that vj"c had no language in common in which V70 co\^d
converse vdthout an interpreter.

campaign could not be nrevented."

Thus, the Russian

(T.

^ ^

(underlinxng

supplied).

On 28 April 19A1 IJEIZSIECKER ivrotc to Ribbcntrop objecting against
an invasion of the USSR; he stated such an action vfould prolong the
war. (-7g1z. Rxh, 156, doc. No, 227, 'leia. D.B. 1-E, P- 92).
✓

✓

V/EXZSAECKER, in his testimony, implied that ho v/as motivated purely by
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'

f: : '

humanitarian reasons in his dosiro to halt the exp' nsion of tho conflict,

Ribbentrop disregarded "this political vmrning." (T. 7901)•
It is true that ''HilxzSATilCKIilR did not favor the invasiof; of tho
'

.

f

"SSR^ but this attitude was predicated upon purely political^ and not
humanitarian, considerations.

Ho stated in this mcnorandum;

"But I bclicve'that vfo would be victors ovcr'Russia only in a
military sonso^ and would, on the other hand, lose in an
economic sense.
A~\

But tho sole decisive'factor is whether this project vail
hasten tho fall of England,

(a)

England is close to'collapse,

Hope inRussia is not

postponing England*s collapse,

^

"A German attack on Russio would only give tho British new moral

strength.

V',-

It v/ould be interpreted there as Gorman imcertainty

as to the success of our fight ag'^inst "]ngl''nd, v/o would

thereby not only be admitting that tho war v/as going to^
last a long time yet, but v-rc might actually prolong it in this

way, "instead of shortening'it,"

Vifeiz, D-B, 1-E, PP, 92/93)

(V/eiz, Ipch, 15o, Doc, No, 22",

The following analysis ifill demonstrate that '7EIZ3/XG"ER*s objection was

, purely a question of political strategy and submitted only in the best
interests of Germany,

It is to be noted that this report was submitted "since the Reich

Foreign Minister wanted it within the shortest possible time," (Jbid,, P, 93)
Ribbentrop certainly v;ould not have reouosted V/EIZSAlCKER's supporting
argument unless he himself at this time \vas uncertain of the
advisability of this aggressive step.

This conclusion is confirmed by tho testimony of one of

\7EIZSAECKERis own affiants, Dr. schnurro., who v/as the Foreign Office

/

official in charge of economic relations with the Soviet Union,

He testified that in January 19A1 he firmly desired Gcrmanyts victory^

and he believed that the large .amount of economic aid being supplied to

Germany by Russia would appreciably shorten the ^va.r. Ho felt that tho
contemplated attack on Russia would be madness since it would deprive
Germany of this vital economic assistance, (t. 19202/03), And it was
Ribbentrop who, in January 1941, instructed schnurro to

-

arguments to Hitler, in order to cancel the preparations for the inva.sion/
'•JEIZSAHCKER himself stated; "I considered^ that the idea of waging
war on Russia was absolutely crazy,"

(T. 7S97)»
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;

s*"

^'f3IZS/f5GKl!R's

testimony reveals that he iTa.s net shocked at

the thought of Germany launching yet another aggr^sion and inflicting
untold privations upon the inhabitants of Russia* Lilce aJjaost all
prominent Nazi loaders he feared that the extension of the v/ar to Russia
would in nowise promote the defeat of England (as he stated in his

memorandum). Further, the opening of a second front and making an
enemy of the USSR might well result in the ultimate defeat of Germany. He
^

testified that he strongly opposed Hitlerts belief "that the Russian
campaign would take six weeks."

(T# 7896).

He also stated that his memorandum vms another cxarplo of his

f

"very often mentioned double—talk"and that it did not mirror his inner

humanitarian feelings. (T. 79C1). Yet he testified that not one official in
'

the Foreign Office advocated this war. (T« 7900)«>

He admitted, on cross-examination, that at this timo Hitler»s armies
vrcre unbeaten in the field, that Russia was providing a groat deal of

economic assistance, and that Hermann Goering and r.ia.ny of the generals

opposed this two-front war on technical, military, and economic grounds,
"i

'

(T- 9074). Thus, it is quite apparent that the great rajcrity of German
leaders in almost every field of activity believed that the attack on Russia

^

would bo folly. However, when the Fuehrer ordered the attack, they
participated. As the foregoing summary of cvidoncc reveals, aEIZS/JilCKER too
participated in the diplomatic preparations despite his condemnation of the
attack as a grave political

error.

Assuming for a moment that •.nciZ-AEGKERTs inner feelings wore as

alleged, then several imponderables result. He had laiowlodge of Operation
Barbarossa since Christmas 1940; yet it was only at the end of April 1941
that he expressed his objections, VJhy did he wait those many months. At
this late stage in the preparations it v/as most unlikely that the Fuehrer
could be dissuadodj German troops wore already massed in the Balkans. F
ther, from January until April 1941 he actively participated in the pre
parations for the invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia. If his objections

were,based upon humanitarian motives, why did he not soo fit to object.to
this aggressive act, which was being simultaneously prepared? Thct
✓

question too remains unanswered.
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He -contends thnt his statement that England should bo destroj^d first

was another :hxa^ple of his double-talk policy. Yet,; on 14 October 1941^
a,§ German armies victoriously plunged deeper into Russia^ he directed hig

resistance wiiiness yon Etsdprf^ tq deliver

manuscript of pne of l^VEIZ-

SAECKPRfs'lept^rfS; bgfore ^ selept audience of jurists, officials, and
officers, to General Holder, Chief of the General staff and an intermittent
,

resistance leader*

He instructed von Etzdorf particularly to point out the

foUowing passage;
"Even toda.y it is safe to assume that a victorious
Britain would treat us without mercy if she wore in
a position to do so, if vfe weaken and release our
stranglehold on her too early, then vje a.ro lost.
Then the slogan would no longer bo; the destruction

of Hi-tler-Gcrmany but the destruction of Germany •
herself. But the prerequisite for negotiations
with Britain at any time is that our jnilita.ry povfer

must remain intact«>" (pros, E^h* 36IO, NG~2719,>
D* B. 97-C^ ?• 38) (underlining supplied),
VtfElZSAECKER was of course a^vare that Hitleris policies would never

alter*

He knew that Hitler would never abandon his path of conquest and he

also knew the untold misery and suffering that existed as a result of

a

Hitleris criminal policies in adJ. the territories occupied by Germany. Tet,
even in discussing his objections to the Russian canpaign he revealed his
single-minded Nutionafism;
"But I did not desire the defeat of Germaiay in

order to do away with Hitler("f* 7900).
^

4

Three of the major HAT defendants, charged vdth participation in the

aggression against the U.S.S.R., posed this defense*
The IMT, in its opinion, held that even if Goering opposed the invasion

as he alleged, "it is clear that he did so only for strategic reasons*"

(Trial of Major War Criminals, Vol. 1, p* 280), Koitel testified that for
military.reasons he opposed the invasion, and also beco.use it would consti
tute a violation of the Hon-Aggrossion pact,
"tho HiT found that
despite ar^ inner reluctance he actively participated in the military prepara
tions* (ibid., p. 289)., .
✓

'

WEIZSAEGKERig long-time friend and fellow officer, Admiral Raeder,

presented a similar defense,. The HAT, in discussing it, found;
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iiRaeder endeavored to dissuade Hitler from embarking
upon the invasion of the USSR# In September 1940 he
urged on Hitler an aggressive Mediterranean policy as
an alternative to an attack on Russia,

On 14 No

vember 1940 he urged the war against sngiand fas our

m

main cnemyt and "that submarine and naval airforce
construction be continued.

He voiced tserious ob—

jections against the Russian campaign before" the defeat
of"England I, according to notes of the Qcrmaig Naval

War staff#

1 .

He claims' his objections vrore based on

w"

the violation of the Non-/iggression pact as well as
stra.tegy. But once the decision had boon ma-de, he

gave permission six days before the invasion of the

\

soviet Union to attack Russian submarines in the

i

Baltic sea within a specified v/erning area and defends
this action because these submarines v;erc rsnoopingt

on German activities#" (ibid#, ?# 3l6).
Wg submit that it has been conclusively established that V/EIZSAECKER^s

motivation^ and his concomitant participation in the preparations, afford
a striking parallel#

Raeder was found guilty of the commission of Crimes

against peace#

/

, \
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